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Preface

Ideas matter. They are the filter through which people see, organize, interpret,
and attempt to change the world. Economic theories, concepts, views, and
proposals dominate contemporary public debate over traditional political questions about the meaning and content of the good society and state. Economic
issues have always been central to liberalism; indeed, some authors attempt
to define liberalism almost exclusively in economic terms. This book examines
several such authors. It explicates the political ideas, values, policy prescriptions, and interrelation of politics and economics among conservative economists, emphasizing James Buchanan, Milton Friedman, and Friedrich A. Hayek,
with occasional reference to George Gilder, Ludwig von Mises, George J. Stigler, and others sharing similar views on the operation of the market and its
relation to politics. These authors-four of whom have won the Nobel Prize
in economics-provide intellectual justification for returning to a laissez-faire
state, offering support and policy advice for conservative governments in the
United States, Britain and elsewhere. The conservative economists present a
coherent repudiation of the liberal-democratic welfare, regulatory and interventionist state. Their economic reasoning and policy preferences encourage
them to redefine and narrow such political values as democracy, freedom,
equality, and justice, reducing popular participation and both the moral and
empirical bases for active government.
This book examines the normative political ideas of conservative economists;
their definition, justification, and interpretation; and some of the policies that
follow from them. It explores the interrelation of political science, economics,
and philosophy to bring out the values and assumptions of a significant group
of economists, each of whom aspires to influence public policy. Conservative
economists have had an enormous impact, but there has been little analysis
of their political assumptions, ideas, and proposals. They advocate versions
of popular American values, especially in their politically oriented writing, but
they attempt to monopolize how these values are defined and applied. Based
on their economic model, these theorists claim that their interpretations of
Vll
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such fundamental political ideals as democracy or freedom are the only legitimate ones for modern liberal democracies. This claim is highly suspect. Words
have multiple meanings, and sharing and using the same word, formal value,
or principle means nothing until we sort out incompatible meanings and applications, obstacles to the implementation of principles, and opinions about
policies that fulfill these principles. People often interpret familiar ideas in new
and unique ways, so changing their meaning and application that they gain
new substance and advance policies fundamentally different from those supported by another interpretation or set of assumptions. For example, we may
all value freedom but strenuously disagree over its meaning. Agreeing that we
advocate freedom, or any other value such as individualism, equality, or justice, is the beginning of discussion, not its end. There is no way of knowing
what any value means until one knows the circumstances under which a person can and may practice it, acceptable manifestations of the value, obstacles
to it, and so forth. Disagreements over these questions amount to qualitative
difference~ in values and ideologies.
In the same way that one can analyze the political ideas of an Augustine,
Martin Luther, John Calvin, or Reinhold Niebuhr without writing a book
on theology, it is possible to write about economists' politics without writing
an economics text. Conservative -political economy can best be understood
within the context of other interpretations of fundamental political values.
Therefore I occasionally contrast past and present theorists and their arguments with the conservative economists and their arguments. In doing this,
I am not commenting on the validity or invalidity, usefulness or lack of usefulness of their economic theories, even though I may have strong opinions
about them. I am not concerned whether their economics preceded their political theory and philosophy or their political philosophy is the basis for their
economics. But it is important that the conservatives' politics and philosophy
support their economics and that there is nothing in their political theory
which calls their economics into question. For this reason, I emphasize political writing and those shared assumptions and predispositions that are relevant to the conservative economists' political concepts and policy proposals,
not each author's purely economic work. I am concerned more with understanding their rarely studied political theory, and what they are attempting to
say to our contemporary world, than with criticizing it.
Conservative economic arguments provide a powerful belief system in the
conflict for the soul of modern liberal-democratic government: what will it
do, to whom will it resond, what will be its future constitutional structure,
who will benefit from what kind of policy, what do citizens-if the word has
meaning-owe one to another, what is the good liberal-democratic society.
These are political and moral questions. Though they have an economic com-
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ponent, they extend far beyond the confines of economic theory. Economists
may therefore find parts of this book confusing, dealing with familiar ideas in
a different and threatening manner. Political scientists may find parts to be obvious. Perhaps this is inevitable when talking to both groups simultaneously.
However, it is economists who will find most that is new or different. They
may not recognize all of the assumptions discussed or may claim there is no
such thing as natural law or theories of justice in economic theorizing. I agree,
if one looks only at words, not their meaning. Conservative theories contain
the functional equivalent of these and many other normative political ideas,
and it is that which concerns me as a political theorist.
Several people have urged me to make a statement of my political beliefs.
I became interested in the conservative economists when I was asked to review
one ofJames Buchanan's books. I am a liberal, of the reform variety, meaning
that I believe that there are many obstacles to realization of fundamental values;
that under some circumstances government may be an obstacle to realization
of basic values and under others it may be a necessary means to removal of
obstacles; that there are few easy answers; that freedom, equality, individualism, democracy, participation, and tolerance are expansive concepts; and that,
when circumstances change, modifications of policy are necessary to protect
fundamental principles. Some readers may also detect echoes of Burke in some
of my comments. They will not be wrong.
A number of people in political theory, economics, and philosophy have
made important contributions to this book through their support and criticism. I thank them very much for their help and advice. Daniel M. Hausman,
Douglas Rae, and Warren J. Samuels read this book in manuscript. It is a better book because of their diligence, suggestions, and proposals, and I owe
them a special debt. I also thank the anonymous reviewers at the Social Science
Journal who reviewed an early version of chapter 5 and the editors of that journal, who gave permission to use the material here. Several people have commented on parts of this book that were originally presented as conference
papers, once again proving the seriousness with which panelists take their
often difficult task. I especially thank Emily Gill, Gerald Houseman, Joel
Kassiola, and Paul Kress. David Gay has been a friend and colleague, introducing me to information, theories, and ideas relevant to the authors discussed
in this book, while always challenging my perspective. Steven Zega read part
of this manuscript and made numerous perceptive comments. My good friend
Thomas Hone has enriched my thinking and has been a constant encouragement. So has Booth Fowler. I thank the staff of the University Press of Kansas
for their assistance. Finally, I thank my wife, Ann Waligorski. She understood
how important this project has been to me. Errors in interpretation and facts
are mme.
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Chapter One

Introduction

Conservative economics is also a normative theory of politics. Economists
regularly engage in political theory, masking normative judgments with seemingly objective economic analysis. This book examines and explicates the political
ideas and recommendations of important contemporary conservative economists who are revising fundamental political values to conform to their economic model. Chapter 1 discusses why these theorists are called conservative,
who they are, why they may be examined as a group, and how economic
theory can be analyzed as normative political theory. Later chapters examine
the basis for and content of the conservative economists' political theory.
Conservative economics is a response to and has hastened the apparent collapse of the post-World War II neo-Keynesian orthodoxy on the interrelation
of politics and economics. The political-social dislocations produced by economic traumas in the last twenty-five years gave conservative economists an
opportunity to gain support for their long-standing rejection of Keynesian
policies and interventionist government. As in other periods of perceived analytic and policy confusion, when existing explanations appear inadequate, people often turn to older political-social-economic models. Regardless of their
actual value, these models provide a paradigmatic moment-an ideal point
when virtue and policy seem to have coincided-from which dissatisfied theorists and politicians can appeal against the declining convention. The renewed
emphasis in Anglo-American countries on restoring a pre-Keynesian microeconomic market model of political economy represents such a revival. Drawing upon an older public philosophy, conservative economists reject Keynesian economic and political justification of interventionist government.
The conservatives' political and economic theory has little room for intervention, regulation, welfare, or active citizens and government. Based upon
their assumption of a natural economic order, conservative economists propose radically reduced public involvement in economics and rigid separation
between politics and economics. Though economic issues dominate political
debate, governments will no longer attempt to ensure that the market oper3
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ates, provide extensive welfare, or reduce the uneven impact of market changes
or problems. The conservative market comprehensively explains human behavior and institutions; organizes society; defines moral and political values
such as democracy and obligation; sets public goals; judges politics; and seeks
to replace participatory, interventionist, regulatory, and welfare politics with
spontaneous, cooperative market behavior. By asserting that all human behavior is reducible to and understandable as self-interested market behavior,
the conservative economists limit the need for and possibility of political, social, and moral analysis and concerns separate from the market, thus voiding
consideration of the political and social effects of their economic ideal while
making political prescriptions. Limited politics and political norms inevitably
follow.
In surveying the normative political content of conservative economists'
market politics, I am concerned with the political component, relevance and
impact of their economic theories and policy proposals and do not analyze
all economic theories of politics. Throughout, I assume that economics and
politics are closely interrelated-a proposition the conservative economists
accept-and that when economic theory makes political prescriptions, it may
be analyzed as normative political theory-a statement the conservative economists reject. Political theory has a rich history-from Aristotle to Thomas Jefferson to John Rawls-ofinquiring into the type of economy likely to support
preferred polities. Conversely, Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus, Herbert Spencer, and John Maynard Keynes each defined the type of polity necessary to his economy. John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx are claimed by both
disciplines. There are virtually no "pure" political or "pure" economic theories.
All share concerns over distribution and allocation of resources, the role of
government, justice, equity, equality, stability, freedom, and the nature of
popular control. Moreover, political legitimacy, class and regional conflict, social stability, and the rise and decline of nations often have an economic cause
and component.
Even if political science and economics have been conceptually and academically separate for a century, the distance between political and economic
analysis has traditionally been slight. John Locke, for example, influenced
economic as well as political thought. Though ostensibly political, his Second
Trmtise ofGwernment analyzed the development of property and money, while
presenting a simplified labor theory of value. Indeed, political and economic
concerns were inseparable: "[T]he chief end . .. [of civil society] is the preservation of Property,"1 broadly understood. His assuinption that individualism,
property, freedom, and exchange are natural is one of the intellectual sources
of conservative political economy.
Writers mixed political and economic analysis throughout the eighteenth
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and nineteenth centuries. Though Adam Smith was primarily an economic
theorist, his economics deeply influenced subsequent liberal conceptualizations of politics. To Smith, trade and barter were natural. The attempt to better one's condition, and the propensity to exchange one thing for another,
created markets and the division of labor. Free markets exist wherever people
are allowed to pursue their own interests within a framework of minimal government. In the absence of government intervention, such a market would
produce both order and prosperity. Although Smith was one of the first theorists to make a deliberate effort to separate politics from economics, that distinction, even in Wealth of Nations, is neither perfectly clear nor fully developed.
A glance at the daily newspaper illustrates that today the interrelation of
politics and economics is crucial in both theory and public debate. Charles
Lindblom summarizes this point: "In all the political systems of the world,
much of politics is economics, and most of economics is also politics."2 The
major theorists presented in this book would agree with the sentiment but
not its expression. For them, politics is understandable through economics,
and their goal is substantial political and policy modifications to reduce public
and governmental intervention in economic life. They do not quarrel with the
statement that everywhere governments are urged to intervene to protect, promote, and regulate the economy; that people expect and demand laws and
regulations to control and eliminate problems and dislocations flowing from
depressions, the development of new industries, and the vicissitudes of working conditions; that,there is no such thing as an unregulated economy; that
business often insists upon the regulation and intervention that are a major
source of the growth in government. Their argument is that such demands
for government intervention in the economy are illegitimate; they must be
removed from the political agenda and majorities and governments stripped
of the power and means to accommodate them. The market must be freed.
The assumptions and arguments which lay the foundation for these policy recommendations are elaborated in the following chapters.
Conservatism
Labels are important. They can be shorthand expressions for an entire philosophical or ideological approach. Even when used in the most simplistic manner, as in media references to the "conservative wing'' of the Chinese Communist party or Iranian "revolutionary moderates;' they classify similar approaches,
simplify (or oversimplify) the world, and express popular political, social, and
economic positions-though there is no necessary correlation between being
"conservative" or "liberal" on political issues and being "conservative" or "liberal" on economic or social issues.
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Economists such as James Buchanan, Milton Friedman, F. A. Hayek,
George Stigler, William Hutt, and others are considered conservative because
of their faith in markets and mistrust of government. Some of them, however,
call themselves "liberals" and dislike the name "conservative." Hayek emphatically rejects the conservative label, calling himself a true liberal "in the original,
nineteenth-century sense" as opposed to "accidental accretions" that have
attached to liberalism. This true liberalism, "The Abandoned Road," emphasizes economic freedom and the operation of spontaneous forces and represents "the individualistic tradition that has created Western Civilization." It
is opposed to both conservatism and "pseudo-liberalism which in the course
of the last generation has arrogated its name." 3 William H. Hutt believes that
"the word 'liberal' has been stolen by those who are hostile to what used to
be known as 'liberalism."'4 Friedman also dislikes "[t]he change in the meaning
of the term liberalism," which has been most marked in economics where expanded government services and regulation undermine freedom and corrupt
the meaning of liberalism. The "rightful and proper label" for his highly influential Cap#alism and FreediJm is liberalism.5 "I'm not a conservative.... I'm
a liberal in the traditional sense."6
Writers disagree over what to call such theorists. That critics of liberalism
frequently call them liberals, and critics of conservatism call them conservatives, answers nothing. Disagreements remain at a more sophisticated level.
In two recent books published by the University of Minnesota Press, the
author of the volume entitled Liberalism called Buchanan, Friedman, Gilder,
and Hayek classical liberals, whereas the author of the volume entitled Conservatism called Friedman and Hayek conservatives. Hayek is included in both
The Liberal Tradition in European Thought and The Conservative Tradition in European Thought. The contemporary traditional conservative Russell Kirk, who
is skeptical about the individualistic tradition, claims that writers such as von
Mises and Hayek "are at once liberal and conservative." Echoing Burke's Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs, Hayek considers himself an "Old Whig:'
upholding traditional principles of liberty.7 Such disagreement is common.
Each statement is partly correct because each focuses on a segment of reality, ignoring other elements, and elevates a partial insight into a complete
picture. There are many forms of conservatism and liberalism within the liberaldemocratic framework. Conservative economists share the values and assumptions of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism. Economists such as
Buchanan, Friedman and Hayek-or politicians such as Herbert Hoover, Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Margaret Thatcher-an: liberal, if one focuses
on the principles and policies of nineteenth-century Anglo-American, individualistic liberalism. They start from an individualistic perspective, assuming
self-interest is the primary motivation. Freedom, particularly economic free-
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dom, is their principal value. Ownership and use of private property are the
most important aspects of economic freedom. The conservatives accept equal
opportunity, defined as careers open to talent. They agree with parliamentary
democracy and a broad, though not necessarily universal, suffrage. They conceive of society as distinct from the state, spontaneous, superior, and cohering
naturally. Government is the realm of coercion and should be limited to enforcing general laws that are equally applicable to everyone and to protecting the
population from foreign aggression. Since no one can be trusted with coercive
power, and since markets limit power, guarantee individual freedom, and reward people according to their contribution to the welfare of others, markets
should be the primary means for organizing cooperative behavior.
·Despite this catalog of classical liberal principles and policies, the economists discussed in this book will be called conservative because the label is
appropriate within the context of contemporary politics. Indeed, they are conservative if we focus on their interpretation of traditional liberal principles; the
policies they claim are necessary to implement those principles; and their refusal to let liberalism evolve-evidenced by their claim that reform liberalism,
which began with such writers as T. H. Green in the nineteenth century and
argues for development of new policies, including government intervention
to protect enjoyment ofbasic liberal principles, is not real liberalism. Emphasis
on the primacy of a self-regulating autonomous market that promotes freedom, equality, democracy, and justice and curbs human depravity; limited
government defined as nonintervention in economic affairs; limitation of economic rights to narrow competitive and property rights; denial of the relevance of social justice; the claim that freedom and equality are solely negative
concepts (i.e., no interference); and individualism conceived as being left alone
to compete rather than having real choice in lifestyles-all are conservative positions given contemporary perception of political-economic reality.8
There is, however, another lesser noticed and more important link to conservatism in these authors. Conservatism is not simply a bunch of policies or
defense 0£ the status quo but frequently embodies principles shared by many
varieties of conservatives. Economists such as Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek
hold several assumptions in common with traditional conservatives such as
John Adams, Edmund Burke, and Benjamin Disraeli and contemporaries such
as Russell Kirk. These assumptions and principles extend beyond the policy
of the day, forming a core of principles that Anglo-American conservatives
share regardless of specific policy differences. Historically, these assumptions
and principles have formed the philosophical heart of traditional or classical
conservatism in its conflict with classical liberalsim. These principles and assumptions include skepticism and doubts about human reason and ability,
emphasis on the complexity of society, belief that there is an objective order
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existing separate from human will or volition, opposition to equality, and
mistrust of popular rule. These assumptions are major themes in the rest of
the book.
From its beginnings traditional conservatism has been skeptical about mankind. Human nature cannot be trusted. Reason and ability are severely limited,
whether by sin or by insufficient intelligence, and people cannot easily or radically change the existing system. Contemporary conservative economists assert fundamental human ignorance and inherent limits, using those precepts
to defend market relations and to attack government involvement in economics. Emphasis on the complexity of the spontaneous system or market reinforces
the importance of limited human ability. Society is complex, fragile, and held
together with the glue of order and hierarchy; its growth should not be interfered with. Because of the inherently dynamic nature of market society, conservative economists claim that collectively people are not intelligent enough
to intervene successfully in intricate market relations; that-in a combined
political, moral, and economic argument-intervention worsens problems,
undermines freedom and efficiency, and is unfair; that no matter how uncomfortable we feel, we must accept the existing system and cannot reform it according to our wishes or morality; and that acceptance of market results as
the best possible outcome is a necessary limitation on the human temptation
to interfere in natural relations.
Most conservatives assume that an order exists separate from human will,
that it prevails in human relations, and that it is to be discovered, not created
or imposed by conscious human behavior. This order is not maintained because people know how it functions, but because they are brought up in a
certain way to accept and fit into it. Order accompanies or creates higher standards, separate from human volition and guiding behavior independently of
narrow self-interest and concern for the immediate present. Wherever they find
this order-in natural law or tradition for classical conservatives, or the spontaneous market for market conservatives-this superior standard provides
guidance for correct behavior.
If there is natural order in human relations, equality can upset that order.
Conservatives of all varieties mistrust equality, claiming it violates the fundamental human drives associated with order. Tiaditional and market conservatives dislike equalization efforts and usually consider inequality as natural and
desirable to the functioning of the good society, though market conservatives
allow more room for the talented to rise within market society. Both types
of conservatives agree that wealth and birth are natural distinctions, ones with
which government should not interfere lest it upset the guiding order of society. Thus property and inheritance must be preserved as natural and essential
to the functioning of the system. Because popular political power frequently
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fosters equality, each group of conservatives mistrusts popular rnle. Though
modern conservatives no longer reject democracy, they would limit its applicatiort. Flawed human nature and the needs of the market combine to place
limits on democracy, to prevent it from destroying the good society.
This does not mean that traditional and market, or individualist, conservatism are identical. They are separate varieties of conservatism, appealing to
distinct justifications and often opposed on policy issues. They disagree over
paternalism, the nature of community, intergenerational links, and the individual's control over property. But both share a bleak picture of human nature
which sets rigid limits to human possibility. Their common belief that deliberate intervention is likely to go wrong, that human reason and ability are
severely constrained, and that people must collectively accept their fate within
the existing order are in marked contrast to liberal optimism that conscious,
deliberate change for the better is possible.
The popular meanings of liberalism and conservatism have changed over
time. For this reason I occasionally contrast market or individualist conservatives
with reform liberals such as John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth Galbraith,
and Lester Thurow.9 Market conservatives have deep roots in early nineteenthcentury liberalism, especially that developed by Malthus and David Ricardo,
but in their policies and proposals, they are among the most influential conservatives of this century. Writing in societies where some form of liberal values
is officially accepted and justifies public policy, these authors claim the tradition of liberalism but drastically narrow its meaning and application. They
allow no room for growth- no adaptations of policy to promote historical liberal values in altered circumstances and no role for government to protect the
public from a changed market. They dream no great dreams of liberating men
and women in all aspects of their lives, as did John Stuart Mill, who in midcentury began to modify the policies of laissez-faire to promote the principles
ofliberalism.10 To the authors examined in this book, modifying policy cannot
protect a principle such as freedom but instead destroys it. Policy becomes
overriding principle-leave the market alone-and alternative policies and principles, even from within historical liberalism, must be subordinated to this fundamental policy-principle-guide.11 This emphasis on an autonomous market
and market relations as the paradigmatic model for all behavior makes these
authors conservative in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Theorists Discussed
Three economists are emphasized throughout this book: James Buchanan,
Milton Friedman, and Friedrich Hayek. Others who share and supplement
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their views are occasionally discussed, but these three symbolize, and in large
part developed, the normative and empirical justification for the modern conservative political-economic alternative to interventionist government. Differences in individual economic theories are insignificant in the context of the
focus of this book: conservative economists' shared image of political reality.
These three authors present a complete, coherent political theory. They are
variations on a theme, with striking similarities in their philosophical assumptions, dislikes, vision of an ideal economy, and political and social preferences
and beliefs.12
James Buchanan was born in 1919 and received his Ph.D. in economics
from the University of Chicago in 1948. He developed the widely accepted
and increasingly influential "public choice" school of economic analysis, which
studies the constitutional and contractual basis of political and economic decision making. His work attempts to apply economic principles to political decision making, claiming that the same analytic assumptions and modelsparticularly individual utility maximization-that seemingly explain economic
behavior also explain political behavior. Buchanan received a Nobel Prize in
economics in 1986. In his Nobel Prize lecture, he credited the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell (1851-1926) with influencing such aspects of his work as
methodological individualism and the idea that politics is a complex exchange
mechanism. His arguments provided some of the philosophical underpinnings of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law and proposals for
a balanced-budget amendment to the United States Constitution. His public
choice analysis is widely accepted as giving insight into the workings and failure of modern liberal-democratic regimes and furnishes support for reforming
them. Buchanan has spent most of his career teaching economics in universities.
Milton Friedman has been the most active politically. Born in 1912, he
received his Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in 1946. Most of
his teaching career was at the University of Chicago, where, as with Buchanan
and Stigler, he was influenced by Frank Knight. Though Friedman distinguishes
between his scientific and popular work, he is concerned primarily with how
his economic proposals may affect public policy and has been the most active
economist since Keynes in attempting to "construct theoretical models . . .
[that] lead to policy recommendations . . . [and] generate public opinion in
support of them".13 Consciously aiming at a wide audience, Friedman has influenced and shaped policy in the United States, Britain, Israel,14 Latin America,
and Iran. His economic theory, politics, and policy proposals are closely related, in that he has created an entire political-economic model for modern
society, rooted in his picture of a free market. He has attempted to influence
public policy through a column in Newsweek; a television program, "Free to
Choose"; numerous pamphlets; and several popular books. His influential
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Cap#alism and Freedom (1962), claiming a causal link between freedom and
capitalism on one side and oppression and government on the other, had sold
more than 430,000 copies by 1980, when it was still selling at the rate of more
than 25,000 copies a year. The first run of me to Choose, promoted by a $50,000
advertising budget, printed 100,000 copies.15 Friedman received a Nobel Prize
in economics in 1976. His deepest professional impact is through monetarism. Critics often refer to the "Chicago Boysm 6 as disciples of Friedman. He
acted as a writer and adviser to Barry Goldwater's presidential bid in 1964,
helping develop Goldwater's tax plan, despite its fiscal rather than monetarist
orientation. In 1968, less active than in 1964, he advised Richard Nixon.
Friedman offered advice to the government of Chile in 1975 and on occasion
to other governments. Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Menachem
Begin incorporated some of his proposals.17 In the United States, he actively
supported tax limitation proposals, such as Proposition 13 in California. Whether
it is balanced-budget proposals, opposition to increases in taxes and the minimum wage, or pejorative distinctions between taxpayers and tax receivers,
these policies exemplify philosophical assumptions and policy proposals of
conservative economists.
Friedrich Hayek is widely read, and his critique of social justice is accepted
by the preceding authors. Born in 1899 in Vienna, where he studied with Ludwig von Mises, Hayek has had an active intellectual career in economics and
philosophy. He was at the University of Chicago from 1950 to 1962. An opponent of Keynesian political economy since the 1930s, he has been of fundamental importance in uniting, inspiring, and creating modern conservatism.
He also had an impact on David Stockman's economic theories.18 The Road
to Serfdom, his first political book, was condensed in the Reader's Digest. 19 In
1947 he founded the Mont Pelerin Society which organizes and unites conservative economists and has provided a forum for analysis and development of
neoclassical political economy throughout the postwar ascendance of Keynesian public policy. Hayek's professional economics emphasizes monetary
theory and the economic system as a coordinating mechanism, and he received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1974, along with Gunnar Myrdal. His
policy proposals were widely accepted in postwar West Germany.20
Several authors will be discussed occasionally: William Hutt, a South African economist; George Stigler, Nobel Prize winner in economics, 1982;
George Gilder; Thomas Sowell, on whose dissertation committee Stigler and
Friedman served; 21 Robert D. Tollison; Gordon Tullock; and Richard E. Wagner. Except for Gilder, each is a professional economist.
All possible authors are not included, for several reasons. First, this book
emphasizes currently active economists who are engaged in writing about politics in order to change contemporary political economy and does not discuss
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those, such as Kenneth Arrow, who share similar assumptions but are not
politically active. Second, I focus on current writers 22 and occasionally employ
historical examples or contrasts with other theorists and antecedents for interpretative juxtaposition,23 so that theorists are viewed in an intellectual context
rather than in terms of the always problematic and never satisfactory question of
influence. Thus economists such as Frank Knight, Ludwig von Mises, Vilfredo
Pareto, Joseph Schumpeter, and Knut Wicksell receive only passing notice. Finally, this book emphasizes the political theory of conservative economists,
not-with the sole exception of George Gilder-the economics of conservatives;
thus Robert Nozick, an important philosopher who shares many assumptions
and arguments with the conservative economists, is not systematically included. Throughout, this book focuses on the attempt of contemporary conservative economists to redefine basic political values, the role of economics
in politics, and the role of government in the economy.

Common Elements
Though the major conservative economists share a common world view, there
are many methodological and theoretical differences among them. Monetarism (Friedman) is incompatible with supply-side economics (Gilder) . Competition is less important for Gilder than for Buchanan, Friedman, or Hayek.
Gilder is much less of a classical thinker than Friedman or Hayek. Buchanan
places some ofHayek's beliefs that the market cannot be improved "into the
Panglossian category" and is uneasy with some of Hayek's economics, but he
believes Hayek's system is consistent with his own public choice approach.
Buchanan has more room for individual rational choice, contract, and deliberate construction of rules and institutions than does Hayek, who has the
dimmest view of human possibilities. Hayek, unlike Friedman, believes that
capitalism (a term Hayek dislikes) works with imperfect knowledge. Economists
can explain what happened but should not try to predict what will happen.
Friedman wants governments to follow a fixed rule regulating the quantity of
money, whereas Hayek believes this to be impossible and wishes to allow private
enterprise to issue currency. Friedman believes a commodity-based currency
would not work, whereas Hayek wants private issuers of money to experiment
with one. Hayek is less oriented toward statistics and quantitative analysis than
are Buchanan, Friedman, and Stigler, the latter two being quite gifted in the
field. Buchanan has less faith than Friedman, Gilder, or Hayek in the market
as a perfect instrument for distribution and production of order; to him, it
is simply better than the alternatives. He therefore allows some intervention
to promote equal opportunity. As does Stigler, he distinguishes between so-
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cialism and the welfare state, liking neither. Hayek and Friedman rarely make
that distinction. Friedman writes most about current issues, Buchanan emphasizes constitutional structure rather than day-to-day political questions,
and Hayek is more concerned with philosophical issues in political economy
than are the others. Friedman is less concerned than Buchanan or Hayek with
traditional questions of order and respect for established rules.2 4
These differences are a small part of the story. Fundamental political, policy,
and philosophical agreement bind these authors together. Hayek, Friedman,
and Buchanan have been officers in the Mont Pelerin Society, and Friedmari, Stigler, Frank Knight, and Ludwig von Mises attended the first meeting
in 1947. Buchanan, Friedman, and Stigler admit to having been influenced
by Knight. Some of the less frequently noted economists, such as Gordon
Tullock, have been coauthors with Buchanan. Buchanan refers to Knight and
Friedman as "men with whom, broadly and generally, I agree on principles
of political-philosophical order." Friedman acknowledges that he has been "influenced by a fresh approach to political science that has come mainly from
economists;' including Buchanan, Stigler, and Tullock. He has learned much
of his "philosophy" from "Frank Knight ... Friedrich A. Hayek, George J.
Stigler.ms Stigler believes his approach differs from Tullock and Buchanan "primarily in its strong empirical orientation.m6 Each accepts the basic concept
of methodological individualism.
These authors may not form a single school, but they speak the same
language; share similar values, ends, assumptions, themes, and vision of the
good society; and employ the same deductive structure in their political arguments. Their common world view, shared dislikes (especially ofKeynesianism),
and similar recommendations unite them. Their arguments and approaches
to economics and politics build on one another, interweaving themes to produce a coherent political economy and public philosophy. Their ideas may be
discussed as a trend or movement, in the same way that one can analyze the
common arguments and policies among Sophists, eighteenth-century liberals,
or contemporary democratic socialists.
The major element in this shared world view is a picture of the market
as the most important social regulatory mechanism. There is extraordinary
consistency in the conservative economists' market-based political-social recommendations, conclusions, and criticisms. Each writer believes that the needs
of the economy should limit and control politics, because it is inferior to market economics. Whether the focus is on Buchanan's constitutionalism, Hayek's
rule oflaw, or Friedman's monetarism, the conclusion is that public discretion
must be limited. Intervention into economics is always dangerous and counterproductive. Reduced and limited government is an axiomatic corollary. The
good polity will follow general laws, applicable to all, curb popular participa-
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tion and intervention into natural markets, and limit democracy to election
procedures. Whatever the situation, the economic market produces order and
fairness, while politics produces chaos and destroys freedom. The economic
market controls and channels human passions into constructive, potentially
harmonious ends; politics gives free rein to and multiplies the worst effects
of human greed. Given human nature, government cannot create or pursue
the common good, produces nothing of value, and always serves particular
interests. This means that economic intervention inevitably and disastrously
fails or at best robs some people for the undeserved benefit of others. Although the market may sometimes produce undesirable outcomes, its results
are generally for the best, especially in the long run, whereas public intervention in the long run is unjust, oppressive, and destructive.
There are no important political or social issues, policies, concepts, or conclusions on which the major authors disagree. As a group they call for and
justify a fundamental change in the guiding philosophy, policy goals, and
methods of operation of modern, welfare-oriented, interventionist liberaldemocratic systems. Given their common starting economic and philosophical
perspective, each develops one or another part of their collective public philosophy. Pictures of freedom, justice, equality, and democracy are complementary. Each would be comfortable living in the ideal world of the others. Although my arguments do not always apply to each author, they fit as a group
and as an alternative political model. Different combinations of theorists are
discussed in each chapter, but the book discusses only issues upon which at
least two major authors agree, notes who takes what position, and where they
may occasionally disagree.

Economic Theory as Normative Political Theory
Theorists such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx have inspired fundamental changes
in the economic and political orders of Europe and North America. Conservative economists seek to emulate that influence. They believe it is appropriate
and necessary to make policy recommendations in order to create their ideal
market society. Their ideas provide the philosophical basis for much of the
current American, British, and Canadian social-economic policy. This is not to
claim that they have directly shaped specific policies, but through their books,
journals, membership in foundations and think-tanks, and occasionally direct
advice to politicians, they have influenced opinion leaders, decision makers
and sometimes the mass public. As individuals and as a group, they are attempting to provide a complete alternative to interventionist political economy.
Economic theories have normative and political implications when econo-
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mists define and employ political ideas and values such as freedom or democracy;
condemn most of the existing western political enterprise as inefficient, dangerous, and in need of major renovation to conform to supposedly nonpolitical
standards; distinguish the private from the public; prescribe public goals and
policy; shape public images of what is possible; and propose altering the structure and behavior of governments to achieve a superior system reflected in
economic theory. Assumptions about human motivation, normal class relations, and what constitutes ethical behavior are politically relevant when they
limit the extent and nature of legitimate policy debate, define political problems, and structure acceptable solutions to whatever is conceived as a problem.
This applies across the political spectrum equally, to liberal, socialist, and Marxist economic theorists.2 7 Even specification of the way in which politics and
economics are to be studied-and in the west, liberalism rather than a rival such
as Marxism defines the expected relation between politics and economics-is a
political judgment. Moreover, when violence, revolution, and despair result from
economic conditions, the nature of the economic theory attempting to deal with
those conditions becomes of primary importance to politics2I!.... particularly if an
untestable theory claims superiority over political or social considerations.
Normative political theories share several common elements. These include
assumptions about the nature oforder, either in the universe (as with Plato and
much natural-law theory), polity, society, economy, or all four. Normative
theories contain explicit or implicit assumptions about human nature or motivation-beliefs about why people behave as they do. The picture of order, coupled
with human nature or motivation, usually defines proper distribution, whether
it is justice, offices, power, status, or wealth that is being assigned to people.
Assumptions about order and human motivation also delimit what is natural
and must be accepted from what is susceptible to successful intervention. Major theories attempt to define and explain basic concepts such as justice, freedom,
authority, and the good life. These conceptions are usually tied to and limited
by an author's notions of order and human nature and in turn limit the range
of acceptable public behavior. Moreover, every significant normative theory
contains a justification; that is, an appeal to standards higher than mere human
volition-the Forms, history, the dialectic, the will of the people, utility, laws
of nature, natural law, or, in the case of classical economics, a naturalistic ethic,
the impersonal market-that attempts to "prove'' the "correctness" and "truth"
of that theory and its recommendations. Most important, normative theories
create guidelines for policy prescriptions-who should rule and why, the nature of
social welfare, how to achieve freedom, justice, equality, and so forth-that
define legitimate goals and the proper means to attain them.
Conservative economics is both an economic theory and a normative theory
of politics. First, it contains each of the components of normative theories.
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It starts from essentially philosophical, indeed metaphysical, assumptions about
the nature of reality, order, harmony, human nature, natural relations, distribution, and Newtonian-like causality. Second, it attempts to define basic political ideas: freedom, individualism, equality, democracy, justice, power, obligation, coercion, order, public morality, the nature of social cohesion, the ends
and goals of society, welfare, and legitimate political problems. Third, conservative economists make comprehensive political and policy recommendations
based on their starting assumptions. Many of these-less active government,
abolishing the minimum wage, curbing labor unions, a reduced role for popular
participation, elimination of widely held beliefs that governments should attempt to mitigate economic dislocations-require major political and social
changes. Even the definition of a problem and acceptable solutions is, therefore, heavily value laden.
The inevitability of some value-laden analysis affirms the importance of appreciating starting assumptions. The history ofscience illustrates 29 that values and
preconceptions order and shape observations and color attempts to explain the
world. Human beings never approach a phenomenon with a blank slate. The
more important something is to our world view or the more involved we are in
outcomes, the more likely we will see what we expect. This is particularly so with
human behavior, though it is present in even the most rigorous scientific endeavors. Whether based on religion, formal philosophy, or myth, our ideologies,
values, starting assumptions, and expectations about normal behavior provide
a framework for analyzing and interpreting the world.30 Ideologies and values explain and interpret reality for people who hold them, conditioning what people
see and how they explain another's behavior. They give clues to what is legitimate
and illegitimate, a real alternative or an impossible fantasy, and what one must
attend to and what can safely be ignored. They shape what is considered acceptable evidence. People rarely fight and kill over "facts." In many of the great controversies of normative political economy and politics, the facts narrowly understood are hardly in dispute. Rather, people fight over beliefs, values, and often
incompatible interpretations of facts-whether a particular "fact" is significant and
whether a specific situation does or does not fit a value criterion .
The controversy over abortion in the United States may be the quintessential example. There is no disagreement over the "facts" of an abortion. All sides
agree on what an abortion is, how one occurs, what results from an abortion.
The issue is not facts but interpretation of those facts. What is the moral and
political significance of an abortion? Why and when is it a problem requiring
a public solution? Is the fetus human or not? Who has rights? The fetus? The
potential mother? Both? Others? If both have rights, whose right should be
paramount, and is there a stage in the pregnancy when one set of rights over. rides the other? What is the role of government in protecting the rights of ·
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whoever has rights? No amount of merely technical data can answer these questions. This applies to many political-economic controversies. For example, is
the minimum wage legitimate, particularly when conservative and liberal economists agree that it can increase unemployment? Is that increase politically or
socially significant, and if so, how? Does it make further intervention to address any new unemployment legitimate, or forbid any intervention? Is the
status of women a problem or not? Unemployment? Poverty? Air pollution?
Violence on television? Sexually explicit magazines? If yes, by what criteria are
they so defined? Who should deal with these problems and what means may
they employ? Answers cannot be determined by technical means, though
these invariably affect one's view of the moral and political issues.
The role of preferences and values must be remembered when examining
claims about politics that originate in any economic theory. Political theorists
have been too reluctant to examine economic theories, especially those of conservative economists. The moral, philosophical,31 and political assumptions in
economic theories do not invalidate them . However, unspoken and often
unacknowledged presuppositions color what an individual, a nation, or a generation considers normal, obvious, a concern, legitimate, or otherwise. The
next chapter examines some of the most important assumptions that form the
foundation of the conservative economists' critique of modern politics. These
assumptions give clues to what is or is not a problem, which problems should
be addressed by public intervention and which left alone, and where the burden of proof will be placed. They help explain, even if they do not determine,
why these theorists think as they do and how they reach their political and
social conclusions. The remainder of the book examines the political theory
associated with these assumptions.

Chapter Two

Starting Assumptions:
The Philosophical-Economic
Foundations for a Political Argument
The free market wouldn't alww Scrooge to exploit pwr Bob.
-Edwin Meese, December 15, 1983.

Assumptions shape perceptions of and responses to the world. This chapter
reviews six politically crucial assumptions that form the foundation for conservative political theory and policy recommendations. It does not discuss all of
the conservative economists' assumptions, only those that are relevant to their
political theory and model. Some of these concepts are not economic as such
but are the structuring beliefs and principles that lie beyond economics. The
assumptions discussed in this chapter are: that the theory is (relatively) value
free and objective; that human nature or motivation is individualistic; that
self-interest is the primary human drive; that self-interest creates order; that
the market embodies this order; and that the market is the model for politics.
These preconceptions form an untestable ''vision" of how the world does and
should operate.1 They structure and dominate the conservative economists'
understanding of politics and political values.
These "working ideas about the nature of the whole of reality"2 are a mixture of political, philosophical, and economic concepts based on normative
and empirical claims. Authors switch between normative and empirical, description and prescription, without alerting us to the change. In most cases
assumptions are definitional in nature and presented as universally applicable.
They set limits to political possibility, forming the foundations of an alternative design for the democratic polity. The conservatives' beliefs encourage
them to divide the world into either/or terms, promoting absolutist politicalsocial thinking without shadings of ambiguity or the possibility of compromise between values or policies.
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Objectivity Claims
Values shape behavior, how people view the world, what they consider important, where they place the burden of proof in controversies, how they decide
what is a problem, and what is an acceptable solution to problems. The conservative economic theorists claim that their analysis is objective, and, for Friedman, positive, scientific, and value-free, providing an impartially correct standard
by which to judge politics.
The claim of a superior standard entered political theory with Plato, but
the modern assertion that economics can be positive and value-free dates at
least to David Ricardo in his debate with Malthus and was developed in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by such theorists as Vilfredo Pareto. Friedman takes a strong position. For Friedman, "[T]here are no value
judgments in economics." He assumes that wide agreement on technical issues
eliminates value conflict.3 Economic theory is independent of and separate
from normative and ethical judgment. "Science is science and ethics is ethics."4
Economics is theoretically capable of producing knowledge equivalent to the
natural sciences-"[p]ositive scientific knowledge that enables us to predict the
consequences of a possible course of action."5 This is a continuing theme, illustrated in his essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics."6 Friedman's
economics "is, or can be, an 'objective' science, in precisely the same sense as
any of the physical sciences." It is independent of and the basis for normative
judgments, not vice versa.7 Results are the only test. Are its predictions generally accurate and confirmed by experience? Despite the virtual impossibility
of testing his theories, determining what is a result of assumptions, or deciding
in a nontautological manner what is an acceptable outcome, Friedman claims
that it is irrelevant to look at his assumptions. Assumptions specify when a
theory will be valid; they do not determine or affect its actual validity. Friedman undercuts potential criticism by occasionally claiming that he links economic hypotheses to actual behavior and policy recommendations with an "as
if" statement. One can examine real-world behavior "as if" people conformed
to hypotheses such as always trying to maximize returns: "It is only a short
step . . . to the economic hypothesis that under a wide range of circumstances
individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns . . . and had full knowledge of the data needed to succeed in
this attempt." He believes that "[t]ruly important and significant hypotheses
will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality."8
Friedman intends that this position be taken seriously. Discussion of values
is an evasion. Disagreements are related to conflict over scientific economics,
. not preferences or assumptions. Differences on how to achieve an end do not
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result from value judgments. Moreover, he seems to confuse values with motives. He condemns "the widespread tendency to attribute policy differences
to differences in value judgments. This tendency arises because it is often so
much easier to question a man's motives than to meet his arguments or counter his evidence." Too often people assume that those who disagree are simply
'"bad."'9 He believes that there is, or should be, a technical solution to every
disagreement. Thomas Sowell echoes this, emptying value conflict from political economy, in his assertion that different factual interpretations, empirical assumptions, and images of causation, rather than values, separate rival
perspectives. 10
Friedman takes the most extreme position, but others accept elements of
this view. Though critical of a positivist approach, Buchanan contends that
"the only test for 'realism' of assumptions lies in the applicability of the conclusions." He sees his position as "neutral with respect to ideological or normative
content." Though making a sharp distinction between science and morals,
Buchanan acknowledges that "[l]ike [Knut] Wicksell my purpose was ultimately normative rather than antiseptically scientific." Despite admitting a
normative component to his concerns, Buchanan often claims that his economic model of behavior is predictive and descriptive, having no prescriptive
or ethical element. Although he admits that calling his exchange theory the
key to a better political system is normative, this insight is lost when he makes
policy recommendations. Even if he is not necessarily offering hypotheses for
empirical refutation, he asserts that some of his propositions are potentially
testable. Market thinking makes economics scientific, independent of value
judgments. The idea of spontaneous order is itself a principle of science, based
upon observation and "the exchange paradigm."11 Ryan Amacher acknowledges
that economic analysis "may embody implicit value judgments and ideological
biases," but "one simply has to be careful to avoid these pitfalls."12 He does
not tell how.
Though Hayek does not claim that economics can be a science in the same
way as does Friedman, he believes that his central concept of spontaneous
order is correct, objectively true, and a valid statement of how the world actually operates. It is based upon observation of social evolution, but though
it has "scientific status," it is not testable as such. Social and policy debate are
"capable of a definite scientific treatment." Controversies between nonsocialists and socialists are not caused by value differences but "rest on purely intellectual issues capable of scientific resolution." Economics is the only science
that comprehends all of humanity and therefore provides the basis for judging
other institutions.13
Hayek employs science in a more traditional, less positivist sense than
Friedman. Methods used in physical science are not applicable. The purpose

The Foundations for a Political Argument

21

of economics is to explain, not predict. As with Buchanan, Hayek is willing
to acknowledge that his work contains normative elements, though both authors claim that their conclusions follow from the naturalistic market rather than
normative values. Hayek's policy claims, however, are as strong as those of
Friedman and Buchanan. More important, despite lack of agreement over the
exact nature of science and economics, these authors agree that their economics is scientific and objective and that their policy recommendations are the
only possible ones for modern democracies. Their images of order, human
nature, and the concomitant market are not hypotheses to be debated but objectively valid statements about an existing, natural system of human relations.
Conservative economics is not another ideology but provides lasting principles and a true picture of reality that are valid bases for correct policy advice.14
It would be easy to add more examples of this extraordinary claim, which,
consciously or not, fulfills two policy objectives. First, it makes the system invulnerable to criticism. Second, it attacks the liberal assertion that there are
no neutral policies-that every policy contains normative judgments that make
necessary and legitimate choices about who will benefit from what types of
public policy. For example, Lester Thurow claims that value judgment is inevitable. Definitive experiments are impossible, and "unobservable variables"
are common. Efficiency statements are no different from equity statements.
"Both depend upon an underlying set of discussable value judgments." "Prescription dominates description." It is not possible to rationally or empirically
claim that people are rewarded according to contributions in a neutral market;
therefore, we have no choice but to make deliberate distribution choices. 1raditional economics has become an ideology, "a political philosophy, often becoming something approaching a religion."1 5 The conservative economists
vehemently reject this position. Political and economic stability require acceptance of their objectivity claim. Introducing deliberate choice inevit:ably undermines the efficient operation of the economic system and political values such
as freedom and democracy which are based upon it.
The problems with this crude positivism are immense. An objectivity claim
reflects acceptance of a particular guiding principle or method of reasoning.
The conservative economists deny the structuring impact of context and perspective, claiming universal validity for their theory. There is no outside platform upon which one can stand to look into their model. As with Plato, the
only sound test assumes the validity of the starting premises. This model of
science presupposes an objective reality, separate from observation, and unvarying, discovered laws of nature. As with spontaneous order, these laws are
not created by observers, are not imposed upon reality, and do not change
with the observer but are implicit in what is observed. Because they reflect
reality, moral injunctions and wishful thinking cannot affect them, nor can
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they be modified merely to accommodate temporary desires. The conservatives' premises may be hypothetical (though they rarely say so), but their political and policy conclusions are not.
The method of analysis is largely a priori, deductive reasoning. Despite the
mathematical talent of several of these writers, there is a strong anti-empirical
bias in their thinking. Propositions are often true by definition. Political proposals are not offered as hypotheses for analysis but as categorical statements,
true because the economic premises from which they are deduced are true.
Testing, falsification, and experiment are rarely possible or attempted. Experience cannot prove the validity or invalidity of assumptions 16 or conclusions.
There are no explanations of results that are divorced from such normative
values as freedom or efficiency.
All theories, especially those dealing with people and values, share the problem that preferences inevitably affect a theorist's work. This does not invalidate
the search for understanding but cautions against easily accepting claims of
complete neutrality or universal applicability. Except for Hayek's on occasion,
the conservatives' objectivity claims ignore the controlling role of perception
and the possibility that assumptions may lead to choosing a method of confirmation that confirms the assumptions. Causal linkages, especially between
government intervention and economic problems or between capitalism and
freedom, are asserted without controlled experimentation or clear causal connections. This is a simple picture of science, defined as observation and deduction, which misses the crucial role of deciding what is a fact, how facts are related, and how analytic methods are selected.17

Human Nature
All political, social, and economic theories contain and are based upon a
theory of human nature1 8 or motivation. Assumptions about human nature
explain how people behave, provide clues as to how they should behave, set
adamantine boundaries to politics, determine the legitimacy and illegitimacy
of public action, and hint at desirable public policies. The extent and scope
of freedom, the meaning of equality, the nature and content of democracy,
the existence of public morality, the nature of obligation and social ties, and
the limits and possibilities of public policy and collective action are all contained in a theory's picture of human nature. In seemingly empirical theories,
images of human nature or motivation affect what is considered proper methodology, what can safely be ignored, what behaviors must be attended to, and
what requires an explanation.
There are many conflicting theories of why people behave as they do.
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Classical liberalism, capitalism, and liberal democracy are based upon a mildly
hopeful premise, that improvement is possible. As Thomas Jefferson summarized, "Although I do not, with some enthusiasts, believe that the human
condition will ever advance to such a state of perfection as that there shall no
longer be pain or vice in the world, yet I believe it susceptible of much improvement, and most of all, in matters of government and religion, and that
the diffusion of knowledge among the people is to be the instrument by which
it is to be effected." 19 The traditional liberal emphasis on freedom, tolerance,
and education would make no sense unless one assumed that people are, or
are potentially, capable of understanding and pursuing their interests and effectively participating in governance. Optimistic assumptions may encourage
the conclusion that people can understand and creatively improve their situation, individually or collectively. On the other hand, a pessimistic approach
generally entails the belief that people are permanently limited by sin, ignorance, tradition, or fate and that there is little they can do to improve their lot.
If people are essentially evil, weak, sinful, corrupt, or irrevocably ignorant,
then it makes no sense to argue for freedom; people will only abuse it. Democracy becomes dangerous nonsense-the ignorant masses need strong leadership, or else they will destroy that little bit of order known to the few who
have some insight into the nature of reality.
As an example, capitalist and socialist theories are divided by many things,
especially by rival images of human motivation-what people may achieve and
how they ought to behave. As a child of liberalism, capitalism assumes that
people are fairly competent, naturally competitive, and are most dependable
when their self-interest is involved. Government policy succeeds when it allows people the freedom to competitively pursue their interests but must
otherwise be limited. Socialism, and especially Marxism, has assumed that people are naturally creative and cooperative. Competition is an aberration resulting from defective economic and social institutions that must be corrected to
release human energies. In some varieties of this thinking, government may
have extensive power to recreate the world in the image of the perfected person.
Assumptions about human nature are not always characterized by such
dualism; there are many degrees of shading and complexity among arguments.
The crucial point is that conceptions of human nature deeply affect interpretations of what is due to people, what is the nature of obligation, what people
consider possible or legitimate, and what is desirable behavior. Whether one
looks at the debate over equal rights for women, Burke's attack on the French
Revolution, Lenin's claim that the unaided proletariat is capable of nothing
more than trade unionism, Hitler's murderous effort to purge Germany of racially "inferior" stock, or the gentle debate between John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson over who is a member of the natural aristocracy, assumptions about
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human nature and motivation animate each conflict. Will people save or spend
a tax cut? Are racial groups equal? Are differences between women and men
politically significant? Economically? Socially? Responses to these questions
are not graven in stone. Though societies frequently have given incompatible
answers, these rival answers have seemed obvious and right from within each
society's dominant value system and picture of human nature. To understand
a theory and its claims, one must understand its assumptions about human
nature and motivation.
Conservative political economy is based on classical liberal theory. While
sharing many values with such liberals as John Maynard Keynes or John Kenneth Galbraith, the conservative position has more limits and fewer qualifications. It is closer to Malthus than to Adam Smith, but Smith is the starting
point for their analysis. For Smith, in The Wealth of Natwns (1776), people
are fundamentally alike-individuals competent enough to see and seek their
own interests within a given setting. They necessarily pursue their own good,
but not to the extent ofThomas Hobbes's war of each against all. Cooperation
results from seeking one's own ends. Pursuit of economic self-interest-"[t]he
natural effort of every individual to better his own condition"-is the motivating force behind the invisible hand, which tends to promote human harmony
in market-like situations. Assuming a large number of small producers, sellers,
and buyers, with no one dependent upon any other participant, self-interest,
if pursued within the limits of legal and moral codes, tends to promote the
welfare of others. One could improve one's position only by producing a better product, selling a product at a lower price, or both. Even though man is
self-interested, man is also a social animal, and the extensive division of labor
which arises out of self-interest illustrates that interdependence.20
The conservatives' assumptions about behavior and motivation seem to
override their science claims. When discussing political or market behavior,
the issue of objective, value-free science is mostly forgotten, and analysis starts
from human nature. The economists' assumptions about human possibility
and the role of the market in harmonizing human behavior shape all their
arguments and conclusions. Given basic human drives, the market becomes
the arena of cooperation and safe competition and is the key to reconciling
egoistic individuals. The conservatives take human nature as fixed and largely
independent of moral, cultural, and social influences. These factors may modify
how people seek self-interest but not their inevitable attempt to do so. People
cannot be trusted outside the market and need strong spurs to cooperation.
Opportunities for satisfying greed are the most productive incentives to proper
behavior. In a form of secular Calvinism,21 life is seen as virtually penal in character. Men22 are purposeful but isolated, having few ties. Interests and pains
are incommensurable.
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Conservative man is mired in profound ignorance, overwhelmed by passion for his own interests. Each author agrees that humans can never know
enough, or sufficiently divorce self-interest from decisions, to plan for the entire economy. Rather than justifying protective government intervention, ignorance requires that collectively people leave things alone, accepting the results of evolutionary change in the economy. Though ignorant of the larger
picture, individuals know the immediate circumstances they confront and are
free to attempt to act within that situation if there is no outside, coercive interference. Individuals are thus independent and free to act, because the market
reconciles and harmonizes their conflicting efforts. Groups must not be free
to act because there are insufficient limitations upon their ability to act.23
The conservative economists are in complete agreement about what motivates people. In all environments, regardless of context, individuals compete
to satisfy self-interest24 in market-like situations. Individual self-intert:st is the
key to conservative political economy, providing a powerful explanatory and
predictive tool-the only interpretative device needed to understand economics, political behavior, and the inevitable failure of government intervention
into economic relations. As the most important element in human nature and
politics, pursuit of self-interest provides a "natural" limit to public action.
Economics is identified with analysis of the pursuit of individual self-interest.
Economic behavior is separated from total behavior. All motivation, perception, and behavior are individualistic. Each person is engaged in self-chosen,
utility maximizing,25 purposeful action, directed toward individual and individually chosen ends. In all circumstances, individuals pursue self-interest
regardless of the structuring function of role playing, public opinion, context,
or institutional goals which either mask self-interest or represent a temporary
coincidence of individual self-interests. These theorists assume a close connection between individual interests and preferences "and social outcomes"; 26 i.e.,
that it is correct to say that politics reflects the psychological and moral makeup
of individuals. They look at collectivities-groups, corporations, political parties-and see only individuals. The political or social whole can be understood
in terms of the part-individual pursuit of self-interest.
Self-interest is the most "dependable spur" to motivate people. Altruism,
or "human kindness," always fails before self-interest. Self-interest is whatever
people strive for, including money making and peer approval. "It is whatever
it is that interests the participants, whatever they value, whatever goals they
pursue."27 Self-interest fuels competition in the market and in politics but
simultaneously ensures cooperation. There is one choice: allow individuals to
seek their own self-interest in markets which limit the destructive pursuit of
self-interest or the vain hope of government beneficence.28 Trust in government simply loosens restraints. The market performs better than government
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because it generates minimum standards of respect for law, property, and the
rights of others which curtail destructive expressions of self-interest.29 When
people appear to behave in an altruistic manner, they are engaging in selfinterested activity from which they derive psychic income. The only nonmarket limit on pure, individual self-interest is the recent assertion that a man's
family is part of his definition of self-interest.30
Self-interest produces competitiveness, and to the conservatives, competition serves several functions. It controls and rewards behavior, makes consumers sovereign, ensures market adjustment, provides the alternative to government direction of the economy, removes temptations for public provision
of services, and thus promotes cooperation, freedom, and equality. Given
limited human knowledge and ubiquitous self-interest, neither intelligence
nor goodwill can create the order and institutions needed by society. Undirected
experimentation through competition provides the means by which individuals and societies advance, making it the only way to overcome human limitations. Although competition does not guarantee the best possible outcome,
it ensures maximum use of available knowledge and skill.31
Self-interest and individualism are not identical, but in the conservative
economists' formulation, individualism is reduced to allowing pursuit of selfinterest in market-like situations. Self-interest is the key element in individualism as well as in all aspects of politics and public policy, including conservative
critiques of democracy, freedom, and equality. The market theory of economics and politics is individualistic. Individuals are the major, perhaps the
only relevant, focus of attention. To the extent that a social whole exists, it
results from and reflects individual action and behavior. Common interest is
Hobbesian, encompassed by the pursuit of self-interest and by the system that
forces cooperation-here the market rather than government. Neither values
nor relative standing induce behavior, except when envy leads to egalitarian
demands.
Individuals and individual ends are the subject matter of economics (and
should be for politics), as opposed to '"social engineering'" which means "the
uses of individuals as means to nonindividual ends."32 Common interest is fulfilled by pursuit of self-interest in the market, individuals invariably seeking
self-interest regardless of context. This is the basis of Buchanan's "methodological
individualism." Buchanan states that individuals are the ultimate decision
makers. Economics and economic analysis of politics focus on individual actions
and choices in all circumstances. This supposedly makes economics scientific,
gives it superior status to other social sciences, and enables it to be predictive.
People are presumed to act according to individually determined preferences.
Individuals are the sources of their own valuations and always attempt to maximize autogenously derived conceptions of self-interest, usually envisioned as
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increases in wealth but always involving a desire for more. In the absence of
individual interest there is no interest. Postulating supra-individual interests
is unscientific and allows those who claim to speak for a greater interest to exercise their own self-interest-control over others.33 Institutions are important34
because they shape how individual interest is expressed and whether it has a
beneficial (markets) or harmful (politics) impact.35 The conservatives agree,
however, that institutional purposes are always subordinated to individual
ends, which "explains" the inevitable failure of all redistribution and intervention policies and "proves" that socialism is impossible. Though Buchanan is
aware that institutional context affects individual definition of utility maximization, serious analysis of how individuals interact-one of the basic concerns
of political science-is missing from each theorist.
The other authors agree that there are no collective goals and purposes,
only individual ones, that everything people do is to promote their self-interest,
and that this is the key to making political-economic recommendations. Selfinterest is a universal motivation, intuitively obvious and the starting point
for subsequent analysis. Despite his emphasis on "spontaneous order," tradition
and evolution, Hayek considers himself a true individualist in the traditions
of Locke, Hume, Smith, and Burke. Individualism is the alternative to socialism because people understand only their own immediate circumstances, and
no one can comprehend an entire social-economic order. 1iue individualism
requires spheres of indepe:ndent action - the economy-where people may attempt to achieve their ends. Like Buchanan, Hayek assumes that analysis starts
with individual actions and purposes, which create institutions as the unintended consequence, not the purpose, of most interaction. Order follows
from individuals pursuing self-interest and in turn provides the proper frame. work for that pursuit. Thus only individuals engage in purposeful action, not
groups. Social goals are simply the "coincidence of individual ends." There is
no way to adequately compare people. As previously mentioned, individual
self-interest is not egosim and includes a man's family.36 Friedman accepts essentially the same arguments. Though Gilder rejects much classical theory and
adds a creative element to his heroes of capitalism that is missing from the
others, his individualism is also contrasted with collectivism and is fulfilled by
individual action in the market.37
The self-interest dictum does not advocate that people treat one another
with selfishness, brutality, or lack of compassion. Nor is it a warrant for law
breaking. Rather, it claims that people always put self-interest first, howsoever
they define it. Whatever a person does, even if it seems foolish or suicidal to
an outside observer, is done in that person's self-defined self-interest, not for
moral or group ends.
Individualism is not necessarily a normative concept. Buchanan's initial for-
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mulation of methodological individualism, when stated in if/then terms, can
serve as a fruitful, nonnormative starting point for analysis. It takes on normative implications when it becomes the basis for policy prescriptions-a point
Buchanan admits but fails to carry into policy advice-and is operationalized as
the only valid expression of individualism. In the conservative formulation, individualism means the right to compete in markets; it does not address many of the
classical liberal concerns with allowing and encouraging autonomy and spontaneity outside the market.38 Indeed, impersonal, natural forces, beyond conscious
or collective control, determine general behavior and individual life chances.
Conservative economists claim that individuals bear the consequences and
rewards of their actions-as in Malthus's classic argument, even in an overpopulated society, "[h]e who performs his duty faithfully will reap the full
fruits of it"39- but that they have no power to constructively change the system. The individual may be the focus of analysis, but individualism, like freedom, equality, democracy, and justice, is procedural only. Procedural individualism
is not concerned with success or outcomes, only with the existence of procedures that allow individuals to attempt to compete. It is not a substantive
concept and has nothing to do with self-development, self-expression, successful achievement of goals, or the valuing of individual differences, all of
which open the possibility of legitimate public intervention to help people
achieve their goals. As such, it is a system-maintaining concept, because individual fate does not matter as long as the system that allows for interaction
is maintained.40 Individualism means behavior in the pursuit of self-interest
that is never outside the rules of the market. It is satisfied by the assumption
that people choose and act based on their own purposes and by allowing them
to seek their interests in the free market. Individual valuation is acceptable
only if expressed in conformity with the market. Otherwise, pursuit of individual self-interest is destructive and must be limited by constitutional restraints.
This individualism is neither the result of empirical analysis nor a proposition offered for testing, but is the irreducible starting point for analysis. The
conservatives may be correct about self-interest and individualism, but they
are excruciatingly vague about the content and meaning of self-interest. Selfinterest is the conservatives' Ptolemaic earth: Everything circles around it and
all counter evidence is made to fit within the system . The concept cannot be
refuted or falsified.
If self-interest means measurable financial interest, then the self-interest
axiom is clearly false,41 since that ignores other things of value as well as role
playing, conditioned responses, noninstrumental behavior, and accepting group
norms. If it refers to esteem, reputation, or psychic income, then we enter
realms of higher metaphysics, where every action is of necessity self-interested
because that is how conservative economists have defined human nature.
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Humans act only in self-interest; therefore whatever a person does, even if it
costs a great deal of money, peace of mind, or status, is in his or her selfinterest. In this context, only the individual is admitted as judge. By studiously avoiding specification of the meaning of self-interest, conservatives can
employ the concept to defend any policy or outcome, such as inequality,
which results from market relations, and to attack any welfare, tax, or redistribution policy. Such policies can serve no public interest but instead cloak
the self-interest of tax eaters-welfare recipients, majorities, and bureaucrats.
The self-interest argument depicts a world that must either be this way or
that, with no possible midpoint. Rousseau or market individualism are the
only alternatives. These theorists see only individual behavior and claim that
to discuss anything else entails jumping to the fantastical idea that there is a
supraindividual entity and that everyone seeks the common interest. Discounting that possibility leaves only procedural individualism.
This perspective overlooks behavior that is neither narrowly self-interested
nor altruistic. Goals and values may develop in consultation with others. The
act of bargaining may change one's perspective. Reflection on strongly held
values and ideals may modify attitudes and behavior. Individuals may internalize group norms; after all, people confront but do not create most of the
norms and rules that surround them, a point these authors celebrate under
the rubric of spontaneous order. If individual behavior is modified-and the
modification is called a tradition, institution, society, or whatever-we are confronted with something new that is not reducible only to single individuals.
Political and social institutions, unlike businesses, are not created to advance
the interests of entrepreneurs, investors, or employees but have other purposes or missions. Moreover, self-interest is a motive, not a justification acceptable to others. Even if morality is a fig leaf for naked self-interest, people insist
that self-interest be justified by appealing to a larger value. That there are rewards for advancing an institution's stated purpose, that individuals must conform their ends to the ends of the institution or tradition or be excluded from
it, that they need the institution to achieve their own ends, that advancement
requires behavior which seems to advance group norms-these counterassumptions mean that the node, or point, of interaction is important and must be
analyzed in itself.
In asserting that all action is self-interested, these authors use self-interest
in two ways. It means (a) any interest or gratification, including psychic income, and (b) tangibles-monetary, or occasionally power, gain. The conservative economists focus on the first when discussing general behavior and the
second when discussing politics and government. By definition, the possibility
of seeing political self-interest in terms of moral values is excluded by shifting
the meaning of self-interest. Self-interest (b) excludes upgrading the common
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denominator, patriotism, and risking death in the armed forces. It prevents
consideration of role playing, collective norms, and customs and depreciates
structural limits on how an individual can pursue self-interest. If self-interest
(a) were allowed into politics, internalization of group norms and guidance
of self-interest by these norms would be possible. This would effectively undermine the political market concept because (a) allows the possibility of something other than coercively self-interested behavior. That would reduce the
contrast between the political and economic markets. If only tangible selfinterest is possible in politics, the economic market is protected from intervention, and politics should be drastically curtailed.
Even if politics is only self-interest (b), while (a) is possible in economics,
and even if the conservatives adequately explained this difference, the model
ignores the Aristotelian and Madisonian tradition of limiting political selfinterest by pitting interest against interest, passion against passion. These authors
make no attempt to explain why some actors do not define self-interest in terms
of whistle blowing instead of competing to join in plundering the public or
wealthy minorities. Yet the success of their political and constitutional proposals depends upon someone standing aside from the general scramble for
place and plunder, seeing their and society's long-range interest and reinstating
economic sanity. If people and politics are as these authors claim, it is unclear
where the majority coalition to do this will come from-though a majority in
support of their policies may not be necessary if high deficits, low taxes, and
reduced popular participation destroy the resources necessary to support the
welfare state. Moreover, it is left unexplained why and how these authors have
overcome human nature, seen the truth, transcended the general chaos they
describe, and avoided charges that their policies are tainted by self-interest.
Either they stand above self-interested political struggle or their arguments express self-interest, not an abstract truth. Acceptance of the market may give
this ability. Hayek states, "I am as certain as anyone can be that the beliefs
set out in it [Road t:o Se,fiwm] are not determined by my personal interests."42
If it is possible to transcend self-interest in this instance, why not others?
If people are solely rational utility maximizers as the conservatives paint
them, the free-rider principle should apply in politics. Why should a rational
economic man join a political group, or contribute to mosquito abatement
or pollution control, when he will receive benefits whether he contributes or
not, as long as others contribute? The linkage between voting or group membership and hoped-for rewards is even more tenuous in politics than in such
public health programs. What is being "produced" and "purchased" is less
obvious in politics than in the economic market. How votes replace dollars
is unclear. Voting is extremely difficult to explain in individualistic terms.
Presumably one weighs the costs of group membership or voting against the
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likelihood that membership or voting will directly affect the outcome in a way
that is personally beneficial. If it is a large group (and in this model, despite
Friedman, groups must be fairly large), individual action has little impact. It
makes no sense to join a group even if membership is beneficial unless selfinterest (a) is allowed,43 and then civic virtue or ideals or group-think may be
operating. To appeal to individuals by saying that if everyone behaved this way
no one would get what he or she wants is irrelevant. That is a moral appeal,
logically and functionally identical to "be a good citizen," "do your part," "win
one for the Gipper," but given the conservative model this is irrelevant, perhaps
impossible. Morality is often a cloak for self-interest,44 a rationalization for the
tangible self-interest of politics. Thus, either the conservative explanation of
how groups act together is correct, or their picture of human motivation and
the free rider are correct-but not both, unless people are irrational.45
As with God's will and fate, conservative self-interest is sufficiently broad
to acc~unt for all behavior while not explaining it. At the same time, these
authors reject the possibility of creating institutions to make narrow self-interest
serve wider public goals and purposes. The market does this automatically,
but it is impossible in politics. However, calling behavior self-interested solves
nothing until one specifies how it is self-interested. Instead of a priori assertions, there should be empirical analysis to determine if this or that agency
or policy can be shaped to channel self-interest into benefiting others. Regardless of whether conservative self-interest is a hypothesis to be tested or a metaphysical claim, it is presented as axiomatic and carries a heavier weight in shaping and coloring their argument and analysis than any of their other assumptions.
The issue of self-interest can never be resolved. Perhaps it is similar to the
old question of whether the glass is half full or half empty. The answer is not
important in itself-the glass is both46-but tells much about the answerer.
How a person conceptualizes interest determines what policies he or she considers possible or legitimate. The conservative economists resolve the problem
of self-interest by limiting politics and public policy. Self-interest shapes their
image of order and the kind of polity that follows.

Order
Human nature, operating within the market, creates a natural, harmony producing, autonomous order. That self-interest here leads to coordination and
harmony is based on the belief that this order exists, separate from human
volition, immune from successful intervention or collective manipulation. In
a fundamental philosophical assumption, the conservatives insist that instead
of chaos, irregularity, or randomness, there is order, regularity, and identifiable
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causation which result from individual self-seeking behavior. This belief takes
on mythic proportions, providing a basic explanation of reality. Despite a Hobbesian picture of human motivation, the market makes people naturally social. As with such nineteenth-century political-economy, natural-law theorists
as Malthus, Herbert Spencer, and William Graham Sumner, the conservative
economists believe that this order is both scientific and moral, setting limits
to human desires and possibilities. It is an evolved order, not created by any
single person or group, independent, and superordinate to politics. It is neither
convention, model, nor metaphor and is not imposed by analysis.
The concept of an existing order to which behavior should conform is very
old. Platds forms, the medieval linkage between human and eternal law through
natural law, and the concept of natural law as rational behavioral principles
deduced from human nature sound a continuing, though disparate, theme in
political analysis. Throughout its varied development, people making this
argument have insisted that everything is not convention, that man is not the
measure of all things, and that there are relations humanity cannot consciously
change for the better.
The Physiocrats first developed the idea that the economy is orderly, forming a natural, independent operating system.47 Adam Smith's invisible hand,
where a person intending his or her own interest is led to promote the interests
of others, and his assumption that the market tends to produce harmony of
interests are based on the belief there is an existing order to which people contribute and conform. Malthus made the same assumption, but his order, though
it summarized the essential idea of economic order until today, was not so benign. The ratio between food and population growth froze humanity into existing political-economic relations which could not be directly altered or ameliorated. Even political reform depended upon the poor accepting that government
could not improve their situation. The natural order of things-including the
distribution of property-decreed conformity and nonintervention.
Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek agree that there is an order-a spontaneous
order. This natural order is self-maintaining, in equilibrium in a fundamental
sense. Hayek's concept of order is the most developed and serves as a model
for the others. Though he does not consider economics to be as objective as
Friedman does, he believes that spontaneous order in human affairs is an objectively true statement. It is the fundamental reality upon which he bases his
political economy.
Hayek's spontaneous order exists ''without having been deliberately created." It is characterized by self-correcting forces, a "self-steering mechanism,"
"regularities," and is "self-generating."48 To Hayek, it is impossible for the conscious human mind to produce this kind of order and cooperation. "[T]he unconscious collaboration of individuals in the market leads to the solution of
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problems." Action is possible because the social and physical worlds are "orderly," but this order is "only partly the result of human design." Instead, it
arises "from regularities of the behavior of the elements which it comprises"
and, while affecting them, is "the unforseen effect of conduct that men have
adopted" for their own ends. Human actions "take place within a more comprehensive spontaneous order" that rests "in part on regularities which are not
spontaneous but imposed." Thus, it is "a spontaneous order of human activities of much greater complexity . . . than could ever be produced by deliberate arrangement:' evolved by "individuals without their intending to create
such an order." It is the nondeliberate and "unforeseen results of the haphazard
activities of countless individuals and generations." Given human inability to
understand complex wholes, this is "an order of much greater extent than we"
could create by conscious manipulation. This order is the "outcome of a supraindividual process of evolution and selection." The "discovery'' of this spontaneous order "provided the foundation for a systematic argument for individual liberty."49
Hayek's order is composed of abstract relations-actually a rationalist construction-though it is the basis for concrete policy recommendations, and
"cannot be defined in terms of any particular observable facts . . .. not something visible or otherwise perceptible but something which can only be mentally
reconstructed." It does not have a purpose but allows individuals to seek their
purposes within it. General rules, equally applied, encourage the formation
and maintenance of this natural, spontaneous order, but it is impossible to
work out its details or force its development. As the product oflong-run evolution and adaptation, the spontaneous order may not be the best that can be
conceived, but it is better than anything man can deliberately create. Such an
order "may persist while all the particular elements they comprise, and even
the number of such elements, changes." General rules-stripped of reference
to existing societies but discoverable through their behavior and evolution allow people to adjust one to another "through the confinement of the action
of each" to those rules. Each person is not assigned but creates his or her own
position within this order. Thus relations develop without reference to any
known, definite individual.50
The concept of order represents a reality superior and antecedent to individuals who must conform to the rules and needs of this order. As with
Burke, it compensates for individual ignorance, providing answers for both individual and shared dilemmas. The assumed fact of the order's evolution is
of crucial importance in conditioning acceptance of economic relations as
natural, conveying an air of inevitability and creating a naturalistic standard
superior to human will by which to judge behavior. This belief in order, evolution of order, and existence of an order of reality structures the thinking of
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other conservative economists. To Friedman, the development of "complicated and sophisticated structure . . . as an unintended consequence" of pursuit of individual self-interest explains not only the market but, as in Hayek,
language, science, and social values. His monetarism cannot be understood
apart from belief in underlying regularity and order. Friedman claims that an
invisible hand promotes harmony in economics, while "scientific laws" guarantee failure when government interferes in economic affairs. Nothing can prevent it.51
Like Hayek, Buchanan claims that "discovery" of the spontaneous coordinating properties of the market in the eighteenth century provided concrete support for constitutional democracy, limited government, and economic analysis.
This "untouchable" principle of classical political economy "combines freedom and order." Despite his interest in contractual creation of and limits on
government, Buchanan rejects a constructivist position, claiming that the
institutional structure and foundation of society are not consciously created,
nor are outcomes "purposely directed." Order in the political economy evolves
from the processes that generate it, primarily pursuit of individual economic
interest. Order, a central element for each of these authors, has often developed in opposition to government.52
Despite differences with these authors, George Gilder repeatedly expresses
faith in the compensating logic of the world and universe. The concept of
order, natural relations, and natural systems permeates Wealth and Poverty.
Increasing wealth for the rich benefits the poor because it is entrepreneurs
who "know the rules of the world and the laws of God." There is a natural
order in human affairs, with the wealthy on top and women in their natural,
inferior position with regard to men. Poverty and inferior status for ethnic
minorities result from interplay of natural forces . Though it is moved by creative entrepreneurs, not by Adam Smith's invisible hand, order exists.53
Spontaneous order has profound political implications, which are elaborated in later chapters. Along with self-interest, it is the key argument limiting
politics and popular expectations. The concept can conceal political power under
seemingly impersonal forces. Despite Buchanan's contractarianism, spontaneous
order rejects the liberal tradition that a social contract is the basis of the political system. Government, a created not evolved institution, is suspect, based
on ignorance, and likely to interfere in delicate relations no one fully understands. Spontaneous order limits political choice, setting large parts of public
life off limits to political intervention. It considers social and class relations
natural. It contends there is ultimate harmony between people. While its promoters avoid the word "equilibrium," their basic concepts and claims-monetarism, self-adjusting relations, the market as the best protection against market
abuses, private gain leading to public good, adjustment of supply and demand-
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assume order and equilibrium,54 negating intervention. How could there be
spontaneous order without belief in equilibrium? If people cannot direct outcomes to desired ends, all they can do is maintain the procedures that allow
the natural system of spontaneous order to operate.
Order encourages the emphasis on procedures over outcomes that is seen
throughout conservative economists' political theory, shaping their concepts
of freedom, equality, democracy, justice, and the role of government. Hayek
recognizes this. The key danger facing his order is revolt against impersonal
forces and necessity-the unwillingness of people to accept "impersonal and
anonymous" mechanisms. Conscious efforts to intervene, whether through
planning, regulation, specification of collective goals, or vain attempts to impose "high ideals," inevitably fail-a theme constantly echoed in Buchanan and
Friedman-leading to totalitarianism.55
This concept of order is a secularized version of natural law, embodying
the authority and attractiveness of claims based on necessity and inevitability
rather than human volition. It both describes and prescribes human behavior.
Any theory that argues that people should follow a prescribed course of action
because it flows from basic human nature or relations and is of universal application, is a form of natural-law thinking. Spontaneous order is natural in
that it springs from innate human drives, human nature, and motivation but
is independent of deliberate human design. Human actions generate relations
and institutions, but neither consciously nor according to human wishes.
Everything has some purpose and can be explained from within the system
by those with knowledge.

The Market Is Spontaneous Order
While many spontaneous orders can exist, the quintessential one is economic,
and conservative economists claim they have demonstrated its existence.56 It
is embodied in the market. The market is the single most important social
interaction-a model for proper conduct and a goal of public policy. When
free of government intervention, the market is orderly and order producing,
distributing goods and services in direct proportion to each person's contribution to the self-determined welfare of others. With the exception of rare and
necessarily transitory monopolies, no one exercises control. Each participant
is equally subject to the same impersonal forces. Outcomes are not the result
of any one person's or group's actions or will. The market is fair, just, spontaneous, and voluntary and coordinates self-interested individuals without coercion. It compensates for human nature by channeling self-interested impulses and correcting for limited knowledge and ability. This makes it much
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more efficient than any other possible means of organizing people. If the market is not working as it should, something external to the market, such as coercive labor unions or intrusive government, must be interfering to benefit
some at the expense of others.
To Hayek, the market ensures "spontaneous collaboration" and order. If
left free, the market operates at maximum efficiency, making more "available
than could be done by any other known means." It assures "each will get for
the share he wins . .. as large a real equivalent as can be secured." Since distribution is independent of "anyone's designs or intentions, it is meaningless to
describe the manner in which the market distributed the good things of this
world among particular individuals as just or unjust."57
Given a "stable monetary framework," Friedman's "market system is inherently stable;' more so than any other system. It is characterized by equilibrium. Prices organize activity, provide incentives, and "determine who gets
how much of the production-the distribution of income"-through operation of "an invisible hand." Pursuit of self-interest creates a "finely ordered and
effectively tuned system, yet it is not deliberately created by men." It operates
only when people voluntarily agree to trade, exchange, or interact. Everyone
is free to enter. Competition peacefully coordinates behavior, prevents abuses,
and distributes rewards. Distribution is fair because "market imperfections are
not very significant," and there are fewer imperfections than in any alternative
system. In the long run, despite any apparent difficulties, the market must be
left to its own self-correcting, autonomous forces, because intervention ruins
its intrinsic order. Past instability has "been produced by erratic and unwise
government intervention rather than any inherent instability in the system
itself. " 58
The market reconciles "autonomy . . . with coordination and continuity,"
or "spontaneous coordination." "The market is the classic example" of order produced by "decentralized processes."59 It creates voluntary cooperation
through competitive pursuit of self-interest without coercive imposition of
common values. Friedman claims it "permits unanimity without conformity"
and allows peaceful collaboration while each person "goes about his own business." Emphasizing each separate, distinct exchange, rather than the exchange
framework and those who may be affected by that exchange, everyone involved benefits from a transaction, or else it would not occur because each
person is allowed to choose with whom he or she will exchange.60 In the absence of government intervention, market relations are "the institutional embodiment of the voluntary exchange process."61
These claims are reflected in Buchanan's identification of the market with
moral order.62 Though admitting the market is not perfectly competitive, he
asserts that it embodies consent and unanimity through free exchange, is ere-

The Foundations for a Political Argument

37

ated by cooperative behavior developing over time, ensures that "owners of
inputs" receive rewards "commensurate" with those inputs, and prevents "unilateral action" by any one participant.63
These arguments provide the essential justification-an appeal to higher
standards to confirm the validity of an argument-of the market. They are a
mixture of naturalistic and utilitarian claims. The market is a natural system,
resulting from human nature, that has evolved through gradual accretions of
unconscious and nondeliberate inputs from millions of individual participants. Fortuitously, the market harmonizes interests, ensuring that pursuit of
self-interest promotes rather than harms the interests of others and eliminating
the need for exogenous value systems. The market is the model of what people
should aspire to be and do as well as a limit upon what they can do and be.
By definition the effects of a natural system must be better than those of any
possible alternative. Belief in a natural system provides a powerful attraction,
since "the order of Nature is unquestionable and good .... in order to lead
a better life one must conform to the laws of natural necessity."64 Mankind
has no choice but to conform to this natural order. People cannot do all they
can imagine but must learn to accept the market order as the best they can
achieve.
The conservative theorists also make utilitarian claims-even though Hayek
and Buchanan reject utilitarianism-that are potentially subject to empirical
verification. The market produces long-term desirable results (over time, more
people will benefit) and is more efficient than any other economic or political
system. Though these authors rarely mention Pareto, their market is Paretoefficient and cannot be improved deliberately without reducing someone's
self-defined welfare. Because it is voluntary and noncoercive, the market promotes more freedom, justice, and equality than politics or governments. It
overcomes human greed and limits the worst effects of human ignorance. This
produces a form of rule utilitarianism; Regardless of individual impact or outcome, people must follow the rules embedded in the market. Though too ignorant to deal with problems on a day-by-day or even cycle-by-cycle basis,
people have been given the primary rule for political and economic behavior
in the economists' discovery of the principle of spontaneous order operating
through markets. The hypothetical element in this claim is soon lost, and the
market's rules and injunctions become the only possible (an empirical claim)
and legitimate (a moral claim) means to promote welfare, efficiency,65 and such
political values as democracy. Even if some individuals, classes, or nations
suffer from supposedly temporary dislocations, there are no remedies outside
of the market framework. Winners and losers may be different, but the only
hope for long-term improvement is to follow the rules and allow natural market forces to operate. Hardships and disturbances are transient, adjustments
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occur rapidly, and people are guaranteed the maximally efficient use of all
resources.
As a natural, autonomous, noncoercive, self-equilibrating, spontaneous
system, the market provides an excellent perspective from which to analyze
and critique sociopolitical phenomena. This deterministic portrait is not open
to debate, which forestalls any analysis of its value assumptions. If this is an
objective description of reality-at least the way reality would be in the absence
of public intervention into economic relations-policy conclusions follow
with logical inevitability. Rational people cannot debate them . The image of
order through the market is the final element in the philosophical foundation
for the market critique and model of politics.

The Market as Analytic Model and Challenge to Politics
The market as a political concept consists of three elements: The market is
a model for political and social analysis, the basis for interpreting political
ideas, and a replacement for and alternative to government and politics. This
section briefly examines the market as a means of political analysis, focusing
on "political markets," while later chapters will take up the two remaining
themes.
For at least two centuries, a single protean idea has guided liberal, and
deeply affected socialist, thought: The market is a remarkable coordinating,
information producing, and distributive agency. Economists debate its exact
nature, extent, and contemporary importance, but it is at the center of most
of their analyses-Friedman or Galbraith, Hayek or Keynes. The analytic and
prescriptive value of markets is, therefore, the heart of contemporary nonMarxist economic thinking. Political science, on the other hand, has largely
ignored the market.66 That neglect now haunts our discipline, because the
market alternative disputes the validity of our normative and empirical enterprise. Some economists, such as James Buchanan, are engaged in virtual economic imperialism67 with their claim that an individualistic market model
explains political behavior. It supplants traditional political analysis that emphasizes institutions, interpersonal and intergroup relations, power (which disappears in the market), authority, role playing, legitimacy, normative analysis,
and so forth. In extreme market models, relationships are reduced to individualistic, utility-maximizing, exchange terms that explain "economic" and "political," individual, group, and institutional behavior. Groups hardly exist as
separate entities.
The simplicity, apparent precision, potential quantification, and determinism of the market model have encouraged its application outside of econom-
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ics. Though this book does not examine economic (i.e., market) analysis of
law, family life, marriage, language, philosophy, crime, anthropology, and other
areas,68 the market metaphor69 (though it is intended as much more than a
metaphor) is widely accepted as a valid and accurate analytic tool and basis
for policy prescription. In some cases, individualistic economic analysis has
become the sole behavioral explanation and the exclusive input for publicpolicy making.
Buchanan is very explicit. Economists offer the most valid theoretical
explanation of human behavior, which enables them to "unravel the most
tangled sets of structural relationships among human beings." This allows the
development of "a meaningful 'public philosophy,"' in part by undermining collectivist-welfare-policies and in part by "imposing reality upon man's
natural proclivity to dream. The economist, almost alone, takes man as he
exists." This requires that political science change its perspective to that of
economics, a "shift from the organizational entity as the unit to the individualin-the-organization" and his or her interactions with other individuals. The
approach of"methodological individualism" thus brings necessary realism and
rigor to political analysis. Focusing on anything other than individual, private
behavior while participating in decision making simply leads to faulty analysis
and wishful thinking. Political science lacks a tradition of analyzing and incorporating "a theory of human behavior into" its study of political processesmeaning its conclusions are prescriptive, not explanatory. Economics can contribute a theory to political science, but beyond gathering data, political science can offer little to economics.70
How has the 2,400-year-old tradition of political analysis failed? By ignoring the political market. The economists referred to in this book save their most
intemperate language, and the full normative implications of the market approach, for their description of the political market.

Political and Economic Markets: A Picture of Politics
The conservative economists insist on dividing political and social phenomena
into mutually exclusive alternatives with no stable resting place in between.
This dualism is apparent in the contrast between the political and economic
markets. In an extreme restatement of the classical liberal distinction between
society and state, there are only two ways to organize people: voluntary cooperation through markets or coercion through politics. These alternatives are
irreconcilable; 1 at opposite ends of the spectrum. Though ideal types, these
two markets form the basis for conservative policy prescriptions.
The political market is the reverse image of the economic market, revealing
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the essentials of politics. For Buchanan, "[T]he political relationship is not
commonly encountered in its pure form, that of abject slavery. . . . the economic or exchange relationship is, at least conceptually, visualized in its pure
form and, in certain instances, the relationship actually exists."72 Human nature explains the "success" of the economic market and the "failure" of the
political market. Motivation-self-interest-and the process of exchange are
the same in both the economic and political markets, but they produce distinct results because behavior constraints are radically different. The orderly
economic market is the result of spontaneous growth where many individuals
over long periods of time separately make decisions; politics is the area of constructivist, deliberate, conscious decisions by the few for the many. The economic market controls self-interest; the coercive political market allows it to
operate unchecked. Free individuals dominate economic markets; coercive
groups make up temporary, exploitive majorities that dominate the political
market. The evolved economic market is supposedly competitive, decentralized, noncoercive, and responsive to individuals and promotes diversity. Unless they have formed contracts, individuals may enter or leave at any time,
such movement being the essence of freedom. People act rationally in pursuit
of self-interest, each checking the ambitions of others while producing spontaneous order and benefits to others. Relations are always voluntary and expanding sum because people enter a relation only if it is beneficial.
These conditions are absent from politics. In the political market there is
coercion and limited choice. Rational pursuit of self-interest is detrimental because groups, not individuals, compete, which opens the way to potential
abuses of power. Unlike the economic market which supposedly harmonizes
egoistic individuals, politics provides no systematic spontaneous checks on
self-interest. There is neither free exit, as in the economic market, nor noncoercive competition. The object is to gain power to force others to comply
with one's will. The invisible hand of self-interest leads to dominance and conformity. Coercive groups-usually labor unions and welfare claimants-organize
and compete to control decision making, forcing redistributive demands on
productive individuals.
How does this political market operate? Western political institutions
"threaten to destroy the market economy'' by allowing excessive public spending with "a bias toward deficits." Competitive democracy encourages incorrect
popular expectations. Vote buying and lack of fiscal restraint create "inherent
and fundamental biases" for intrusive intervention which undermines natural
economic processes and stability. Because governments "are collectivities of utility maximizers," whose freedom from market control permits self-interest to
become exploitive, there is an inherent "propensity to truck, barter and exchange'' at the expense of public good. The result is a systematic bias favoring
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growth in public services at the expense of the natural economic order.73 This
is inevitable, flowing from human nature, universal suffrage, weak political parties, Keynesian economics, and immoral exploitation of the affluent minority
by redistributive majorities.
Why have governments allowed this? Given existing rules and institutions,
nothing else is possible. Government as a collective noun does not exist. Government institutions are aggregations of uncontrolled, self-interested utility
maximizers who do what is necessary to gain or retain power. Politics is an
exchange system employed for private, not public, ends. Public policy serves
selfish purposes. Universal suffrage requires responding to whatever satisfies
temporary majorities of greedy voters. Politicians and voters act alike; neither
sees their real interest. There are neither moral nor institutional restraints as
politicians outbid each other by making more and more promises to voters.
Electoral competition replaces competition to produce a better product. The
political market is created by luring voters into spending their "political income"-votes (which would seem to be expenditure, not income to obtain
coercive advantages). Self-interest ordains that politicians promise reduced
taxes and increased expenditures, encouraging gullible and unthinking political consumers74 to follow their natural propensity to demand something
for nothing. Politicians literally buy their election-a universal tendencywith funds taxed from someone else. In Friedman's terms, there is a "policy
of spend and spend, tax and tax [someone else], elect and elect." Frequent
elections ensure a short-term perspective, where particular and narrow interests dominate the general interest of cheap government and free markets.7 5
Special interests and group pursuit of privilege are the obvious problem.
A special interest is any interest-demands for welfare, redistribution, social
security, aid to education - that does not accept market outcomes but seeks
gains outside the economic market. Any extramarket gain, such as welfare or
minimum wages, is privilege. It does not matter if recipients are rich or destitute; they are privileged if part of their income comes from government programs. Whatever the market distributes cannot be privilege, no matter how
much wealth is gained or inequality generated.76 Thus a welfare recipient or
a person working for the minimum wage, if that is higher than wages in a competitive market, is privileged while a successful entrepreneur is not.
Majorities are collections of small minorities. In a model reminiscent of
John C. Calhoun, "The majority that rules is typically a coalition of special
interests." Choosing a number determined more by the needs of the theory
than by any empirical analysis, each interest rarely represents more than "2 or
3 percent" of a constituency, but combined they form temporary majorities.77
Democratic theory;8 according to Hayek and Samuel Brittan, holds that whatever majorities wish is just, gives majorities unlimited power to satisfy every
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whim, and fails to distinguish between temporary and permanent majorities.
Unlimited modern democracy hardly differs from totalitarianism . In both
cases, a selfish minority (or minorities, or temporary majorities of minorities)
rules the (real) majority, producing government, in Hayek's mind, that is
"[c]orrupt at the same time weak: unable to resist pressure from the component groups ... however harmful to the rest such measures may be." The
competitive market in votes, to Brittan, means "liberal democracy inhibits
government from tackling coercive groups.m9 There is no unity of purpose,
except to plunder; no limit upon excesses, other than destruction of the economy; no morality, save self-interest; no moral order, only voters and politicians bidding for power in the political market. The result is that each government "must be expected to be generally engaged in operating against the
long-term public interest by serving its short-term political advantage."80
Human nature produces the political market and determines that governments must fail when they attempt to satisfy popular demands for welfare,
regulation, or intervention. This is inevitable. To Friedman, "[T]here is something innate in the political process that produces this result." Government
must be inefficient; "scientific laws" ensure the bankruptcy of any market
intervention. This is no accident but is mandated by the "use of bad means
to achieve good objectives." Spending someone else's money guarantees it will
be spent badly. Friedman's argument virtually duplicates William Graham
Sumner's: 81 ''A person who intends only to serve the public interest is led by
an invisible hand to serve private interests which it was no part of his intention
to serve." As with Adam Smith's invisible hand, this ghostly guide is selfinterest.82
By denying efficacy to politics and raising the idea of a political market,
these conservatives shield the economic market from criticism and intervention. The political market prevents government from either ending or mitigating economic problems. Even if the economic market fails-which is doubtfulpolitics cannot correct it. Because the political system is preordained to fail,
there is little or no likelihood that it could cure market failure, if market failure
existed. Apparent problems such as recession, unemployment, or falling living
standards must be endured because spontaneous order ensures that correction
will occur and intervention prevents natural corrective action. Even if one concedes a market failure with consequent political and social dislocations, this
must be balanced against the certainty that collective attempts to address it
will also fail, compounding the initial failure. To Friedman, "[P]olitical considerations prevent the effective use of the scientific knowledge we do have
for the purpose of promoting stability." The burden of proof must fall on
those supporting intervention-and these authors reject the macroeconomic
theory that might allow this. To the extent that markets fail, it is more often
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because of government intervention in spontaneous relations than any market
defects.83
The economic market is clearly superior, if only we have patience and limit
political intervention. The choice is either consumer protection, diversity, and
freedom in the economic market or conformity and collectivism in the political market. Allowing just a little intervention is similar to being a little pregnant. The essence of freedom is being able to "choose how to use our income"
and resources, and that, according to Friedman, may be more important than
occasionally voting. Politics is virtually defined as coercion, which is lacking
in the market; therefore, government and politics are the major, perhaps the
only real, dangers to freedom. These authors reject the possibility that consumer preferences might dominate in politics as they claim they do in economics. In politics, preferences-and people have only individual preferences,
not considered and collective judgments-must be limited and restrained,
because in politics coercive power is added to preference. Intervention concentrates power, and centralization of power increases coercion. Given its many
participants-the word implies individuals-the market denies centralizing
power to an administrative king. No one is in control, able to impose his or
her will; no one person or group makes all relevant decisions; no one must
subserve another. Thus, for the conservatives, limiting politics ensures freedom.84
While economics is variable sum, politics is zero sum and coercive. "If participation were voluntary, one would not observe negative-sum games, since
the affected minority could always refuse to participate."85 This follows from
conservatives' peculiar definition of coercion and their claim that all market
relations are and must be voluntary. Ignoring externalities, constrained choices,
and the impossibility of avoiding all exchanges, the authors believe that one
always must choose the market over politics or collective decisions regardless
of apparent inconveniences. As noted above, government use of resources is
and must be wasteful because officials use someone else's assets for their own
ends. Thus Friedman charges that "[c]rime has risen not desp#e government's
growth but largely because of government's growth." Given human motivation, aid to education, pollution control, unemployment compensation, and
regulation have inevitably compounded the problems they sought to address.86
Whether focusing on greed, interference in natural relations, or simple carelessness, each author claims intervention inevitably causes inefficiency.

Comments
Assumptions are crucial. Discussing damaging industrial smoke, Buchanan
and Tullock argue: "If the externality is real, some collectively imposed scheme
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through which the damaged property owners are t:a.xed and the ft:rnrs owners are subsidized for capital losses incurred in putting in a smoke-abatement machine can
command the assent of all parties. If no such compensation scheme is possible . . . the externality is only apparent and not real." In defining costs,
Buchanan and Tullock assign the burden of proof, and therefore the policy
decision as to who should pay, not to the persons imposing the fouled air,
but onto those who are affected by it.87 A different starting assumption could
easily conclude that the cost of air pollution control should rest on those who
produce pollution and their customers.
These authors contrast the ideal of an economic market with the partial
reality of politics. They discuss how markets should operate, not how they
do operate; how politics must operate, not how it actually does. By definition,
the economic market is impersonal. It cannot be oppressive, because oppression is a relation between identifiable persons, and in the market one can avoid
such relations. While an unemployed, hungry person may miss the significance of this distinction, these authors are unconcerned with such people if
their problems are not the fault of an identifiable other. In economic relations,
constraint, lack of alternatives, and inadequate means are irrelevant to freedom.
The market critique of politics is deduced from the starting assumptions
about human nature and markets and is presented as a universally valid principle. Though Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek do not accept all of the assumptions in this chapter to the same degree-there is most divergence over
the objectivity claim-each accepts the essential argument. Their most important agreement is over their vision of human nature, spontaneous order, and
the market, as they frequently employ identical language to describe similar
phenomena. This shared view of the world encourages them to develop similar political and social arguments and recommendations, all converging to
limit political possibility.
The market vision is a powerful naturalist and occasionally rule-utilitarian
justification for conservative politics. Philosophical justification serves many
purposes. The most important one is to convince others, and perhaps oneself,
of the validity and superiority of a political, social, religious, or economic position or proposition. A justification establishes principles that can serve as operational statements in policy areas. It may be a sanction for belief or action.
The market model produces a presumption for the market and against politics
and government. It justifies self-interested economic and social behavior, the
minimal state, and little concern for the social-political impact of economic
behavior. It narrowly defines fundamental political values, so that they conform to natural market relations. This model leaves aside large parts of social
and political reality, especially behaviors that at least seem to involve more
than individual preferences and simple exchange. As economists, these authors
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are attuned to instrumental behavior, yet noninstrumental 88 behavior is often
an important reason for cooperation, political participation, and patriotism .
How institutions survive over long periods of time, if they are simply bundles
of utility maximizers and unarticulated rules, remains unexamined. Despite
grievous problems, the market model defines the great issues of politics. It is
the basis for the claims and arguments examined in the rest of this book and
will become clearer as we study the role of the market in conservative political
theory.
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Chapter Three

Freedom

The generality oflabourrrs in this and most other countries have as little choice ofoccupation
ar freetWm oflocomotion, are practically as dependent on fixed rules and on the will ofothers,
as they could be on any system shart of actual slavery.
-John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, bk. 2, chap. 1, sec. 3.
And effective freetWm depends on power; it is freetWm to use power possessed and has content
only insofar as the person has <means.'
-Frank H . Knight, "Abstract Economics as Absolute Ethics," Ethics 76 (1966) :166.

Definitional Assumptions and Politics
Politics is uniquely linguistic. Even in authoritarian systems people ultimately
control and manipulate others with words and ideas. Though using the same
terms, liberals, conservatives, socialists, and authoritarians give them different
meaning and content. Basic ideas and values, such as freedom, justice, equality, and democracy are "hurrah" words that are almost universally approved.
Even the most ruthless dictators claim to be "restoring" the conditions for
democracy. Each of us values freedom, but we debate its meaning: being left
alone, or having resources for choice and/or self-development, or willing acceptance of necessity. Justice is always the basis of the good life. But as Aristotle noted in his Politics, there are many competing interpretations of justice,
each arming its holders with some partial and legitimate claim to recognition.
Socrates and Thrasymachus discuss justice in the first two books of The Republic, but mean radically different things by it. Realization of either conception
of justice must annihilate the other.
It matters how people define or conceptualize important political ideas.
Words and ideas are not neutral but have consequences and symbolic importance. We perceive, explain, and understand the world through ideas and concepts; they construct and may constrict reality. Words control what people

49

50

Market-Based Politics

consider to be a problem, legitimate means to address that problem, and acceptable policy options. Frequently, definitions are actually moral claims and
assumptions about basic political values and provide the gauge to measure and
judge behavior, people, and institutions. A policy or proposal may be exploitative, a threat to freedom, acceptable in a democracy, or unjust depending
upon how one conceptualizes these values. Radically different policies, or
entire political systems, result from different images of commonly held beliefs
and values.1 If others accept our interpretation of the essence of freedom or
the meaning of democracy, we have gained significant control over their political perspective and behavior. Though normally definitions are useful,2 given
a particular purpose, and not necessarily true or false, conservatives' definitions follow from their economic assumptions and support their policy and
political claims.
This and the next three chapters explicate the conservative economists'
understanding and use of political ideas that have been contested for centuries; ideas that are pivotal in the history and operation of western liberaldemocratic systems. Conservative economists attempt to monopolize public
debate by recasting traditional political ideas to conform to their market model.
They assert that their definitions are not convention or convenience but are
given by nature or at least human nature, virtually a form of natural history.3
Human nature and the political market reveal the meaning of key ideas; any
other interpretation will replace the competitive economic order with coercive
political conflict, destroying freedom and the most productive possible economy.
Moreover, conservatives' definitional claims are interrelated, so that one opens
or closes possibilities and alternatives for the others, forming an integral part
of the economists' policy claims. For example, if democracy requires little
popular participation or if it means choosing among rival elites, then people
do not need extensive freedom or much equality. If equality is the right to
attempt to compete, then one does not need more freedom than the right
to compete.
These definitions have consequences for political discourse and control
the range of legitimate policy options.4 In C. B. Macpherson's term, market
economics sets "the inescapable requirements, of the political system." Though
starting from a significantly different perspective, Milton Friedman claims the
free market "defines the role that government should play in a free society."5
The conservative economists' definitions are inescapable. If they are successful
in convincing the public that freedom means being left alone, especially in
market relations; that democracy has little to do with political participation
and that currently low levels of participation should be further reduced; or
that equality and inequality are the result of natural economic processes into
which the public cannot constructively intervene, then their policy proposals
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and government model follow logically. These redefinitions, which flow from
the view of human nature and economic and political markets discussed in
chapter 2, set the framework for understanding the conservative economists'
challenge to public provision of welfare, regulation, and intervention into the
economy and are the basis for reconstructing contemporary liberal-democratic welfare states.

Debating the Meaning of Freedom
Freedom is one of the most important and contentious concepts in western
political discourse. Even within the same normative tradition, such as liberalism, there is unending controversy over the content and meaning of freedom
as well as what factual situations promote or retard freedom. In defining freedom differently, rival economists either condemn or applaud the welfare and/
or interventionist state; limit or expand the scope of government and group
action; and attack or defend democratic politics and equalization policies.
The perception of freedom has never been static. It has continually expanded to include more people and areas of life, adapting to problems, challenges, and opportunities. Freedom may refer to rights, liberties, powers, immunities,6 national independence, or being left alone. For the ancient Greeks,
freedom pertained to the polis and its independence from foreign rule, not
the individual-a meaning it still retains in many twentieth century national
liberation movements. Early modern theorists such as Locke emphasized the
relation between the individual and government in defining freedom . Nineteenth-century theorists such as John Stuart Mill added oppressive social situations, majorities, and holders of economic power as dangers to freedom.7
During the 1930s, freedom in the United States increasingly came to include
protection against economic disaster and concentrations of economic power.8
It is a virtual truism that no value, not even of life, is absolute, uncompromisingly dominating and overcoming all other values in all circumstances.
Freedom's meaning is no different. It too is hedged in by other values, beliefs,
traditions, and interpretations of what constitutes an obstacle that should be
overcome for its promotion. The question is not whether there will be any
limits to freedom-classical theory always emphasized that freedom is possible
only under the law-but rather what encompasses and constrains freedom,
what trade-offs are legitimate between freedom and other desirable values, and
what policies are likely to implement whatever one conceives as freedom. Such
limits must be defended and justified in one of several ways. Limits may be
imposed to protect another desirable value, as when the conservatives protect
their economic freedom by criticizing democracy. Or, limits may be based on
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the claim that people are not yet ready to enjoy the value-such as Lenin's
assertion that the proletariat was not ready to revolt or govern and therefore
needed strict party leadership to enforce success. Limits may also be imposed
on the ground that the value does not mean what it appears to mean, such
as the frequent eighteenth-century claim that the political equality implied by
widely accepted natural-law arguments did not include women, the poor, or
slaves.
An adequate theory of freedom must address a number of questions: what
is the general meaning of freedom; what are its source and justification; to
what areas of life does it apply; if there is conflict between different arenas for
freedom, which is dominant and by what criteria; is freedom a negative or
positive concept, or both; who has freedom-individuals, groups, or bothand under what circumstances; what are the obstacles to realizing freedom and
why; and what is choice.

Conservatives' Freedom
Freedom is the conservative economists' primary value and central idea. It
trumps all other values, confining their meaning and application. The conservative economists reject the claim that the meaning and content of freedom
continue to change and expand. Freedom has a specific content, the same as
it had for liberals in the eighteenth century9: being left alone and using your
property as you wish. Within a liberal-democratic framework developed over
the last three hundred years, the conservatives have chosen the historically narrowest meanings of freedom, equality, democracy, and justice, forcing these
concepts into the constraints of an idealized market economy while claiming
to maximize them. (In this context, "narrow'' means the fewest legitimate options, the smallest range of alternatives, the least chance for expansion, the
most tenuous interconnections between politics, economics and society, and
a focus on procedures, not substantive content or outcomes.) The result is
that although these theorists claim that their economy is, or should be, autonomous, political and social relations must conform to their economic model.
The conservatives' depiction of human nature, the market, and market requirements provides an absolute barrier to expansive conceptions of economic
or political freedom. Each of their values and proposals is structured upon,
limited by, and required to conform to individualistic pursuit of self-interest
as the essential component in freedom. A simple picture of human nature
encourages a simple picture of freedom, its necessary conditions, and its value.
Conservative freedom is grounded in human nature rather than an appeal to
contract, rights, or transcendent standards. Though the economists write ex-

Freedom

53

tensively about freedom, they are not concerned with related philosophical
and political questions. They have no developed theory of rights. Freedom
is their ultimate standard, but they justify it in negative, weak utilitarian terms.
Hayek defends freedom as the consequence of fundamental, "necessary,"
"irremediable," and "inevitable ignorance" that all people confront. 10 This primordial ignorance is not a reason for intervention but is the basis for rejecting
intervention. People must be left alone to take their course in the market. No
one can possibly have an adequate understanding of another's immediate situation, and no one can measure the consequences of the actions of millions;
therefore, to maximize efficiency, production, and satisfaction, people must
be allowed to choose, unhindered, in their immediate situation and take the
consequences of their choices. In this formulation, freedom's justification depends upon the functioning of the economic system. Given human nature,
freedom is absolutely necessary for achieving all that we want, but it is still an
instrumental good, justified not in and for itself or even as a means to individual expression, development, or self-determination, but as a means to largely
material-productive ends.11 As such, it lacks the philosophical grounding these
authors seek for their policies and is potentially open to refutation if the preferred ends can be achieved by empirically verifiable alternatives-though they
believe this is not possible and reject all contrary evidence.
Freedom is a process and condition summarized by the absence of coercion, especially government intervention in one's affairs. The primary meaning of freedom is economic, negative, and individualistic: being allowed to attempt to use one's resources as one wills, in competition with others. It is an
economic concept in the narrow sense of exchange relations in a market, not
in a wider meaning of maximizing output or minimizing potential resource
waste. Any political or social connotation is derivative and legitimate only if
it supports the principle economic meaning. The market is, therefore, the absolutely essential arena for the exercise of freedom. Moreover, the requirements for freedom determine the role of government and the obligations citizens
owe to one another. Freedom in the market allows people to promote selfinterest, but giving equal (same) freedom to everyone prevents concentration
or exercise of power. Thus market freedom is the best expression of human
freedom and simultaneously limits the potential for abuse of freedom.
For Friedman, freedom means allowing each "individual to pursue his
own interests so long as he does not interfere with the freedom of others to
do likewise." This involves seeking one's ends, giving the "opportunity for the
ordinary man to use his resources as effectively as possible." It has nothing to
do with maximizing opportunities or being successful. Though Friedman
believes that freedom is indivisible, with each component contributing to the
others, he is most concerned with economic freedom-allowing the individual
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to pursue his or her economic interest.12 To Hayek freedom is the opposite
of slavery. It means "a state in which each can use his knowledge for his purposes." Freedom exists when people may act on the basis of their "own knowledge and in the service of their own ends," though this applies mainly in the
market. Each of the conservative economists agrees with the argument that
freedom involves the elimination of"coercion by the arbitrary will of another."
The key word is "arbitrary." Coercion does not exist in the market. Only government can arbitrarily coerce people, making government the major threat
to freedom. Thus, to Buchanan, "[A]n individual is at liberty or free to carry
on an activity if he or she is not coerced from so doing." Freedom for Hayek
does not guarantee "any particular opportunities, but leaves it to us to decide
what use we shall make of the circumstances in which we find ourselves."
Freedom does not include agency; 13 means or power to satisfy wishes; extensive choices; collective efforts to change circumstances; or any guarantees beyond protection from physical force and being allowed to attempt to do what
one wishes. Freedom is not affected by the conditions under which one operates, the results of unsuccessful competition, perceptions, or the inadequacy
of means to operationalize one's freedom. 14

The Market and Freedom
Given these notions of freedom, how is the market related to freedom? The
conservative position is clear. Freedom depends upon and is generated by the
market. The market is the primary area of freedom, an absolutely essential
means of protecting freedom, and a necessary support for freedom. Without
a free market, political freedom and democracy could not long survive. Even
if it does not operate perfectly, the market encourages freedom, especially in
the long run. The conservative claim focuses on being allowed to act rather
than broadly conceived conditions for the exercise of freedom .15 To the extent
that these authors,relate freedom to self-development or self-realization, it is
exclusively economic self-realization-pursuing one's ends-through a competitive market.
Though Hayek is less inclined than Friedman to claim that the market always defends freedom, he believes that it usually does and that it is absolutely.
essential to freedom . The preexisting spontaneous order is the basis for freedom; freedom grew as the spontaneous order developed. Thus, discovery of
natural order in human relations "provided the foundation for a systematic
argument for individual liberty."16 As the spontaneous order is primarily economic, a market order is a functional, logical, and sequential prerequisite for
the development of all freedom.
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For Friedman, economic freedom "is itself a component of freedom broadly
understood ... an end in itself .... [and] an indispensable means toward
the achievement of political freedom." Economic freedom means being allowed
to choose "how to use our income" and "to _use the resources we possess in
accordance with our own values." There is no difference in freedom for those
with large or small income, property, or resources. Regardless of contrasts in
wealth-I have one dollar, you have one million-everyone is equally free as
long as no one coerces another in the use of his or her resources. This freedom
includes owning and using property; entering any chosen business or profession, without limits or licensing requirements; and voluntarily buying and selling in any market.17 It means that freedom cannot be enhanced by acquisition
of new resources through government redistribution or protection.
The conservatives equate free with voluntary. In another example of either/
or thinking, voluntary behavior is the opposite of being coerced. All behavior
that is not coerced is free, voluntary, and self-chosen. Though the market is
not the only arena of voluntary behavior, only voluntary behavior occurs in
the market; only the market guarantees voluntary behavior. Equal formal access to the market, therefore, is the essence of freedom. Pursuit of self-interest
ensures that voluntary relations are neither coercive nor uniformly one-sided.
Voluntary, for these theorists, is a very broad concept, including situations
where a person has little choice and may face substantial constraint.
This image of voluntariness transforms the market into the realm of consent, and consensual, noncoercive relations. Because market relations are voluntary, they are entered freely and deliberately: "[B]oth parties must benefit
. . . so long as the exchange is voluntary and there is no force . . . both people are better off." Even if it is not a sufficient condition, "voluntary exchange
is a necessary condition for both prosperity and freedom ." Though in Cap#alism and Freedom Friedman notes that"[e]xchange is truly voluntary only when
nearly equivalent alternatives exist," this qualifier disappears from his later
work. Because, by definition, force cannot take place in the voluntary market
and in the absence of force freedom is preserved, government should not intervene in economic relations.18 Any intervention must diminish freedom.
The "ethical attractiveness of voluntary exchange" becomes an important
part of the defense of markets, even though analysis excludes concern for nonforceful coercion.19 It assumes that each person in an "economic" relation is
an autonomous, self-directing actor and views freedom from the perspective
of the person acting, not the person acted upon. The notion of being acted
upon - by manipulation, compulsion, subliminal suggestion, or passive receipt of externalities-hardly exists in this thinking. People outside market
transactions are not considered.20
Other conservatives expand upon this position. William Hutt sees the
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market as both free and democratic, where "each person's vote" is weighed in
proportion to his contribution "to the common pool of output"; that is, his
contribution "to the well-being of the rest." This free and democratic system
depends on private property, and its democratic content is not abridged by
participants having different numbers of votes. As in classical political economy, property is a key element in the definition and defense of freedom . Protection of property is not a threat to individuals, even those without property,
but is the basis for civilization, freedom, and the spontaneous order. For Ludwig von Mises, "Private property creates for the individual a sphere in which
he is free of the state." Hayek agrees that we need such autonomous spheres
to prevent coercion. Property, liberty, and law "are an inseparable trinity." The
condition of propertylessness, however, does not compromise freedom, because those without property are free (allowed) to choose for which property
owner they will work. To Murray Rothbard, freedom depends upon property
and using property and talents as one wishes. Such "freedom leads to economic development" which encourages further scope for individual action
and freedom .21

Economic and Political Freedom
Conservative and liberal economists agree that economic and political freedom are interdependent, but disagree over the meaning of economic freedom,
the nature of its relation to politics, and whether freedom is an extensive or
narrow idea. Liberals envisage an intimate, two-way linkage. Economic freedom may promote or harm political freedom. Both are necessary values, and
neither should be emphasized to the detriment or exclusion of the other.
Under a wide variety of circumstances, such as poverty, unemployment, unequal access to employment, or lack of educational opportunities, political
intervention can expand economic freedom, whereas poverty and economic
instability can destroy the conditions of political freedom. On the other hand,
conservatives see a strong causal link from economic to political freedom .
Economic freedom is prior to and necessary to political freedom, but economic freedom cannot be expanded by any public intervention. Indeed, the
spontaneous order of economic freedom may flourish even in the absence of
effective political freedom. There is no evidence that the conservatives contemplate any conditions where economic freedom could undermine political
freedom or stability.
Friedman exemplifies the conservative position . "Economic freedom is an
essential requisite for political freedom ." "Restrictions on economic freedom
inevitably affect freedom in general, even such areas as freedom of speech and
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press." The market limits government and reduces "greatly the range of issues
that must be decided through political means," and anything that limits or
diffuses government power increases freedom. Thus the market prevents concentration of political and economic power, which is the only alternative to
free markets, thereby serving "as a check and a counter to political power." It
does this by providing a wide variety of services, removing an important area
of life from government, creating a polycentric system as opposed to a concentration of power in politics, and providing an economic base from which people who are not acceptable to the government may be able to advocate dissident ideas.22
Friedman makes no effort to explain to whom holders of economic power
are responsible if they have the ability to check government power. The word
"responsible" literally has no meaning in the market, as he and the other conservatives deny that there is any private, economic power because it dissolves
in the market. Efforts to enforce "responsibility" must always be destructive.
Market power is a positive contribution to political freedom for two reasons.
First, one can always find another buyer, seller, employer, or employee; therefore, no single buyer, seller, and so forth can have any coercive control. Second, since coercion is the only danger to freedom, politics is coercive, and
since the market is an impersonal mechanism that can never be coercive-a
point upon which Hayek repeatedly insists-the market protects freedom. It
provides "a system of checks and balances" which "enables economic strength
to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement."23 Thus its limitations on government, even on popular majorities, always promotes freedom.
Economic freedom has virtually created political freedom. According to
Friedman, political freedom in ancient Greece and Rome, as well as in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "clearly came along with the free market
and the development of capitalist institutions." By creating polycentrism, the
market encourages diversity of opinion and reduces the areas of life where politics is dominant.24 Hayek agrees: "Economic freedom is thus an indispensable
condition of all other freedom:' necessary to and resulting from personal
freedom. It is "the prerequisite of any other freedom." He links planning and
government intervention in economic affairs with "the disappearance of all personal freedom [including "spiritual freedom"] and the end of justice." Individual and political freedom have never existed and cannot now exist except
under his version of economic freedom.25 Buchanan also links economic to
individual and political freedom, claiming that markets are less arbitrary and
more likely to support freedom, justice, and equality than is politics or government. Markets "tend to maximize freedom of persons from political control,"
and it is in systems with free markets that freedom in general is best protected.26 The conservatives' causal link between economic freedom and overall
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freedom is a deductive necessity rather than a hypothesis offered for evaluation . The conservative economists' choices are simple: unrestrained economic
freedom, essentially laissez-faire capitalism, which is the only system promoting
freedom; or centralized control, something close to the Soviet model. A stable
mean does not exist.
The lack of a stable alternative between complete market freedom and a
totalitarian system helps explain the conservative reluctance to support active
measures to curb racial discrimination. Freedom to buy and sell in the market,
as well as freedom to exit undesirable market situations, replaces the need and
desirability for political action. In Capi,talism and Freedom, Friedman argues that
only coercion should be subject to public policy because discrimination is simply
the refusal to trade with someone; efforts to address that kind of'"harm"' always "reduces freedom and limits voluntary co-operation." Antidiscrimination
policy means arbitrary use of government power. Though discrimination can
be an obstacle to freedom, Friedman argues that the market provides the only
climate within which minorities can be free and that minority progress can
be attributed to free, capitalist markets. Impersonal markets prevent arbitrary
exercise of power, financially hurt those who discriminate, and provide a safe
haven for minorities. Conversely, if the market does not eliminate what appears to be sex or race discrimination, this means they are in some sense natural.
For Friedman, the market "protects men from being discriminated against in
their economic activities for reasons that are irrelevant to their productivity."
To Hutt, "the free market is colour blind." Profit incentives ensure the best
worker will be hired, regardless of race. Assuming rationality and profit maximization as the primary goal, people would not discriminate if governments
would only end minimum-wage laws and similar artificial supports for market
imperfections. George Gilder sees racism as a myth and believes that minorities
must work harder than they did in the past and that antidiscrimination policy
has become the great enemy to minority progress.27 In the long run, the market eliminates discrimination despite past inequalities and discrimination .
Discrimination is not an issue of morality but of efficiency and productivity, typical of any other exchange. Given ignorance and natural market relations, this position accepts the nineteenth-century ideal of free competition.
Yet past discrimination has probably prevented people from developing their
talents, so that minority workers may not be "the best" available. Except for
Buchanan, who allows limited intervention,28 the authors regard the conditions within which market freedom can end the results of discrimination as
a nonissue. To admit it as a problem would open the possibility of legitimate
public intervention which in turn must undermine the economic freedom
necessary to political freedom .
The conservative economists deeply value all forms of freedom, including
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political freedom. Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, and others repeatedly warn
of the dangers that public economic intervention holds for democratic politics
and political freedom, using prewar Germany, the Soviet Union, and Salvador
Allende's Chile as examples. "Political freedom means the absence of coercion
of a man by his fellow men.m 9 Beyond the absence of coercion, what is the
content of political freedom? The conservative economists do not provide a
ready answer, though one can be construed from their view of politics and
the political market, their emphasis on economic freedom, and their evaluation of democracy.
Political freedom requires limited government, not a particular form of
government. Political freedom is dependent upon, secondary to, and in the
long run probably less important than economic freedom. For example, in The
Road to Serfiwm, Hayek admits that in early modern Europe, growing political
freedom encouraged economic freedom, yet "political freedom has never existed" without economic freedom. Friedman concurs: "[T]he ingenuity of people, acting separately, in the economic market in finding ways around governmental restrictions has been far more effective in maintaining a relatively free
society than the good sense of citizens acting, jointly, in the political market."30
Since the economic market requires impartial application 'Of law and relieves the political system of the burden of such divisive policies as redistribution or antidiscrimination laws, citizens have more protection and need a
smaller range of political rights than in a system with extensive or active government.31 Consequently, political freedom is a narrow, procedural concept, centering upon the essence of economic freedom-nonintervention. It contains
a limited notion of political equality, which includes identical treatment by
the law and acceptance of the principle, if not always the letter, of universal
suffrage. Classical liberals such as James Mill claimed that participation to protect rights and interests is the heart of political freedom. But when government has little power to affect interests, there is not much need for extensive
political participation. The market supplements and in ,some cases supplants
civil and political liberties; indeed, dependence on welfare may be a proper
ground for reducing a person's liberties.32 Political freedom has nothing to do
with antipoverty programs, socio-economic status, equal information, similar
impact on formulating the political agenda or policies, or widespread public
influence on government. In fact, the latter may be a danger, and many of
these authors would curb citizen access to and influence on government.
Based upon their arguments about the dangers of concentration of political
and economic power, the conservatives accept freedom of speech and the press,
the right of people to organize-though they mistrust interest groups-and
probably the right to dissent from public policy.33 Other forms of freedom are
possible. Friedman, for example, more consistently libertarian than the others,
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has opposed the draft, supported creation of a voluntary army, and argued for
decriminalization of drugs.34 These are normally seen as separate elements in
freedom, rather than supplements to political freedom.
The conservatives' concept of political freedom discounts the possibly
adverse impact of economic dislocation, poverty, unemployment, or depression upon political freedom or politics. If people are not allowed to demand
that government address such problems, then these difficulties cannot trouble
political stability. As such, they are not obstacles or dangers to political freedom or democracy. It is only when people attempt to force governments to
intervene into the spontaneous economic order that economic, and therefore
political, freedom become threatened. Given this rationalist construction,
economic problems can never trouble the polity, because freedom requires that
politics be divorced and removed from economics.
Though no one can deny that all control in the hands of one person,
group, or government would constitute a condition for tyranny,35 this does
not mean that all types of economic freedom are necessary to political freedom,
or that one cannot draw any line short of destroying a free economy.36 There
is no logical or historical reason for believing the market always protects freedom. Market failures, economic instability, and maldistribution undermine the
conditions necessary for people to exercise their rights and encourage development of extremist movements. People will not ignore great inequalities, even
if all inequalities were economically efficient, which they are not. People experiencing unemployment, sexual harassment at work, few or no job alternatives, or a declining regional economy understandably-even if, from the conservative perspective, erroneously-mistrust spontaneous forces. They may
believe that their situation is accounted for by identifiable decisions of identifiable persons and expect some public aid to resolve their problems. When
a person may be called free therefore depends heavily on what is an obstacle
to freedom.

Obstacles to Freedom
Determining the obstacles to freedom-what makes a person unfree, takes
freedom away, diminishes freedom, or creates conditions under which one is
not free and/or able to do what one wishes-also defines the nature and scope
of freedom by demarcating its parameters. Which obstacles an author considers
"natural" and which are due to controllable human agency affects what he or
she believes must be accepted, even if its results are undesirable-such as the
inevitability of poverty and starvation to Malthus-and what may be purposefully changed. Thus if market distribution is "natural," this produces a different
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relation between freedom, politics, poverty, equality, and employment than if
market distribution is controlled or at least deeply affected by some participants.
The question of freedom's context is, therefore, very important. It enables
us to understand what authors mean by a value and what policies they consider suitable to implement it. Where liberals emphasize context and conditions, the conservatives depreciate most environmental considerations, focusing on the individual and his or her currently available choices. In looking at
limits, they emphasize formal freedom . This has important policy results,
because if freedom is a negative concept, there are fewer limits on it than if
it is positive, requiring aid and support. The conservative economists emphasize the definitional fairness of starting "ground rules" rather than conditions,
ability, "end states," or results.37 Like individualism, equality, and democracy,
freedom is a procedural concept. With this understanding, how are coercion,
power, unemployment, the role of government, and the range of choice potential obstacles to freedom?
The conservative position is startlingly simple. Coercion is the only significant obstacle to freedom . The absence of coercion is a sufficient condition for
freedom because individual choice is possible in all circumstances except under
coercion. Only governments have consistent power to coerce. Therefore only
government is a danger to freedom. How is this conclusion reached?
In a position accepted by Buchanan and Friedman, Hayek claims that
'"freedom' refers solely to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement on it is coercion by man." It does not involve being able to fulfill
plans and is not limited by the range of available choices. Coercion is force,
"arbitrary violence," and the intention to shape others' behavior. Thus losses
in the market are never coercive, and in a definitional argument, coercion does
not occur in the market if government leaves it alone. Coercion means "control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order
to avoid greater evil, he is forced . . . to serve the ends of another."38 The
meaning of"greater evil" is narrowly conceived-withholding needed supplies
and even imposing severe limits is not coercive-thus voiding the possibility of
intervention to protect freedom.39 Private property, equal application of the
law, and the market provide the conditions which prevent coercion. In the market, one finds only "voluntary cooperation;' making the market free.40 The
possible coerciveness of private property, compulsion, necessity, or few open
possibilities is defined away.
The restraints some people see in the market are only apparent and trivial
and do not affect being free (allowed) to attempt to act. The market is noncoercive because it is impersonal and spontaneous and its results are unintended, unforeseen, and undirected by any one person. Unlike politics, no
one has direct control or power over another, therefore no one is forced to
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serve the end of any identifiable other. In a virtual caricature of Rousseau's
General Will, it is no infringement on freedom that one must be dependent
on all for the conditions of life. Every one is deprived of arbitrary power.41 Existing restraints are not arbitrary but rather provide "narrow limits on the potential for exploitation of man by man."42 Such restraints are natural in that they
are "imposed under the 'democratic' form . .. consumers' sovereignty."43
There can be no rights against a natural, spontaneous order. Since the
market is natural, it cannot be an obstacle to freedom. Even "[t]he threat of
starvation" is neither coercive nor a violation of freedom if it results from normal market relations because "its effect on my freedom is not different from
that of any natural calamity." For Hayek, the market prevents coercion by ensuring "that nobody has to be dependent on specific persons for the essential
conditions of life." Only under the rarest monopoly over absolutely essential
supplies, such as water, would it be possible for one person to coerce another
in the market.44 Without coercion, which can be sustained only with government support, monopoly is extremely rare and short-lived, because in a free
market, monopoly prices encourage others to invest, thereby reducing the
would-be monopolist's profits. If no one invests, it proves there are no monopoly profits to attract other investors; thus there is no monopoly and no one's
freedom is endangered.45 Under all other circumstances, even if the situation
may be painful, freedom is protected because each person may seek another
supplier, employer, or customer.46 The absence of coercion becomes the necessary, and in most cases sufficient, condition for freedom.
The conservatives argue that businesses have no real power and that property
is not normally a source of control because relations are voluntary, enterprises
are private, and power is dissolved in the market which controls a firm's behavior and guarantees alternatives for consumers. This means that in any
politically relevant sense, there is neither an economic elite nor economic
power. Business decisions are private not public decisions. The potential ability
of business leaders to reject public policies of which they disapprove is unimportant, is not an exercise of power, and is a wholesome limit on government.47
Size is unimportant because it does not give real power if there is any competition. It simply means an enterprise has been successful in meeting consumer
demand.48
Control over people in the workplace is thus not meaningful power or an
obstacle to freedom, because, in Hayek's words, it is "never power over the
whole life of a person."49 If everything one does is for self-interest and if market relations are voluntary and mutually beneficial, no one has any reason to
complain if results are unsatisfactory. Participants are always allowed to leave
or find other employers or consumers; therefore, no one can control another
without his or her agreement, meaning that there is no private power in the
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sense of controlling a person against his or her will. Thus, where theorists such
as Heilbroner and Galbraith see control and subordination, in addition to voluntary behavior, in the market, Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek see only voluntary behavior.50 Business has no influence over employees or government. If
it does have influence contrary to market theory, that is the fault of excessive
government and its arbitrary power to benefit special interests. The power of
business is a dangerous myth that can be employed to attack freedom.
Even work rules do not affect worker freedom. Hayek argues that freedom
means taking the disadvantages of employment choices along with the benefits.
Disadvantages from selling one's labor include doing "the bidding of others."
This does not make a person unfree, because he or she may always quit, even
if leaving has very high costs.51 People choose to work for others. It is a voluntary agreement between individuals for their own benefit.52 Only labor unions
have coercive power; strikes are the only example of "private use of coercive
power ... an intolerable infringement of human freedom." Hutt claims that
boycotts and strikes are not significantly different from the use of physical
violence.53 Neither hierarchical relations and dependence, which are never discussed, nor differences in wealth, status, position, and socio-economic benefits affect freedom because they are not coercive. Although private ownership
is asserted as a necessary counter to governmental power, there is no real private power in the market. Thus the market can never endanger freedom, and
there is no need to regulate the market or attempt to curb the "power" oflarge
corporations. Indeed, there is good reason not to, because intervention concentrates more power in the hands of the shifting majorities who control government for their own selfish ends, or gives power to corporations they would
not otherwise have, or both, thereby destroying freedom.54
Liberal economists do not accept this argument. They see more impediments to freedom than coercion or force. Market conditions such as constraint,
availability of real choices, and inequality, whether intended or not, affect
freedom. Racial discrimination55 is a serious impediment to individual freedom and the efficient operation of markets. Freedom requires recognition that
the market does not dissolve power and that many groups exercise market
power, coupled with development of mechanisms to limit that power. Thus
power is a more inclusive term and pervasive reality for liberal economists than
for conservatives.
For Galbraith, power is "the ability of persons or institutions to bend
others to their purposes."56 Given this broad concept, power includes "condign, compensatory, and conditioned power."57 Condign power is similar to
the conservatives' physical coercion but also includes painful emotional situations. Conditioned power-which changes belief through education, persuasion, manipulation of perceived alternatives, appeals to common values, and
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even advertising5Ldoes not exist for the conservatives. Where they see voluntary action, such as responding to an advertisement or popular acceptance of
business goals, Galbraith sees conditioned power. Conditioned power is analogous to legitimate authority, but the conservatives exclude authority from
their analysis. Compensation - the offer of positive rewards-is also missing from
the conservative argument as either a form of or a means to exercise power.
Rather, for them, it ensures voluntary cooperation. Where they see selfish
farmers and coercive labor unions harming freedom, Galbraith sees countervailing power to that of what he calls the planning system. Great inequalities
of wealth, therefore, mean that many exchanges are only formally free and that
one or some parties have little or no choice but to accept an offer.
These different perceptions of the meaning of power are significant. For
Galbraith, property, organization, and size are sources of power.59 For the conservatives, property is natural and necessary to freedom; there is or should be
no moral or political difference between the corner grocery store and General
Motors- both are controlled by the market. Galbraith believes this is nonsense. Not only are the members of the planning system independent of the
market, but, as Lindblom claims, they have influence and control over government. This includes expectations that they will be consulted by governments
and the conditioning of popular and elite beliefs to accept corporate goals as
national goals.60
This situation results in "the organic inequalities of bargaining power in
a market where the many face the few." Power protects the large and well organized by enabling them to control and regulate markets.61 Both Lester Thurow
and Galbraith consider the neutralizing market a myth that disguises power,
making its exercise easier and more effective; people see price increases, production decisions, wage offers, and so forth as dictated by the market, not as
exercises in power. This, in turn, defends corporations from charges that they
are acting against the public interest. If power to affect welfare, wages, and
working conditions does not exist, government intervention to protect freedom
is unnecessary.62
Power is not the only problem. Liberal freedom is more than not being
coerced, and government is not the only danger to freedom. Liberal economists
agree with Knight and Mill that conditions affect both freedom and its effective exercise. Unlike the conservatives, unintended consequences are not the
equivalent of natural forces, nor is the market the result of the same kind of
evolutionary processes that produced language or common law. The unregulated market does not guarantee freedom because freedom includes some
ability to act, meaning that unintended consequences of market behavior can
be as much of a limitation on freedom as are monopoly and intentional obstructions. For the liberals, freedom can be compromised even if there are no

Freedom

65

specific or identifiable actors or beneficiaries. Lack of material resources and
inability to act are obstructions to freedom, therefore, maximization of freedom, consistent with other values, requires removal of as many obstacles for
as many people as possible. Compulsion, vulnerability, discrimination, severely restricted opportunities, large inequalities, and what Galbraith called the
"nerve-wracking problem of insecurity'>63 are all relevant to freedom.
Is unempluyment related to freedom? That depends upon one's concept of
freedom. If freedom is simply being left alone to use one's resources as one
wills, the answer is no. If freedom has any positive content, even as little as
having some means to employ one's resources or to take advantage of opportunities, the answer is yes. From Keynes onward, liberals have viewed unemployment as one of the most important conditions compromising effective exercise of freedom . They reject the claim that people are free as long as they are
allowed to seek employment, whether or not they find it. For the conservatives, unemployment is neither a public problem nor an issue for freedom.
Involuntary unemployment is impossible in a free market; all will find work,
and if all have the opportunity to work, freedom cannot be compromised.
For Galbraith, full employment, guaranteed income, or welfare reduce compulsion because they eliminate starvation as the alternative to exploitative
employment.64
Governments can play an important role in promoting freedom and welfare only if the liberal position is correct. Otherwise governments can do nothing directly to promote freedom or, in the long run, people's welfare. This is
the core of the conservative idea about the role ofgwernment in freedom. Government may be necessary, but it is always the chief danger to freedom. For
Friedman, "to limit the government" is to free people.65 Governments can do
nothing to expand freedom except stay out of the market, avoid other coercive intervention, and enforce laws which apply equally to everyone. Anything
else limits freedom . Redistribution does not increase the freedom of recipients, even if it provides them with more choices. It decreases the freedom of
taxpayers and, by undermining incentives, reduces production. By interfering
in natural market relations, governments are always the cause of poor economic performance.
Policies such as affirmative action, equal-pay requirements, guarantees of
employment, minimum wages, welfare, and worker participation do not expand freedom and are unnecessary and dangerous. Thus for Friedman, "The
growth of government at all levels . . . is destroying freedom, liberty and prosperity." Curbing government growth must augment individual freedom . Hutt
says that any intervention cripples "these very humane social forces" which
automatically harmonize interests and promote freedom. Stigler believes intervention undermines freedom, not only in terms of denying people the use
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of their property but also by replacing private expenditures; limiting private
charity; deflecting private research and gifts to universities; creating barriers
to employment; controlling licensure over television, liquor, and so forth;
and, through "censorship of tastes," trying to protect consumers.66 Friedman
lists government spending, fear of the Internal Revenue Service, welfare, monetary controls to solve balance-of-payments problems, and even national parks
and the National Science Foundation as dangers to freedom. Every intervention in spontaneous market relations is dangerous: "[F]reedom is one whole
. . . anything that reduces freedom in one part of our lives is likely to affect
freedom in other parts."67
Intervention, regulation, and welfare attack freedom in all its forms. To
Friedman, welfare engenders "childlike dependence," takes away recipients'
and taxpayers' freedom, and compromises freedom in general by giving discretionary power to public officials. Resources are wasted without any compensatory increase in freedom for anyone, and morality is undermined. To Hayek
there is no logical stopping-place once extensive publicly supported welfare is
introduced; it is a virtual code word for socialism and must lead toward that
freedom-destroying result. As a multifaceted danger to freedom, public welfare must be eliminated. For Friedman, the only legitimate way to help those
who fail is through his proposed negative income tax-which would eliminate
the welfare bureaucracy by ensuring a minimum yearly income to people at
a fraction of the poverty level-or preferably "voluntary action.''6 8
The relation of choice to freedom also depends on one's basic concept of
freedom. For the conservative economists, the number and scope of choices
is irrelevant to freedom. Although the choices presented by the market promote freedom, freedom does not require that all or any of these choices be
open. More important, government intervention, which by definition is coercive, cannot permanently increase choice. Even ifit could provide more choices,
coercive behavior cannot promote freedom. In all cases, intervention expands
the role of government while crippling the freedom-producing market. Choice,
in terms of directly expanding the number of options available to people, is
simply not an aspect of freedom. Market maintenance, rather than individual
choice, is the prime goal.
The conservatives claim that only their market promotes choice.69 Although
the title of Friedman's television series and one of his books is Free to Choose,
in what sense are people "free to choose''? They are allowed to pick from what
is offered in the market, if able to afford it, without government interference.
The conservatives seem concerned with promoting freedom by expanding the
number of choices only in areas where the market may profitably substitute
for government services. Private mail delivery, Friedman's school vouchers,
and Hayek's denationalization of money would end what they consider to be
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unnecessary and inefficient restrictions upon consumer choice, but there are
no areas within the market where they seek to expand the number of choices.
Hayek identifies claims that choice is necessary to freedom with wishes to
have power to do whatever we want, such as fly, and with deliberate attempts
by socialists to confuse the meaning of freedom and destroy individual liberty.
Demands for expanded freedom are the same as the desire to be released from
"necessity" (meaning the market and its results) and from "the compulsion
of circumstances." If freedom requires expanded choice, this inevitably leads
to demands for equality and redistribution of wealth, which must destroy the
true meaning of freedom . He argues "that the range of physical possibilities
from which a person can choose at a given moment has no direct relevance
to freedom ." Freedom does "not depend on the range of choices" but on
whether a person can act according to "present intentions" without coercion
or manipulation or, in Friedman's terms, whether a person is allowed to enter
"into any particular exchange." Focusing on the "given moment," "present intentions;' or "particular exchange" means that freedom is not informed by longterm intentions and is not affected by the inability to carry out projects, no
matter how one cherishes them. Freedom is not a function of context, of the
total environment, or of all restraints upon a person. All that matters is the
immediate situation (though this does not apply to defending the market
against public intervention). Freedom means only "the absence of a particular
obstacle-coercion by other men" - not the assurance of opportunities that allow
one to take advantage of not being coerced.70 In essence, the individual is protected from any one, but not from all.
As in their disc~ssion of discrimination, a person is free if no identifiable
other coerces him or her to hold a particular job;1 live in a particular place, or
shop at a particular store. As long as there is no coercion, external circumstances are irrelevant to freedom. One can always say no and accept the consequences. Hayek argues that even if one must pay "a cruelly high price," choice
is available, making the market superior to any alternative.72 Ignorance, lack
of awareness of potential choices, poverty, necessity of taking a job at any
wage, acceptance of costly alternatives against one's preference, and lack of
nonharmful choices do not affect freedom, and public policies to ameliorate
ignorance, poverty, and so forth do nothing to increase freedom. Collective
choices, especially those altering the structure of the system and the choices
offered by it, must be resisted in the name of freedom .
Choice is integral to the conservative view of freedom only when discussing coercive power. Since people are not coerced in the market, they have
choice and freedom. In any nonmarket context, such as politics (except perhaps in elections), choice is not a component of freedom. People may choose
between freedom as either noninterference or its negation, the destructive at-
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tempt to do all one can imagine. By setting up these alternatives, these writers
defend their concept of the market but confuse their rationalist ideal with the
realities people confront. People may be free from coercion but unable to experience the value73 or worth of freedom because they are constrained. However, such factors are unimportant. Friedman, for example, claims that what
is done with freedom, is an individual ethical problem.74 But conditions and
constraints do affect one's ability to make viable choices. Actual people face
constraints-including life and death decisions about working conditions, insufficient health care, mental retardation caused by malnutrition, care for children or work outside the home-that are not neutralized by comparing them
with the desire for the impossible. Economic distress erodes the ability to participate in politics and support for democratic politics. To expect people to
value the conservative picture of freedom so highly that they must be willing
to suffer great deprivations-such as exiting an undesirable market situation
into worse conditions but not protesting or expecting public aid-presents citizens with too few alternatives. And that is the choice people face in the conservative model. Their freedom of choice does not include the idea that there
will, or should be, a tolerable alternative; 5 though there is always the existential choice between life and death . If the market does not provide an acceptable (however minimally defined) option, then people must either endure what
the market offers or do without, regardless of what they may be required to
forego. The free individual is content to accept his or her fate whenever it
comes through the market.
These beliefs about choice illustrate unspoken assumptions about determinism: that individuals always seek self-interest, that much of the politicaleconomic world is beyond human will or control, and that individuals are
fitted into an ongoing system. There is much more determinism in the conservative picture of freedom than in the liberal economists'. Individuals are subject to a necessity they do not create. For the conservatives, the natural market,
guided by its internal law, adapts itself through an invisible hand to changing
circumstances. Individuals discover but do not deliberately create it. If left
alone, the system automatically produces efficiency. Individuals may do as they
wish within their range of options as determined by the autonomous market,
but it is improbable they will do anything except follow narrowly defined
self-interest.
Given the conservatives' view of human nature, the individual is at least
partly determined; Hayek uses iron filings and a magnet as an example of
natural ordering principles.76 As with Edmund Burke, Hayek says that individuals need not know much, not even the rules they follow, "in order to be able
to take the right action.'m In this context "right" means system supporting.
People make few actual choices. They must choose only from the options
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available at the moment. Individually they may try to expand these within
market rules, but collectively nothing can be done. They must act according to
natural propensities. People respond to tax cuts by increasing expenditure;
to opportunities by risk taking; to unemployment by accepting lower wages; to
government intervention by reducing output.78 The deductive logic of the
system and human nature mandate that this will occur unless there is coercive
interference from labor unions or governments. Thus the less each individual
is coerced, the greater the degree of system-level determinism. The more people attempt to control, rather than accept, the macro system, the more they
reduce freedom at the individual level. Acceptance of the necessity of nonintervention is a prerequisite to freedom .
In spite of their ostensible individualism, these theorists emphasize system
needs. Ultimately it does not matter what happens to individuals as long as
their behavior is system enhancing and the system is maintained. In discussing
markets and coercion, for example, they lose sight of individuals and focus on
the system. Occasionally they write as if the market has an aim or purpose and
employ functional language,-asking what does a person or group contribute
to the spontaneous order. Individual welfare is less important than how people
act within and contribute to the spontaneous order. For example, each author
would reduce public assistance to force more people to work. Gilder is concerned with how religion and traditional sexual mores support capitalism. Entrepreneurs need freedom to "perform their role . . . . collectively." For Hayek,
"Freedom means that in some measure we entrust our fate to forces which
we do not control." Freedom is necessary if a businessman "is to perform his
functions." That freedom is found in "submission to the impersonal forces of
the market." The total order is much more regular "than the individual facts"
that make it up.79
There is also an element of determinism about politics in the conservative
definition of freedom. People cannot shape political relations as they wish. The
human mind may imagine a better system, but idealism is impossible because
human nature, the political market, and the dictates of freedom allow nothing
better to develop. For Buchanan, Gilder, and Hayek, society, morals, and politics evolve. The pace of evolution cannot be hastened, though we can encourage those political institutions that, by conforming to human nature and the
needs of the market, reflect underlying human drives. Market freedom, economic needs, and human nature delimit the range of permissible behavior, the
nature of justice, and the duties, policies, and scope oflegitimate government.
Neither governments nor human willfulness can successfully intervene into or
change the patterns set by economic relations. The rebellion of mindless children through destructive constructivist intervention is possible, but that is virtual suicide.80
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Negative or Positive Freedom?
At the most obvious level, both conservatives and liberals espouse a negative
concept of freedom, that is, a notion of freedom which emphasizes that people have or should have an area within which they are exempt from control
by or interference from others. The debate focuses on what is interference, what
is an obstacle to freedom, whether someone is free if no identifiable person
coerces them through force, or if freedom requires being able to carry out some
or many permitted behaviors. A broader notion of negative freedom is plausible, one requiring a good deal of regulation and intervention to prevent people from being subject to compulsion. Thus economic intervention, public
education, antidiscrimination policies, provision of welfare, and so forth can
be defended as negative freedom. They expand the scope or area oflife where
one is protected in what one does-in the sense of having more choices, opportunities to act, and doors open81 and being protected from a wider range
of potential interference than coercion defined as force. This does not include
positive freedom conceived as real will, living up to a higher self, or obeying
a true self.82 On the other hand, if positive freedom is defined as legally guaranteed "rights to assistance of some sort,"83 as rights to be supplied various goods
or services, as creation of a framework within which people can achieve their
negative freedom or expand autonomy, or even as assistance for fulfilling selfchosen ends, then many liberals accept a version of positive freedom that conservatives cannot accept.84 Indeed, the conservative economists verbally reject
all elements of positive freedom.85
Debate over the correct meaning of positive freedom is not directly relevant to this book. However, although the conservatives emphasize negative
freedom, their argument sometimes resembles a concept of positive freedom .86
While there is no real self in the conservative picture, except that real selfinterest can be achieved only through competing in the market, freedom involves accepting necessity and the world as it is. Freedom is defended by and
is possible only within the market. People who reject the market cannot be free,
and one purpose of government is to prevent people from abusing or forcefully leaving the market-in a sense forcing them to be free. People will be free
when they stop rebelling against the limits imposed by human nature and no
longer want what the market cannot provide. Rational people do not attempt
to alter market relations but try to "understand"87 their necessity and operate
only within them. That means accepting results-distribution, reward, equitywhich, even if they are the product of human behavior, cannot be constructively changed by deliberate intervention. The market gives a single formula
to end all economic and most political and social conflict, one that encompasses all value. Although people may have many, separate ends, the market
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reconciles them by placing a price on everything and provides the means to
achieve them. Within this context liberals such as Galbraith and Keynes, who
accept a plurality of values and the possibility of value conflict, are closer to
the principles of the classical liberal tradition than are theorists such as Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, or von Mises.

Implications
This picture of freedom has powerful implications for the meaning and construction of other political values and public policies. The conservative economists repeatedly celebrate the limitations their concept of freedom places upon
government, politics, and public policy. Although these are discussed in the
next several chapters, a few examples can illustrate the conservative view.
Liberal economists have long argued that the market does not operate as
conservatives claim, neither protecting freedom nor promoting welfare. In
Keynes's phrase, liberals accuse the conservatives of "regardlessness of social
detail." 88 This charge is true, but irrelevant from the conservative perspective.
From Malthus and Ricardo until today, the conservative position has claimed
that economic efficiency and freedom are primary goals; that the natural, free
market best achieves these goals; and that poverty and inequality, although
undesirable, are the unchangeable result of natural, beneficial economic forcesforces with which we cannot interfere without destroying freedom, morality,
and efficiency.
Two positions taken together prevent much conscious change. If a person
does not like his or her employment, supplier, or customer, he or she can always find another position, supplier, or customer. However, given self-interest,
conditions in the market are generally as good as they can be. Individuals are
allowed to seek a better situation, but considering the market and profitseeking employers, conditions are essentially the same for everyone offering
the same services or product. Individual action produces little or no change
in the absence ofmany other individuals acting in the same way, but combined
action is illegitimate and inefficient. The result is that little or nothing can be
done to increase freedom (or equality or democracy or justice) beyond what
is allowed by the market.
Spontaneous order demands that governments stay out of autonomous
economic relations. Public policy can do nothing positive to permanently
reduce or eliminate poverty or the unhappy effects of market forces. Even if
interpersonal comparison was possible and intervention increased happiness,
taking resources from some to aid others must reduce freedom to use one's
resources as one chooses and enlarge government. Requests for intervention
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based upon claims of collective needs mask partisan interests. Government
should be small and inconsequential. In the name of freedom, the conservatives accept only those policies that narrowly support the market: impartial
laws that are "neutral" between classes; protection of private property; defense; some limited provision of public education and welfare; enforcement
of contracts; and so forth. Anything more undermines the interdependence
between market and freedom .
Along with the assumptions in the previous chapter, this picture of freedom
is the basis upon which the conservative economists build their politics. Their
primary value is negative freedom, particularly economic freedom conceived
as noninterference in the use of talents and property. There is only the actor
and the absence of any coercive agent. Ability to act is incidental to freedom .
Conservative freedom rules out conflict with other desirable values, since it
always takes precedence. Thus there is no need to balance conflicting claims.
Economic freedom is superior to all other political and social values, the basis
for achieving whatever is good, and a condition of free and democratic governments. Any other concept of freedom must, in the long run, destroy freedom
and democracy. The conservatives' policy advice follows from this picture of
freedom and is designed to support it. As with individualism, equality, democracy, justice, and other fundamental values, they have selected the narrowest possible interpretation - requiring the least amount of government and
holding the least possibility of expansion, particularly by collective or public
intervention. The primary role of government in freedom is to leave it alone
and enforce the law. A wider meaning for freedom or coercion cannot be
admitted, because that portends a larger role for freedom-destroying public
intervention.
This freedom follows from the conservative understanding of human nature.
People promote their own interests, but by ensuring equal (the same) freedom
to others, the market prevents the exercise of freedom-destroying power. Market freedom is the best expression of human freedom and at the same time
inhibits its abuse. Noncoercion is the limit of duty regarding another's freedom .
Within the spontaneous and benign forces of free markets, everyone has freedom, and the free individual is content to accept his or her fate, never asking
government for protection from the inescapable vicissitudes of natural economic
relations. It is within these relations that both freedom and equality develop
to the maximum extent possible, given human nature.
This is an attenuated freedom that makes no provision for actual ability,
resources, or opportunity to act. In its definitional rationalism, it is too limited
to address the complex problems of contemporary societies. Absence of coercion is central to all individualistic conceptions of freedom, but there are many
forms of coercion-including deception, invasion of privacy, manipulation,
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psychological abuse or pressure, and in some circumstances, compulsion-and
more limits on freedom than only government and physical restraint. Although
considering themselves classical liberals, these economists define coercion in
narrower terms than Mill did in his most libertarian book, On Liberty. Mill
listed as "compulsion and control" not only physical force but "the moral coercion of public opinion," "social stigma," and popular opinions which are "the
eye of hostile and dreaded censorship"; he also noted that people whose actions are disapproved of "may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments." These economists have no room for Mill's concern for social liberty
and majority or "social tyranny;' which may be more difficult to escape than
an oppressive government.89
Conservative freedom is action-oriented because one is allowed to act, but it
does not require any action because the requirements for freedom are satisfied by
the fact of being allowed. If one cannot carry out a permitted action, freedom is
not compromised. Friedman frequently states that the world is not fair, but it is
superficial to ignore cruel choices or to pretend that people have all possible freedom in the face of extremely difficult decisions. If freedom does not include some
ability to do what is permitted, then it borders on nonsense-given the conservative picture of human motivation-to expect people who do not succeed in the
market to support it. In fact, their support may not be necessary. Hayek, for one,
believes that because the masses do not exercise economic freedom, they do not
see its importance, making them a threat to freedom.90 This perspective is too
limiting. Public policies, such as public schools, health and sanitation programs, and income support, may expand freedom91 and the range and number
of choices, making people more satisfied with the economic and political system. These are not important considerations to the conservatives. Whether
freedom actually exists or not is secondary to maintaining the necessary condition for freedom-limitation of government coercion.
Despite the claim that the market benefits everyone, it is difficult to understand how there can be popular support for freedom if outcomes of supposedly
free processes are irrelevant and if freedom does not include at least some
means for people to do what they are not prevented from doing. Even Frank
Knight, whom Buchanan and Friedman acknowledge as an important teacher
and mentor, noted that '"effective' freedom depends upon the possession of
power as well as mere absence of interference."92 Though the conditions for
freedom are different from freedom itself, conditions are relevant to freedom's exercise, and more than noncoercion is needed to protect freedom and encourage
individuals to take advantage of what they are permitted. One person's freedom
may interdict another's; one form of freedom may limit another.93 Freedom
is multidimensional.94 Political freedom may prove impossible if economic conditions do not permit a broadly based sense of safety and satisfaction.
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The proposal that the market should become the final arbitrator of economic and much political freedom leaves too many areas of significance to too
many people unresolved. For example, is the market-as presently constituted
or as possible with the elimination of most welfare, regulation, and intervention -or freedom the primary value to be maximized? These authors claim
both: that freedom can be realized only through the market. However, that
means accepting as freedom enhancing whatever results from the market. If
one really wished to maximize freedom within a market model, he or she
would encourage more competition through rigorous antitrust policies, similar to a Jeffersonian ideal. But these authors refuse to push freedom that far.9 5
Freedom does not require giving up a little market efficiency and corporate
dominance. The conservatives ask that nothing be sacrificed for freedom , except the ability to be free if the market does not perform as promised. They
present an either/or choice. Accept the market with market freedom or have
neither markets nor freedom . Defense of market freedom must "be dogmatic.''96
There is no safety valve; no means to draw off pressure and reduced social trust;
no way to enhance support for the political-economic system; no means to
disarm discontent. In a crisis pressures may build up, as Keynes feared in the
1930s, and threaten the existence of both freedom and the market.
Even if the conservative picture of market operation is correct and their
model took cognizance of large corporations and international trading, they
offer little evidence to support it. Concern for social and political stability requires moving beyond a policy of doing nothing supported by a strong police.
Leaving economic relations alone may undermine the freedom of people who
do not have effective opportunities, resources, or alternative employment,
multiplying the real power of those who possess alternatives and resources. People may be vulnerable9 7 to more than just physical coercion. Rights may be
more dependent upon what one's employer does-the Bill of Rights applies
less in the workplace, and courts in the United States limit government employers more than private business in areas such as drug testing, electronic
surveillance, and invasion of privacy-than what the police on patrol may do.
Individual freedom requires more than a choice between accepting and rebelling, between conforming to what is offered and literally having no livelihood.
Consider the claim that employers have no power because employees (or
suppliers or customers) have other opportunities from which to choose, therefore they are free. If this is a definition of freedom, it is not possible to argue
with it except to ask for a broader concept of freedom. As a description of
freedom, of what many people experience, sufficient conditions for freedom,
the basis of changes in human lives, or a guide to public policy to foster freedom, however, this statement is incomplete even within economics, unless
at least three conditions are met. There must be something close to full employ-
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ment so that people have a viable opportunity to find alternative work . Positions of similar pay and satisfaction should be available. Costs of changing
employment (or customers or suppliers) must not cause greater deprivation
than is tolerable to the reasonable person celebrated in law. The higher the
opportunity costs of changing, the more constraint there is against changing,
thereby increasing the ability of employers, suppliers, or customers to enforce
undesirable conditions. The person who has no choice, or extremely limited
choice, is not free in the sense of being able to act. Everything that occurs
in the market is not voluntary and, even if voluntary, may not be freedom
enhancing. Even Adam Smith, writing about bank note issuance, acknowledged
that it may be necessary to limit "the natural liberty of a few individuals, which
might endanger the security of the whole society.''98 Experiencing freedom requires the opportunity and in many circumstances the means to implement
freedom . Intervention may enlarge the opportunity to be free by removing
obstacles to action or by expanding the range of available choices.
What meaning we give to the abstract concept of freedom is important
because it involves the shape, direction, and guiding philosophy of politics,
as well as who can and should benefit from public policy. Freedom is closely
linked to equality, which the conservatives also claim develops in and is limited
by the market. In the conservative world view, they are interchangeable.

Chapter Four

Equality

The weaker arr: always anxious of equality and justice. The stronger pay no heed tv either.
-Aristotle, Politics, bk. 6, chap. 3.

Equality is a traditional concern of normative political theory, but economists
dominate contemporary policy debate over its meaning, scope, and specification . Conservative, liberal, socialist, and Marxist economists offer opposing
policy prescriptions, basing them on incompatible conceptions of equalitywho is or should be equal; what will be divided according to the accepted principle of equality; when persons are equal; how relative equality is evaluated;
whether equality is an extensive or narrow, system-sustaining or individually
oriented, group or individual idea and policy; 1 and what the conditions for
and obstacles to equality are. Discussing the same issues analyzed by political
theorists and philosophers, economists have had more influence than they have
on public perceptions and policy in such areas as welfare, the role of government, taxes and the meaning and nature of justice. Conflicting conceptualizations of equality support rival pictures of the scope of legitimate political
activity, attacking or supporting welfare programs, affirmative action, civil rights
legislation, participatory democracy, and intervention into and regulation of
the economy. From Plato to the present, the questions who is equal and
under what circumstances are basic to a theorist's or politician's picture of
legitimate equalization programs.

Defining the Meaning of Equality
Equality, like all important political ideas, is a protean concept that includes
rival philosophical claims, debate over which policy may implement it, and
conflict over whether a particular situation is relevant to it. Equality richly
illustrates how words and concepts do not necessarily mean what they appear
to mean. Equality is normally stated in universal terms, as in Jefferson's asser-
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tion "that all men are created equal," but few people suggest that the words
are to be taken literally. There are always qualifications, limits, emendations.
What is equality? Does it mean that all men are the same? Or are all people
or persons the same, even though throughout most of history women were
not people in a politically or legally relevant sense and slaves under the Constitution were persons but not part of"We the People"? Most people state that
equality does not mean everyone is identical; opponents of equality focus on
the obvious fact that people are different to discredit it as an ideal. Rather,
there is some relevant sense or arena in which people are presumed or claimed
to be similar, or the same, or requiring identical respect or consideration.
Is equality achieved through identical treatment in all areas, especially
economics? Most people would say no, at least if that implies the same rewards or income. We have been taught that it is unjust and discourages effort to treat people the same or ensure identical income despite differences in
effort, ability, or contribution. The constituency for such a concept of equality
does not exist in western democracies, though there may be support for treating people according to needs in areas such as education, medicine, and welfare.
Perhaps equality does not mean equality, but equal opportunity. In the
United States, one can almost visualize heads nodding approval-surely equality
connotes equal opportunity, in which inequalities develop based only upon differences in effort and ability. But what is equal opportunity, and why must equality be narrowed to that? What is necessary and/or sufficient to have equal opportunity? To what and where does it apply? Does it mean to allow people to compete? to provide some resources, whatever these may be, to make it easier to compete with something approaching similar chances? to handicap some to make all
compete evenly? to promote some sameness of result or outcome, and ifso how
much and where, to allow more equal competition? Is it measured by absence of
formal restrictions on competition or by the results of competition? By looking
at individuals or at groups? Where should competition by allowed? Everywhere?
In the economy? By what means in the economy?
Many people emphasize political equality, where the popular meaning implies treating all alike. If the accepted assumptions and patterns of behavior
are the obvious, natural meaning of equality, then equal opportunity as applied to politics requires some identical treatment. But political equality is not
obvious. What is it, and why should it be valued? Is it equal or the same political power or identical influence? Most people say no, emphasizing the impossibility of creating a political system embodying these concepts-though
Rousseau's General Will may have proposed it among that portion of the community who were citizens. Thus theorists do not normally claim that everyone
should have equal or identical political power or influence, though it should
be alike in some sense.
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Perhaps political equality refers to rights (a common argument accepted
by the conservative economists) but which ones, and does everyone have them?
Does it mean simply possession or the ability to actualize those rights? Many
people emphasize voting rights, but that reduces political equality to the equal
(that is, the same) right of citizens, though not all persons, inhabitants, or
potential members, to vote. For many, it refers only to the opportunity (regardless of how effective) to vote, not actual voting and, for the conservative
economists, certainly not voting in such a way as to actively influence public
policy.
Each of equality's meanings supports and is supported by rival views of
human nature, justice, public order, and democracy. In application, equality
is a tangle of possibilities. Equality may apply to political, social, moral, or
economic relations, encompassing debate over what is to be divided and how.
It can be a statement of fact about shared characteristics, a claim that people
are alike, an assertion of hope, or a desirable but unachievable ideal. It can
involve rights, equality before the law, political equality, equality of opportunity, equal respect, equal treatment, unequal treatment to equalize people,
or equal result. It relates to distinctions based on age, sex, race, religion, class,
ethnicity, income, education, nationality, status, and political standing. Equality
may be inclusive or narrow, applied to everyone or to special categories of
people. It may refer to human relations, moral worth, sameness before God,
a common essence behind all differences, or an ideal future state. It encompasses formal procedures, such as allowing everyone to try, and substantive
results, such as redistribution. It involves disagreement over the causes of inequality, justifications of policies that foster inequality or equality, what are acceptable inequalities, whether equality is an individual or group concept, and
legitimate policies to achieve whatever one conceives as equality.2
The quest for equality and equalization is determined by what is perceived
as an obstacle within such givens as human nature, what people conceive as
being subject to successful human intervention, and goals. Each component
may be further divided, as in the debate over what is equal opportunity and
where is it applicable. The important point is that authors rarely mean by
equality what an alien observer would assume it to mean by examining the
word separate from context, tradition, and power relations. Equality has multiple meanings, especially when it appears to conflict with other goals, values,
and purposes such as freedom or property. Tension is resolved by placing one
value in ascendance, defining one value in terms of another, redefining equality,
setting limits to its meaning, confining equality with other values and beliefs,
claiming that people do not want "pure'' equality, or stating that equality undermines efficiency. In this dance of reduction, authors must give good reasons or justifications why a seemingly universal value does not mean what it
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appears to mean.3 Their answers determine much of their view of the government's role in a society. Clearly, equality policy is not autonomous from other
considerations, such as the nature, structure, and purposes of markets.
Liberals of all varieties have been more concerned with freedom than equality. They often define equality in terms of freedom: equal political rights;
equal access to the market; equal educational, employment, welfare, and other
opportunities; economic equalization to promote freedom.4 Having said this,
however, we have not said much. Though the meaning of liberal equality is
bound to liberal freedom, there is no single, simple meaning of liberal freedom. The interrelation of equality and freedom is a complex creative tension
where changing notions of freedom and equality have modified, enriched, and
limited each other. In the same way, to define freedom as conservative economists do, in negative economic and political terms, limits the scope and application of equality.
In discussing the meaning of equality, I will follow the conservative economists' pattern of concerns. To conservatives, equality denotes sameness, uniformity, and mathematical equality. Despite great differences between people,
equality means that there is no difference in treatment. Whether in the context of economics, politics, or society, A is the same as B. Like freedom,
equality is a procedural concept, satisfied if people are allowed to attempt to
carry out their purposes. It refers to individuals and formal relations and is
neither a public good nor a goal of public policy. Any attempt to apply it to
groups or to consider the conditions for equality, beyond identical treatment
by the law and equal right to attempt to compete in free markets, is illegitimate
and must destroy freedom. Beyond these narrow limits freedom and equality
are mutually exclusive. Emphasis on achieving equality must destroy freedom,
while emphasis on freedom produces inequality and the only legitimate kind
of equality, which allows everyone to use whatever resources they possess as
they wish and to get ahead if they can.
Potential conflict between freedom and equality is resolved by defining
equality as freedom or by claiming that equality is satisfied by equality before
the law, which is essential to freedom. Otherwise freedom and equality become alternatives that must conflict whenever intervention or redistribution
are attempted.5 When the two values do clash, freedom trumps equality. Not
only is economic freedom more important, it also produces more equality than
any other policy. For Friedman, people have "an equal right to freedom" and
opportunity, nothing else. Egalitarian policies come "sharply into conflict with
freedom; we must choose." Unfortunately, demands for equality are part of
the "spirit of the times" and must destroy freedom. Such policies for Hayek
are fundamentally immoral and "the opposite of freedom." Buchanan sees
government-enforced transfers as the functional equivalent of theft. To Fried-
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man, "A society that puts equality-in the sense of equality of outcome-ahead
of freedom will end up with neither equality nor freedom." 6 In the long run,
though great differences will remain, freedom challenges wealth, leading to
natural as opposed to forced redistribution between families and classes. Conceived as sameness in all spheres and relevant only in a narrow range of relations, equality has limited application .

Equal Opportunity
Conservative claims center on a rigid distinction between equal opportunity
versus equal results or outcome : Treat people alike or make them the same.
Again they present dualistic alternatives. Equal opportunity and equal outcome are the only possible meanings of equality but are mutually destructive,
incompatible options. Hayek's choice is equality before the law or "material
equality," "the same material portion," or "the same material position," but
in any case it means treating everyone alike. Equality before the law is simply
due process. "Equal treatment ... has nothing to do with .. . results that
are more favourable to one group than to others." Buchanan contrasts the
policies of individualists, who see the solution to inequality in extending individuals' capacity to compete and in promoting market-based solutions, with
collectivists, who are concerned with equalizing such outcomes as consumption and advocate nonmarket solutions. Friedman agrees that equality means
similar circumstances and treatment. Given that, one must choose between
"equality of outcome" or "equality of opportunity." In the early years of the
American Republic, equality meant "equality before God;' not irrational efforts
by intellectuals opposed to the successes of a free economy to impose uniformity or "equality of results.m
Society cannot move along a continuum of possibilities. If it goes very far
beyond narrowly defined equality of opportunity, a disastrous jump occurs
to equality of outcome, destroying capitalism, freedom, and democracy. Anything other than equal opportunity or equal treatment by the law is incompatible with freedom because it requires the same outcomes for each person,
forcing everyone, regardless of differences, to be and act the same, rather than,
in Hayek's term, leaving "each individual to find his own level." For Buchanan
the principle of"equal treatment for equals" is absolutely necessary in a community "that makes any claim to fairness," but his equality means "identical."
Hayek attacks "the fundamental immorality of all egalitarianism" except identical treatment by the law, regardless of differences in circumstances. For Brittan,
"The ideal of equality . . . . has now turned sour" and has become a "disease"
because of attempts to apply it to economic and social relations. For Fried-
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man, "[t]he end result" ofredistribution "has invariably been a state of terror."
For Gilder, egalitarianism destroys family, community, and real chances of
improvement.8
What, then, is equal opportunity, which, along with identical treatment
by the law, is the only legitimate form of equality? Within an individualistic
perspective, equality of opportunity may range between formal procedures
allowing each person access to, or a chance at filling, available positions, to
compensatory equality of opportunity, that is, attempts to equalize starting
points through expanded or similar educational or job opportunities, some
equalization of material conditions, and affirmative action. The first possibility is most compatible·with assumptions that individuals are self-interested
and solely responsible for themselves, while the second assumes a larger social
component in individual behavior and success and can fit either an individual
or group emphasis in equalization policies.
Conservative equal opportunity is a formal, procedural concept, applicable to individuals and summarized by the ideal of careers open to talent
based on natural abilities, rather than on distinctions such as class, race, religion, or sex. Despite professed methodological and policy individualism, the
conservatives do not support a very extensive equality of opportunity. Individualism is satisfied if minimal conditions (the same as for negative freedom)
are present: no coercion, that is, no arbitrary (nonmarket) distinctions and no
laws preventing people from making of themselves whatever they can, given
their natural abilities, inherited resources, and the choices presented by the
market. It is an ideal of"competitive equality,''9 or the right of each person to
compete against others for position, status, and wealth. "Competitive equality"
does not imply a similar probability that everyone will attain desirable statuses,
and the necessary means to compete are very limited. Except for coercion,
actual conditions facing an individual are of secondary concern.
Friedman confines equal opportunity largely to economics; it is virtually
equivalent to market economics. It means "equality before the law,'' "a career
open to talents,'' and allowing "no arbitrary obstacles" such as birth, sex, color,
or religion to coercively prevent anyone from exercising his or her abilities. It
requires neither leveling, antidiscrimination regulations, direct intervention,
nor limitations on inherited wealth . Equal opportunity "is not to be interpreted literally." Such sameness is impossible because of "what nature has
spawned." Thus wealth, inheritance, parental care, and social position are irrelevant to each individual's attempt to employ his or her resources. Friedman questions whether "from an ethical point of view" there is "any difference between"
inheriting wealth from parents and inheriting the genes that make people
talented. In matters of equal opportunity, government can only address coercive arbitrariness, not these natural differences. Even its role in providing educa-
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tion is limited. Although primary education may be necessary, though not
solely in public schools, public support for vocational and higher education
is anti-egalitarian because it transfers resources from the lower classes to those
profiting from college or training. Advanced education builds human capital.
Its benefits are purely private and contribute to no larger social good, and individuals should pay for it themselves.10
Hayek's position is similar. Educational equalization does not improve the
many but drags down the few. Calls for more educational opportunities are
due to "[e]galitarian agitation." 11 Hayek's equal opportunity is realized by
being "allowed to try [not] ... an equal start and the same prospects." There
is no need to level the starting points from which people compete. Equal opportunity is satisfied "only by treating them [people] according to the same rules
irrespective of their factual differences, leaving the outcome to be decided by
those constant restructurings of the economic order which are determined by
circumstances nobody can foresee." Though primary education may be provided for minors, Hayek believes that "real equality of opportunity" would
require complete government control of all external conditions-"the physical
and human environment of all persons." There is no middle ground. Anything
else, including limits on inherited wealth, produces "enforced equality," giving
advantages and privileges to some by taking them from others. All advantages
cannot be eliminated. Parental differences cause "undesigned and unavoidable
inequalities of opportunity" but must be accepted since they result from a
putatively natural and spontaneous process. There is no need to provide the
same chances to all, nor is there any difference between inheriting wealth and
receiving good childhood care or inheriting genes for intelligence.12 Thus wealth,
popular prejudices, and environment are distinctions as natural as native ability.
Equal opportunity is compatible with extreme inequalities of educational opportunities, status, inheritance, and even reward for effort.
Buchanan varies in detail, in that he sees fewer inherent differences between people and his equal opportunity is not as limited as that of Friedman,
Gilder, or Hayek. He agrees with them that equal opportunity means careers
open to talent. It includes "fair chances," where the economic value "assigned"
to each person is "determined by elements within himself" and by the kinds
of"chance factors" which affect all people. It does not and cannot mean assuring identical chances to employ talents or equivalent results to people with
similar talents. Most starting differences between people are irrelevant. Only
those differences affecting economic performance need to be considered, and
even these do not require that everyone be able to compete for each position.
To believe that everyone should have the same starting capacities is a "narrow
interpretation" of equal opportunity, one that a rational or fair society need
not consider. Indeed, such an interpretation would transfer power and re-
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sponsibility to governments which, given inherent limitations and the selfinterest of governors, will be abused to the detriment of freedom and equality.13
If governments are incapable of adjusting for differences between people
and markets are best able to do so, can anything be done to address initial differences that may affect ability to compete? Buchanan asserts that it is possible
to "take some of the more apparent rough edges off gross inequalities in starting positions" though significant differences will always remain . As with John
Stuart Mill (but not with Friedman or Hayek), Buchanan argues that individualists may propose reforms that tend to equalize initial endowments and the
ability to compete. Buchanan emphasizes essentially negative means-the reduction of obstacles to competing, not direct aid-to reduce large disparities; these
include taxes on inheritance and publicly supported, though not necessarily
provided, education. Unlike Friedman and Hayek, he sees a morally relevant
difference between human and nonhuman resources and believes that inheritance of wealth is not equivalent to inheritance of genes. Buchanan considers
it ethically superior to encourage equality through market-type mechanisms
which increase a person's ability to compete, rather than to equalize results
through redistribution after competition. Moderate intergenerational transfer
taxes and educational opportunities stress individual abilities; therefore, they
may be legitimate-but they are also the limit of what should or can be done
to promote equal opportunity. Thus, the emphasis is on the potential for longterm changes, not on policies to address inequalities between people currently
competing. Direct transfers for purposes of equalization between current competitors must be arbitrary-i.e., nonmarket-and hence destructive of an open
society, though limited redistribution may be necessary.14
The conservatives' position and policy recommendations stand or fall on
their absolute distinction between equal opportunity and equal result. Based on
the obvious fact that people are different, they conclude that there is no way in
which people can be equal except before the law and in their right to compete.
Thus equality means being identical, but one looks in vain for any major theorist-including Marx 15 and Rousseau-who conceived of equality in this way.
Calling people "equal is not to say that they are identical;' only that there is some
relevant sense in which they are, or ought to be, treated alike.16 The question becomes what are the relevant ways in which people are similar and dissimilar. Real
sameness of result is not a significant or legitimate option in countries such as the
United States 17 but there is near unanimous support for equal opportunity,
whatever that means. The debate over equality should focus on meanings and
applications-Buchanan moves in that direction-but it does not. Instead
these conservatives assimilate socially conditioned differences that are embedded in a specific legal-political-social environment-such as political culture, property, and family status-to inherent distinctions and natural ability.
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This position fails to acknowledge that equality and equalization are different. Equalization18 means movement toward equality and reducing inequalities, not that people are identical or will be made the same. Equalization
may raise the bottom; it need not remove the top. It is an ideal and an approximation. Providing a minimum standard for everyone does not produce uniformity but may save people from the uniformity of want and degradation.
Freedom is the conservatives' chief value, but none of them defines it as license
or lawlessness. However, applying their conception of equality to freedom
would turn freedom into license. In the same way that freedom is defined and
limited by values, social obligation, and equal freedom for others, equality is
also limited. Equality is not uniformity or sameness, nor are equal opportunity and equal results as opposed as these authors claim . Equal opportunity
invariably includes some equal treatment or results.19 Equalization presents a
continuum, not either/or alternatives. Values, not inherent economic limitations, determine our position on that continuum. Which equalities are legitimate depends on one's picture of individualism -whether it too is procedural
or means autonomy-and what is natural (such as the market) or what is subject to conscious change. These authors, however, are concerned with procedures. Equal opportunity is satisfied if no one stands coercively in the way
of another as he or she attempts to compete. That view does not address the
conditions within which equal opportunity may operate or its worth and value.
If people are convinced that uniformity is the only alternative to procedural
equality of opportunity (especially when there is widespread disapproval of equal
results), that competitive procedures are neutral, and that outcome is irrelevant to equality, then there will be no need to worry about equalization policies.

The Market and Obstacles to Equality
As with freedom, defining an obstacle to equality delimits equality's meaning
and scope and the kinds of policies which promote it. The conservative economist theorists see few obstacles. Racial and sexual discrimination is not an
obstacle, or at least would not be in a free market. Conversely, anything interfering in free-market operation is necessarily an obstacle to equality.
The conservatives believe the market is egalitarian . It produces equality by
even-handed treatment of people who have identical motivations. Equality is
satisfied by allowing people to compete in free markets, whether or not they
have the resources to compete effectively. Anything beyond equal competitive
opportunity invades the operation of a natural economic market and destroys
freedom, upon which equality depends. As with freedom, noncoercion is the
necessary and sufficient condition for equality. According to Friedman, active
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pursuit of equality destroys freedom and therefore equality. "On the other
hand, a society that puts [economic] freedom first will, as a happy by-product,
end up with both greater freedom and greater equality."20
This means that deliberate efforts to encourage equality must fail and that
governments can do nothing positive to foster more equality. Extramarket
obstacles in the form of attitudes and preferences may exist but are of minor
importance, are "by no means insurmountable," and should be immune from
public intervention.21 The mistaken and fanciful belief that there are relevant
obstacles to equality other than coercion, and that government can remove
them is therefore the major impediment to realization of equality through
market relations. The primary dangers to equality are active governments and
the greedy majorities that support them and demand equal results through
such misguided and interfering policies as antidiscrimination rules, affirmative
action, welfare payments, aid to families with dependent children, farm pricesupport programs, minimum-wage laws, promotion of labor unions, and redistribution efforts. Once these policies are eliminated, the natural operation
of free markets will create both freedom and equality.

Justifying Inequality
The economic theorists believe that both economic and political inequality
are desirable and necessary. They share the common conservative fear that
equality upsets natural order by eliminating variety and leveling natural distinctions. This claim joins a long procession of similar arguments in political theory.
Economics-based defenses of political and economic inequality have typically
employed a negative justification-defense of property. Aristotle argued that
democracy was an undesirable form of government-though it was the best
of the bad forms- because egalitarianism risked unjust seizure of property and
dragged the best people down to the lowest common denominator. The latter
concern was echoed in Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America over two
thousand years later.
Concern for protecting property runs throughout modern political thinking. The first serious attempt to distinguish political rights from property
rights occurred during the English Civil War of the 1640s, and that attempt
was unsuccessful. Both Locke and Burke saw property and the protection of
property as primary considerations, overriding in Locke's case other natural
rights such as political equality. The dominant argument throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries claimed that despite natural rights and natural
law, economic inequality was natural and that equal political rights would undermine property. Even Thomas Jefferson did not call for universal adult male
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suffrage but held that any man who paid taxes or served in the militia was entitled to vote. In nineteenth-century Britain, successive reform acts gradually
enlarged the number of potential voters to include most male holders of property; complete male suffrage was not achieved until this century. In the
United States, the last vestige of property-based justification for unequal political rights was not eliminated until Supreme Court decisions in such cases as
Baker v. Carr (1962) began to require equal electoral districts and the Twentyfourth Amendment to the Constitution removed the poll tax for federal elections. Throughout this long dispute, the defenders of inequality echoed the
words of General Henry Ireton at the Putney Debates in 1647: ''All the maine
thinge that I speake for is because I would have an eye to propertie."22
The economic theorists mistrust equality but deny being anti-egalitarian.
As self-proclaimed liberals, it is neither fashionable nor expedient to condemn
equality outright. Inequality must be shown to be valuable and beneficial,
while equality is narrowed and proven harmful. Instead of God's will, tradition, or nature, as in classical conservatism, their justification of inequality is
essentially utilitarian, based on their view of the market and their analysis of
its operation.
Justification of inequality requires a standard by which to judge. Once
again, the market and freedom provide that standard. Inequality is an inevitable,
natural, and necessary consequence of freedom and equal opportunity to compete in free markets; egalitarian policies retard progress and destroy freedom.
For Hayek, "[E]quality before the law which freedom requires leads to material
inequality." Friedman contends that freedom necessarily produces inequality
and whatever equality is possible. Even if people were equal in any significant
sense, the market rewards them differently for unequal services to others.
Buchanan notes that the assumption of inequality in endowments and utility
functions is common in economic theory.2 3
Inequality is desirable because equality is often a positive political danger.
In another either/or argument reflecting the inevitability of the political market,
equalization policies create a new class of privileged bureaucrats and millionaires; undermine respect for law; force the best, most productive people out
of a country; increase taxes; destroy freedom; and lead to tyranny. Economic
inequality helps preserve political freedom by reducing the role of government
in economic and social relations, by protecting minorities, and by preserving
dissent. Friedman and Hayek believe that in free-market systems, the rich may
act as patrons for unpopular or new groups and ideas. Radicals "have typically
been supported" by wealthy persons. Almost all new movements began when
someone with wealth was enlisted to help propagate or publish the idea. Thus,
in an egalitarian - by definition, "socialist"-or in a noncapitalist regime, there
can be no significant opportunities to disagree with government policy. No
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one can dissent because of the impossibility of raising funds to promote ideas
or groups. Economic inequality therefore becomes one of the important necessities for preserving political freedom. That economic inequality may discourage participation, cause conflict, or be employed to crush dissent is a nonproblem, because, by definition, only free-market systems provide the means
to protect dissidents and radical movements.2 4
The conservatives' market generates both equality and inequality. Inequality
is necessary for equalization. The market creates inequality because it rewards
people differently, but reward has nothing to do with power. This argument
is simultaneously and inextricably empirical and moral, definitional and circular: only in the market do people get what they deserve, and what they deserve
is what they get. As the market is not and cannot be coercive or arbitrary,2 5
it judges everyone by the same criterion: satisfaction rendered to others. When
free, it rewards people according to their contribution to the welfare of others.
Like contributions are rewarded the same; unlike contributions, differently.
According to Friedman, competitive markets encourage three objectives:
"political freedom, economic efficiency, and substantial equality of economic
power." Markets are not the cause of poverty but improve the position of the
poor and produce all the equality possible because no one receives more or
less than he or she produces.26 By encouraging effort and eliminating government coercion and preference for favored groups-namely, anyone receiving
direct aid from public programs-the market ensures rewards proportionate to
impersonally determined contribution and value to others.
Buchanan believes that market rules are fair, enabling distribution of benefits to people based upon differences in their "natural talents." Simultaneously
and conveniently, market performance provides the means to discover an individual's natural talents. For Friedman, the market determines how much each
person should receive. Hutt believes that individuals earn according to their
skills and their contribution "to the well-being of the rest," ensuring that some
earn much more than others. Hayek concedes that because market rewards
correspond to the value of services to others, this gives more to those who
already have the most, but this is the market's "merit rather than its defect."
Given individual ability, effort, and luck, Hayek's impersonal market ensures
that "each will get for the share he wins ... as large a real equivalent as can
be secured." The result of a "truly free market;' for Friedman, would be "far
less inequality than currently exists." 27 Only coercion allows anyone to arbitrarily receive more than their marginal value to others.
The argument that differential rewards are the natural result of freedom
and the unequal contribution to the welfare of others is only part of the
economic theorists' justification of inequality. There are several additional
justifications, weighed differently by separate authors but, taken together, form-
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ing a consistent critique of equality: desert,28 incentive, investment signals,
choice, benefits to others, inheritance, luck, and the nature of the market.
These justify narrowing equality in economics and politics.
Conservative justification of inequality is often based on efficiency claims.
Inequality advances the common good . It is a necessary incentive to work and
invest. As such, inequality produces more wealth which benefits everyone,
though time frames are left vague. This claim is the basis of supply-side demands to reduce taxes and public welfare spending. A successful economy requires growth in the number of wealthy people. Concentrations of wealth
create wealth, not poverty; therefore, if society increases the stakes and rewards, more wealth will be produced. As producers of wealth, the wealthy
deserve "their rewards." This is part of Gilder's lyrical "enriching mysteries of
inequality ... the multiplying miracles of market economics." Thus the same
policy that helps create inequality by shifting resources to the wealthy also encourages investment, which produces the wealth that benefits the less creative.
Inequality spurs those on the bottom to work harder and promises the productive rich that they can keep the profits of their creative investment efforts.
Conversely, equality undermines wealth and enterprise.29
Economic inequality, according to Friedman, Hayek, and Buchanan, is frequently the result of choices, tastes, and willingness to assume risks. Their claim
neglects the fact that people are not equally able to refuse to take chances or
enter lotteries; that often the level of risk varies between rich and poor (i.e.,
monetary versus life threatening); and that the poor have a much smaller surplus they can risk. To these writers, much economic inequality is due to
deliberate choices. People use their freedom to deliberately take risks and satisfy
others' tastes thereby earning large rewards. Gilder claims that inequality results from risk taking and that greater wealth is the reward for risk taking. 30
"Material progress is ineluctably elitist: it makes the rich richer and increases
their numbers, exalting the few extraordinary men who can produce wealth
over the democratic masses who comsume it. . . . Material progress, though
democratically demanded, is procedurally undemocratic." 31
The poor actually benefit from increasing inequality that enables the rich
to expand investment, which is the key to ending poverty. Thus, ''A successful
economy depends on the proliferation of the rich." These wealth producers
are mankind's "greatest benefactors." It is the creative, investing few who "are
fighting America's only serious war against poverty." Using property to create
large enterprises, the economically successful-in a version of William Graham
Sumner's entrepreneur dragging the less able up the evolutionary ladder-freely
give a better life to the rest.32 Because inequality is essential to growth, deliberately increasing inequality helps the poor. In the absence of monopoly, which
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cannot exist in free markets, those who earn the most "are contributing most
to the well-being of the rest."33
Inequality has other positive advantages. It is essential to the progress of
ciPilizatwn. According to Friedman, it encourages progress, diversity, and
freedom. Growth requires a creative elite: "[E]conomic and social progress
do not depend on the attributes or behavior of the masses." To von Mises,
"[I]t stimulates everyone to produce as much as he can and at the lowest
cost."34 For Hayek, inequality is necessary "to achieve any sort of social organization." Rapid economic advance results from and is impossible without inequality. The wealthy, through high-level consumption, "perform a
necessary service." Common goods and services are available today because
the few who were able to afford them pioneered their development, allowing them to percolate down to the rest of society; new goods and services
will arise in the same way. Progress requires inequality in order to produce
goods "too expensive to provide for more than a few. . . . new things will
often become available to the greater part of the people only because for some
time they have been the luxuries of the few." Future welfare depends on "the
unequal distribution of present benefits." In both production and consumption the poor benefit from inequality which spurs their effort while encouraging elite experimentation. This applies between nations. The developing states
receive the same benefits from the north-south gap as do the poor inside
wealthy nations.35
Inequality is also justified by the moral legitimacy and utilitarian value of
inheritance. As the only link between generations, inheritance drives parents
to work harder to provide for the next generation. Without presenting any
evidence, Hayek asserts that it is not a significant obstacle to equality of opportunity. He claims that society will "get a better elite" if wealth. accumulates
across generations and if everyone is not required to start from the same level.
Wealth is hardly separable from the nonmaterial advantages that families can
pass on. Though inheritance increases inequality between individuals, it is not
arbitrary or a question of "unmerited benefits"; therefore, those who do not
receive bequests cannot claim to be harmed by those who do. Inheritance also
maintains independent centers of power which are crucial to freedom. Friedman agrees that inheritance reduces the scramble to find a place for children
that must occur in the absence of inheritance. He adds that inherited capital
maintains gains across generations, preventing them from being wasted, thereby
increasing output and total wealth. As noted previously, Friedman contends
that there is no significant difference between a financial bequest and inheriting genes; such a "distinction is untenable." By linking inheritance of property
and other advantages to nature, he disavows any ethical difference between in-
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heriting real property as defined in the law and genetic inheritance. Economic
inequalities are as natural as genetic distinctions.36
Having hard-working parents from a preferred cultural group, along with
superior genes and a good investment portfolio, is just a matter of luck, and
in a fair economic game, no one can interfere with the results of luck. Luck,
seen as random good fortune for an individual, has little or nothing to do with
sociopolitical relations and cannot be compensated for by public policy without making everyone alike and harming freedom. The social component is ignored in this argument. Luck simply happens. It occurs in the context of
everyone pursuing their own self-interest and has no larger reference; therefore, no one other than lucky recipients can legitimately claim a share in windfalls. Whatever we receive for our efforts results from "choice and chance,"37
and one result is not ethically superior to another.
This argument is the weakest element in the conservative defense of inequality. That something resulting from random good luck properly belongs
to the beneficiary assumes a rights-based justification that the economists do
not attempt. There is little concern for why some identifiable groups, such
as ethnic minorities, seem to have less luck than other identifiable groups.
Luck is not randomly distributed among individuals or groups. The rich, the
middle groups, and the poor are exposed to different risks and opportunities.
Luck in the market-especially in the productive part of the economy as opposed to sports 31!...more frequently depends upon socially derived position
than any truly random occurrence.
Several other arguments also justify inequality. Egalitarianism is destructive, because it is frequently based on envy 39 and "tends to promote greed"40 an argument that necessarily follows from human nature and the political
market. There is no real equality, and the overwhelming number of people
prefer a system of opportunity and inequality to equalization. Egalitarianism
violates "one of the most basic instincts of human beings"- the effort to improve one's condition-expands government power, and undermines respect
for the law.41
Ultimately, inequality does not require separate justification. As in traditional conservatism, the basic principle of order-here, the market-necessitates
and legitimates inequality. Equalization is inequitable and inefficient, a distemper attacking the fundamental structure of order. Inequality is part of the
market system; as an integral result of impersonal forces in that system, one
cannot exist without the other. Instead of condemnation, that is high praise.
Rewards are unrelated and irrelevant to moral worth or even physical effort.
Because their good fortune is the result of luck or is the reward for satisfying
the needs and wants of others, people cannot be rewarded according to intrinsic merit,42 even if that could be established. The economic game is played by
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all, for each person's own benefit, and outcomes are not controlled by any
one person or group. On the whole, everyone's chances will be improved in
this system, and that is justification enough.43
The decisive source of inequality, for the conservatives, lies in ourselvesin human nature and how each chooses to act . Much inequality comes from
freely made, individual choices, not personal capacities. As such, it comes
from individualism and the choices and preferences embodied in institutions,
especially the market. To a large extent, individuals shape themselves according to market choices. Guessing or choosing wrongly is our mistake and cannot be rectified by exogenous intervention . Because the market is freer than
other areas of life and encourages equality, inequalities cannot be eliminated
by attacking the market.44
Little can be done outside the market to remove inequality. Equalization
requires arbitrary and coercive political interference. Given the coercively selfinterested political market and the need to organize such interference, Buchanan
believes that interventions are dangerous and even in good causes "will be
perverted for use in situations where they simply do not apply," thereby damaging efficiency and fairness. Hayek also urges restraint in having government
help "the least fortunate," on the grounds that "benevolent motives" and
charity "inevitably" cause violation of equal treatment by the law, arbitrariness,
and expansion of power. Intervention is legitimate only when inequality is due
to injustice, but the injustice must be recent to be eligible for correction.
Long-standing injustices (how long is left unstated), even when they cause inequality should be treated "as due to accident"; they should not justify the
dangerous expedient of helping identifiable groups. Regardless of purpose,
treating people differently is unequal treatment that leads to arbitrary government, retards society's evolution, and undermines the spontaneous market.45
This argument for preservation and expansion of inequality stands in marked
contrast to the claims of liberal economists. They contend that while differences
in earnings and position are desirable, existing inequalities are inefficient and
freedom destroying, and there is no economic or social justification for increasing
them. They reject each of the conservative justifications for inequality: that
large savings are needed for investment; that people are paid according to their
marginal productivity; that inequality supports democracy; that in the long
run market inequality generates more equality; and that intervention must undermine the economy. For them, the market is not neutral; it rewards equal
effort unequally and many inequalities are due to position, inherited wealth,
and market power.
Though liberal economists reject extensive equalization-despite the mythical critique of their opponents-they argue for a wider and more inclusive
equality than conservatives do. Equality is a matter of relative standing that
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can be improved, not an either/or state. Liberals would actively promote equality
for more individuals and groups, taking into account differences in situation and
utilizing a more extensive image of equal opportunity and some redistribution.46
Keynes set the general tone for subsequent liberal arguments. His General Theory
of Employment Interest and Money, for those who accepted its arguments, removed economic validation for great differences in wealth. The traditional
justification of inequality-"social injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable
incident in the scheme of progress"-stemmed from bad economic theory,
characterized "by the lack of correspondence between the results of their theory
and the facts of observation." Keynes emphasized demand and consumption.
Without demand there was no incentive to invest, and inequality depressed
demand. Progress required increasing "the propensity to consume by the redistribution of incomes or otherwise," not relying on the rich to invest. Without investment opportunities, the wealthy were likely to waste income through
saving or nonproductive consumption. In conditions of low demand and
unemployment, "the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent on the
abstinence of the rich .. . is more likely to be impeded by it. One of the chief
justifications of great inequality of wealth is, therefore, removed." Some inequality is acceptable, but not for reasons of increased investment: "[T]here is
social and psychological justification for significant inequalities ofincomes and
wealth" to channel off potentially destructive drives and passions, "but not
for such large disparities as exist to-day." If investment is inadequate to ensure
full employment, itself an equalizing policy, "the duty of ordering the current
volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands" but instead requires more public direction of investment and accumulation.47
Contemporary liberals reflect Keynes's sentiments. Galbraith claims that
the wealthy may be taxed because "investment of saved income'' is "mercurial"
and "not an especially efficient way to promote capital formation"-a point
echoed in Lester Thurow's observation that most industrial investment is made
out of retained earnings, not invested private savings.48 High taxes do not retard
growth . Indeed, in an argument opposite to the conservative claim, they may
increase work effort. In either case, the United States' most successful competitors have higher taxes, more regulation, and less economic inequality than
does the United States. Galbraith adds that "the thesis that the rich have not
been working because of too little income and the poor have been idling because of too much" (implying different motivations at the top and bottom of
society) is "justification at an unduly primitive level."49
Keynes believed distribution is "arbitrary and inequitable." Where the conservatives see impersonal market determination ofincome, Galbraith sees "human agency" hidden by "the fiction that compensation is decided impersonally by outside forces." Thurow claims that "the world is not as deterministic"
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and that impersonal market forces do not reward effort or distribute income
as the conservatives claim. Most large fortunes are the result of"stochastic processes," chance, and "economic lotteries rather than . . . individual characteristics," gradual reinvestment, or accumulation. The conservatives employ this
insight to defend individual accumulation, but Thurow sees it as undermining
an individual's exclusive claim to benefits. "Each individual is not paid in accordance with what he produces, and equals to not have equal ex post incomes."
Marginal productivity does not determine income. Lower taxes have not "unleashed work effort and savings by increasing income differentials. Indeed, they
have done directly the opposite." Increased production, even if inequality could
generate it, cannot solve equity or equality problems.50
The conflict over equality "is also a clash over ideas, over the nature of
the just society."51 Though equality may be a component of equity or justice,
they are not synonymous. The liberals claim that the market is not neutral
between individuals and groups, ensuring that economic analysis has a large
valuative component. They insist that economics impacts politics and society,
requiring that economic relations be measured by a widely accepted theory of
equity or justice. Choice is imposed upon us. "The Issue Cannot Be Avoided,"
according to Thurow. Both efficiency and equity require conscious decisions
about distribution and acceptable relative standing. "To have no government
program for redistributing income is simply to certify that the existing market
distribution of resources is equitable. One way or the other, we are forced to
reveal our collective preferences about what constitutes a just distribution of
economic resources." The decision to allow or increase inequality is a political
decision, not one imposed by economic necessity. Economic regulations "are
designed to raise the income of someone (and therefore lower the income of
others)." Only an independent theory of justice can determine whether "a regulation is good or bad."52
It would be easy to multiply quotations, but the essential liberal claim is
that purposeful intervention and direction are necessary to ensure equalization, social justice, and economic efficiency. It is impossible to overemphasize
the intensity of the conservative rejection of this argument, starting with Hayek's criticism of Keynes in the 1930s and 1940s. Root and branch, on moral,
political, and economic grounds, they attack this position as unjust, inefficient,
illogical, and destructive of freedom and equality.

Equality and Justice
Normative discourse has repeatedly linked equality and justice. Conservative
economic theory severs this link, denying that justice is relevant to equality
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when discussing market relations and concurrently asserting that nothing positive or direct can be done to promote equality. This position is shaped by the
conservative pictures of human nature, the political market, and the impersonal,
autonomous economic market. The character of the market ensures that equity
questions about market distribution cannot arise. If the market rewards people according to their contribution to others and if this determination is made
impersonally, then it is illegitimate to inquire into market rewards or harms.
Hayek typifies this position . Only conduct can be considered just or unjust, never results. "Nature can be neither just nor unjust," and he and the other
authors liken the market to nature. Only those "situations which have been
created by individual human will," not anything resulting from the natural,
spontaneous market, are relevant to justice. Wages and prices "determined in
a free market" must be considered just because they are impersonally generated.53 For a liberal such as Thurow, "Economic destruction in industrial societies is caused by identifiable human action that can be controlled" (whether
or not control is desirable), which raises equity questions. For Hayek, no one
controls the market, and "no single person or group determines who gets
what"; thus, justice does not apply where "no human agency is responsible;'
and justice and equity issues "ought to be confined to the deliberate treatment
of men by other men."54 Even if the market does not fit one's preferences-and
people have only preferences, not considered judgments-about equalization
and justice, efforts to impose preferences are counterproductive, making the
market immune from rational political assault and guiltless of adverse impact
on society.
Fuller discussion must wait until chapter 6, but some ramifications of this
position on justice directly relate to equality. The conservative view terminates
debate over distribution and saps economic equalization. Justice connects with
equality only as identical treatment by the law. Wage policy, antidiscrirnination rules, social security, welfare, adjustment of taxes to achieve social endsall are swept away by economic determination of political possibility. Laws
treating people differently for the purpose of equal treatment are unjust, expand government, attack freedom and equality, and undermine creativity. As
such they stand condemned on moral and efficiency grounds. All government
can do to encourage equalization is maintain equal laws, property rights, and
a stable monetary framework; enforce contracts; and get out of the market's
way.55 The attack on an extensive role for government is, therefore, a direct
assault on most equalization policies, whether or not redistributive. This attack causes a shift in beneficiaries of public policy-claiming that all will be
treated alike regardless of differences-deliberately increasing inequality and
making impossible expansion or even continuation of the welfare and interventionist state.
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Equality in Politics
The proper relation of the spheres of economic and political equality is an ancient issue and is integral to any discussion of democracy, as I elaborate in
the next chapter. Most theorists have worried that political equality would
threaten property and economic inequality. Only with the rise of liberal democracy did such people as Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green,
and Louis Brandeis begin to address the possible impact of economic inequality on politics. Liberal economists such as Keynes reflect the latter concern. Conservative economists strongly endorse the older perspective and are
not troubled that economic inequalities may undermine democracy or political
equality. They unanimously deny that economic equalization is necessary to
political equality. Business has no direct power to intervene in politics, and
wealth buys influence only when free markets are subverted. Economic inequality promotes democracy by furnishing some people with the means to
resist government and, as noted with Friedman and Hayek, supposedly provides support for radical ideas which would find no backing in a socialist system. Buchanan regularly refers to the "fiscal constitution" necessary to democracy, a model that calls for less participation and, of necessity, less political
equality. He believes that his perspective requires "ex an-rt' political equality
but not equal political influence.56
Political and economic inequality are regularly considered conceptually
distinct, embodying different meanings of who is equal, how, and under what
circumstances.57 Limited political equality is acceptable to the conservative
economists, but the idea remains suspect and potentially dangerous because
of its possible spillover into economics. Political equality always implies equal
opportunity and treating people alike; its ideal is sameness of influence and
results, even when limited to voting. Debate centers on how much opportunity and how much equality of results are sufficient for political equality.58
The conservatives argue strongly for equal treatment by the law-which is different from political equality-and accept universal suffiage as a principle, but
more than anything else, they emphasize equal opportunity as the right to attempt to compete. If translated into political terms, this would be equivalent
to ensuring everyone's right to run for office while disclaiming the need for
an equal vote, voting districts, or rights protective of political participation.
The conservatives challenge the ideal of political equality from their economic perspective. Political equality is most important when government has
a large, active role. When its role is confined to treating everyone identically,
and when the market restrains it from expanding beyond this central duty,
there is less need for political power or political equality. As the role of government is reduced, political equality is narrowed mainly to voting in elections.
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It is political equality beyond the right to vote, combined with Keynesian
economic theory, that encourages and demands expansion of government into economic relations. Since political equality can lead to an effective demand
for more economic equalization, a stable economic system requires a minimizing redefinition of equality and democracy. Democracy's egalitarian thrust provides the basis for the conservatives' contention that the only way to protect
the economy is to limit liberal democracy.

Summary and Some Conclusions
Equality is a complex idea made simple in conservative political economy.
Equality for the conservatives is achieved by leaving people alone to struggle.
It envisages a narrow meaning, content, and arena for equality. Rather than
a complex of interrelated and conflicting issues and questions, equality is
sameness and is not desirable except with reference to treatment under the law.
Only the market promotes equality, and it determines who should benefit from
neutral public policy. Equal opportunity, defined to exclude any equalization
of results illustrates this point that we must accept market results. It is not
a continuum of possibilities that require reducing differences to ensure that
individuals with similar abilities have similar chances but a single possibility
and policy: allowing people to compete without coercive interference. Equality
is a by-product of and synonymous with freedom. Only this meaning eliminates conflict between freedom (the primary value) and equality, by reducing
each to a single formula-participation in the market. Otherwise, antinomy
exists between freedom and equality.
The conservative economists claim that the sole obstacle to both freedom and equality is government-enforced inequalities through preferential
treatment- broadly defined to include most welfare measures, intervention,
and programs such as affirmative action. Given human nature and the political
and economic markets, equalization policies always produce effects different
from their purposes. lreating people differently to treat them alike strengthens
government, weakens respect for the real law, undermines creativity, destroys
freedom, and prevents legitimate equalization through personal effort or luck
in the market. The market is the only arena within which equality may be
achieved and then exclusively through individual efforts. There is no other way
to play a capitalist game, and an economic polity cannot be made to conform
to exogenous beliefs about equality, equity, or desirable outcomes. Even when
inequality is the result of luck, inheritance, radically different opportunities,
and education, the conservatives see no reason for government intervention
or for claims of unfair and unequal treatment. Gender, power, ethnicity, and
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class status are irrelevant to achievable equality, which is that produced in a
completely free market. People must learn to accept inequalities resulting from
natural processes, such as the market or genetic inheritance.
Contemporary United States politics illustrates the impact of economic
theories on public policy and on perceptions of what is politically necessary
and possible. One result is that equality has been deflated as a legitimate public
goal. All of the rich complexity of equality in western thinking is missing from
the conservative argument. Because people have the same motivation, they
are fundamentally alike. Because the individual is the sole judge of what is important, no one can make equality decisions affecting another's property or
interests. Under no circumstances can public policy distinguish between people. The conservatives take the economic system as given and make equality,
politics, and social relations conform to market necessity. Equality becomes
indistinguishable from freedom : isolated self-evaluation, competition, and keeping one's own property. Once again, the market defines permissible public
policy. Government must not intervene in either the market or resultant
political-social-economic inequalities.
Equality for the conservatives depends upon the actual existence of a neutral market, where there is no private power, coercion, or reward separate from
random luck and/or individual contributions to the welfare of others. Or, it
depends upon a believable promise that such a market could exist under necessary and attainable conditions. Absent one or the other of these circumstances,
the conservative argument becomes another justification and plea for special
interests and self-interest, to protect the haves from the have-nots. As a political theorist, not an economist, I do not intend to comment on the second
possibility, and by the conservative's own admission, the first does not exist,
even if they base policy advice upon it. I believe, along with liberal economists
such as Keynes and Thurow, that the ideal neither exists nor is attainable at
an acceptable cost, a belief that is compatible with support for private property
and capitalism. Whether or not it is a viable possibility, this vision has political
and social implications that demand consideration.
The claims about the operation of randomness in the market are also of
doubtful validity. Hayek, for example, states that a particular rule and the market in general are legitimate because, ignorant of future outcomes, "we can
assume it to increase everyone's chances equally." Statistically, someone must
be on top and someone on the bottom, even if picked at random.59 Hayek
employs an obvious statement-that there must be a top and bottom in any
ranking-to support a controversial claim-that in our ignorance we must believe the market is neutral between people and accept existing inequalities.
Justification based upon chance or random good luck assumes that success is
truly indiscriminate and not affected by power or position, that everyone has
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the same opportunity to achieve good fortune . But the market and market
processes are not random in this simple sense. Existing property distribution,
educational and cultural advantages, political culture, popular prejudices, and
plain political power ensure that people are not picked in a fully random fashion.
Ignorance of future positions is not the same for all actors, and people are not
in the same situation with respect to knowledge, risk, property, or connections. For the system and its rules to be truly neutral between individuals, one
would have to ensure the same starting point for everyone or draw lots for
all positions-a concept of equality that most people reject. Since this is not
acceptable, the economists conclude market distribution is justified.
Because equality is not a question of either/or states60 but a continuum
of possibilities and an approximation to a moral ideal, equality is always conceived in terms of purposes.61 To the limited extent equality implies uniformity,62
that uniformity is determined by purposes, such as the ideal of blind justice
rendering all equal before the law. If our purpose is to maximize political participation, we will attempt to make the conditions for participation more equal.
If it is to promote individualism (defined as developing individual talents, opportunities, and personality), we will emphasize support for people to grow,
experiment, learn, and choose. If it is to justify existing power and property
relations, we will limit equality to the minimum acceptable under existing
political conditions. But at all times, purposes and perceptions condition the
meaning and content of equality and the focus of equalization efforts.
The content of equal opportunity also reflects purposes. Although it is
always dangerous to impute purposes to authors in the absence of their explicit statements, the conservatives' equal opportunity is not an expansive idea.
Though its original eighteenth-century formulation was progressive in denying the relevance of anything other than talent, we have moved beyond the
situation where people of equal talent are denied positions solely on class
grounds. Today we are confronted with the common situation where persons
of potentially equal ability do not have the opportunity to develop their talents.
The conservatives would address this problem by allowing market competition to remove differences between men and women, minorities and favored
groups, rich and poor, but that requires elimination of minimum-wage rules
and other protections and a rational, profit-maximizing man, unmoved by
other considerations. Such a creature may not exist in sufficient numbers.
In an effort to deny that self-interest is simply economic, the conservatives'
themselves have testified that profit maximization may be a secondary consideration to desire for esteem, power, labor peace, prevention of boycotts, or
personal satisfaction. If that is correct, and I believe it is, and if inequalities
are cumulative, equal opportunity viewed as careers open to talent is insufficient to allow people to develop potential talents and to compete based on
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their ability. The conservatives cannot have it both ways. They cannot continue to claim that except for luck, differences and inequalities are the product
of variations in tastes and choices and that the market promotes freedom and
equality for minorities despite tastes and preferences among dominant groups
that reduce real opportunities for minorities. Moreover, to the extent that inherited property gives some people greater life chances than those who have
none, the ideal of careers open to talent will be subverted. This is especially
important because advantages from property can accrue without any action
on the part of recipients, while talent and ability require years of study, work,
and development coupled with a receptive social environment before they
benefit their possessors or society.63 In this situation, the market claim to treat
equally all who enter will remain unfulfilled.64
Equal opportunity remains for conservatives what it meant in the eighteenth century. That does not make it wrong, but conditions and purposes have
changed; if one believes in equal opportunity, it becomes imperative to expand its meaning to reduce more economic and social barriers. Family and
subcultural environment which prevent acquisition of basic skills and knowledge
during childhood,65 deficient educational opportunities, and continuing racial
and sexual stereotypes are nearly as much a prison to talent as is coercion, and
they leave affected individuals equally helpless with no one to rally against.
Despite their shared claim that the market is a spontaneous process resulting
from evolution, the conservative market marks the bounds of evolution. It
can go no further. In that sense, history has ended. Self-seeking economic man
is the apex of evolution and limits evolution of political and social institutions.
Equal opportunity cannot be anything more than it was two hundred years
ago, because human passions and drives subvert public policy designed to encourage equality beyond what the market allows.
Conservative claims about equality (and freedom, justice, and democracy)
are vague regarding the time period in which equalization might occur. Aside
from Buchanan's partial dissent, what is, is the best that can be at that particular point in time. Faith in the spontaneous forces of the market allows no
other conclusion. This is an ahistorical model for an ahistorical world of determined beings who react like elements in an atomic table, not a contingent
world of historical accident. I do not deny that market systems have become
more equal over time or that they frequently offer more to people than nonmarket systems. However, everything is set in the eternal present, under the
premise that current inequality will produce as much future equality as there
can be; that is, inequality now promises to produce some or more equality in
the future- but there is never a word on when, except for an amorphous "long
run." In an individualist, as opposed to an organic, system, this promise could
make sense only in a stationary state. In a dynamic system, one that requires
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inequality to generate ever more technology and capital, equalization must
continue to be postponed. In a dynamic system, the justification for inequality
pushes achievement of equality into the future, unless it is defined by the circular argument that equality is what the market can achieve. If liberal economists are correct that economic efficiency requires more economic equalization, and if political equilibrium also requires more economic equalization,
then stability and democracy are postponed into the indefinite future.

Chapter Five

Democracy

Poverty is the cause of the defects of democracy. That is the reason why measures should be
taken to ensure a permanent level ofprosperity. This is in the int.erest ofall classes, including
the prosperous themselves.
-Aristotle, Politics, bk . 6, chap. 5.

Democracy is one of the most used and abused ideas in the twentieth century.
Since the end of World War II, virtually everyone has claimed to be a democrat
and to be supporting, working toward, or preserving democracy. Denominations include liberal democracy, constitutional democracy, participatory democracy, direct democracy, representative democracy, economic democracy, social democracy, elite democracy, majoritarian democracy, mass democracy,
limited democracy, and people's democracy; there are military juntas claiming
to restore democracy and theorists attempting to curb democracy in the name
of preserving it. Sometimes these terms overlap, and often they are incompatible, but there is still virtually universal agreement that democracy is good.
All claims, however, cannot be equally correct. What then is democracy? Where
does it apply? What conditions are necessary to have whatever we decide is
democracy? What are obstacles to democracy? How theorists respond reveals
much about their social-political-economic preferences and models.
The conservative economists agree about democracy. Democracy is acceptable, but democratic theory and practice do not meet the needs of a modern
economic system. This economic censure focuses specifically on democratic
politics, not economic democracy or demands to democratize the economy.
It contends that democratic theory and practice must be radically altered to
become compatible with a free economy. These theorists assert that contemporary democratic politics interferes with efficient operation of the economy
Parts of this chapter appeared in "Conservative Economist Critics of Democracy," Social Science
j(}Urna/ 21, 2, pp. 99-116, and are reprinted here with permission.
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and that unless this trend is reversed by limiting government's economic role
and reducing popular expectations, both democracy and the free economy
upon which it depends are doomed. As with freedom and equality, the analysis
of and prescription for democracy are based on supposedly empirical economic
analysis but are actually a form of normative political theory prescribing major
political and social goals and modifications. The assumptions in chapter 2 provide the basis for an attack on Keynesian and welfare economics and, through
them, on liberal democracy. Democracy is condemned as a form of majoritarian excess with an inherent bias toward intervention and deficit spending.
This critique is associated with a picture of democracy as a limited, procedural,
and purely political phenomenon having no particular aims or superior values.
This chapter examines the economists' theories of how democracy does and
should operate, the implications for democratic theory and practice, and related policy proposals that illustrate the basic normative argument.
Economic-based criticism of democracy has a long history and is closely
related to criticism of equality. The current attack reproduces many traditional
charges: democracy undermines property and property rights; it engenders mob
rule, instability, and demagogues; democracy is despotic imperialism where the
masses impose their ignorance on the elite; the mass public cannot appreciate
the complexities and long-range nature of economics; and political equality
is separate and distinct from economic relations. Aristotle stated the essential
criticism. Democracy meant rule by the poor-government for benefit of men
without means. Though the best of the undesirable forms of government,
democracy was unsatisfactory because it allowed the many to rule in their own
interest, not the common good. Aristotle feared that democracy always included the danger of lawless mob rule, where, in the name of equality, the
demos would use "their numerical superiority to make distribution of the property of the rich" or to confiscate "the property of the rich and less numerous."
Conversely, the majority was endangered by the rich attempting to despoil the
people. The best system, his polity, combined elements of democracy and
oligarchy. It limited the rival claims of both numbers or citizenship and wealth
for preference in participation, giving a large role to the middle classes on the
assumption that they had sufficiently broad interests to protect both property
and wide, though not universal, participation. The good polity, however, protected property, even at the cost of limiting political participation.1
Concern for the problems of mass participation was echoed by nineteenthand twentieth-century economic theorists. Much of the current conservative
criticism is similar to the arguments of Malthus, Spencer, and Sumner. Though
authors such as Knut Wicksell, Anthony Downs, and Kenneth Arrow fall
outside the framework of this book, they illustrate the contemporary theoretical context and background to the conservative criticism of democracy. Despite
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Wicksell's (1851-1926) decidedly liberal political and social preferences, Buchanan repeatedly asserts that Wicksell inspired his work. He considers his
discovery of Wicksell's 1896 thesis as "[o ]ne of the most exciting intellectual
moments in my career." Though Wicksell did not employ these arguments to
directly limit popular participation, Buchanan found in Wicksell an early statement of some of his most important views: politics and economics as exchange
mechanisms; emphasis on the importance of rules in understanding policy outcomes; and concern for unanimity or near-unanimity in fiscal decision making.2
Downs accepts an individualistic perspective in analyzing how democracy
operates, but he is not as overtly political as Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek.
Downs begins with a similar assumption-that people are self-interested and
that their behavior is directed "primarily towards selfish ends." Individual motivation is the key to understanding politics. As with Arrow, analysis starts with
individual utility calculations. Democracy behaves like a political market in
which parties compete for votes and candidates are rational utility maximizers
whose primary purpose is election or reelection. This leads them to attempt
to satisfy the largest number of voters possible-and voters to choose the party
promising the most. However, in Downs's model, consistency and ideology
limit political promises in a way absent from that of the conservatives.3
Arrow made the first systematic statement of public choice theory. He too
assumes individual pursuit of self-interest. Arrow illustrates that when individuals have a set of rankings among alternatives; when social outcomes are
positively correlated with individual preferences; when removing one alternative will not change the order of preferences; when citizens' choices are not
limited so that a preference cannot effectively be expressed; and when no one
is allowed to dictate a decision, then there will not be any one social decision
that can satisfy or reflect all individual preference rankings. This calls the efficacy of majority decision making into question, because simply voting will
not satisfy everyone's preferences-although if bargaining is allowed beforehand, more individual rankings may become congruent.4
Theorists such as Arrow and Downs are distinguished from Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek because they are less explicitly and deliberately normative and
political. Though their analyses provide the basis for questioning liberal democratic theory and assumptions and can lend themselves to the politically limiting
arguments of the conservatives, they do not draw the political and policy conclusions made by the conservatives, for whom popular democracy is dangerous.

Democratic Subversion of the Economic Constitution
Conservative assumptions about self-interest, spontaneous order, the political
market, and the inevitability of government inefficiency form the starting point
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for a significant criticism of contemporary democracy. They are the basis for
attacking Keynesian political economy and, through it, democratic values and
practice.
Democracy is in trouble because it has abandoned traditional economic
behavior and embraced Keynesian economics. These authors present both a
political and economic criticism, each of which is essential to understanding
their economic position . Buchanan, Wagner, and Tollison claim that under
"The Old-Time Fiscal Religion," balanced budgets were the norm in the United
States and Britain, and this "significantly limited the size of the state." This
older discipline imposed fiscal restraints upon the natural "proclivities of ordinary politicians." The budgetary process produced surpluses in good times and
deficits in bad times such as war, but these tended to balance. At all times the
role of government was strictly limited. A balanced budget prevented excessive
government spending and regulation. Governments could not collect sufficient
taxes to meet all demands, nor could they shift payment onto the future, because an unwritten "fiscal constitution" prevented systematic deficit spending,
ensuring limited government and limited extraction of resources from society.5
A balanced-budget rule formed the major part of this "fiscal constitution,"
defined as "a constitutional constraint . .. a fixed set of principles antecedent
to and controlling the operating institutions of government." The fiscal constitution was superior to ordinary public policies, majority decisions, or temporary governments. Though it may have been unwritten,6 "it nevertheless had
constitutional status" and "was an extra-legal rule or custom that grew up
around the formal document," presumably like political parties or judicial review. The fiscal constitution regulated public spending and financial decisions
and required that government spending be balanced by tax revenues, not borrowing. It was as fundamental as any political institution or rule.7
The use of constitutional language to refer to economic policy indicates
that fiscal affairs are more primary than political rules and decisions. This
language elevates the status of economics by contending that deficit spending
is essentially unconstitutional, contrary to the rule oflaw, and perhaps subversive. Limitations on government economic power become essential to the
restoration of the rule oflaw. Such limits are more important than mere statutes
or temporary majorities and are justified by an appeal to a higher rule; the
natural economic order. Because balanced budgets existed in the past, conservatives can point to their occurrence as a paradigmatic moment when people
behaved properly, making it easier for them to demand, in the name of restoration, curbs on contemporary democracy. In this theory of history, democracies have been seduced to abandon the old fiscal religion and embrace an
economic heresy congenial to the "inherent tendency'' 8 of democracy toward
deficit spending and fiscal ruin.

Democracy

105

The devil behind this seduction is, of course, the English economist John
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946). He is condemned as the justifier of interventionist and welfare policy.9 Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, and Wagner all assert
that Keynesian theory "may represent a substantial diseasemo in democracy
because it has released politicians from the limiting fiscal constitution. Keynesian economics is a dangerous construction, placing human will above the
natural, spontaneous market process created by evolution. They claim that his
macroeconomics and desire to reduce unemployment have taught democratic
politicians that budget balance is undesirable and that interventionist government is necessary to save the economy from the disequilibria which the conservatives attribute to intervention. Buchanan and Wagner believe that Keynes
"has turned the politicians loose ... [and] destroyed the effective constraint
on politicians' ordinary appetites." Politicians may now ignore all fiscal restraints
on their natural propensity to spend and spend their way to reelection. With
all spending restraint gone, such "Keynesians" as Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon could enlarge an already "bloated public sector." Keynes is charged with
elitism, concocting a corrupting political economy, undermining fiscal responsibility, and causing a "shift in paradigm" that has led to most current woes.
These disorders include a "bloated" budget and public sector; inflation, which
cannot be solved as long as we retain current democratic theory and practice
and is a "clear and present danger to the free society"; and unconcern for the
future. 11
This tendency is especially severe in democracies. Keynesian political economy supposedly requires elite or authoritarian government because democracies,
unlike authoritarian systems, are uniquely susceptible to the lure of deficit
spending. "(D]ebt is more dangerous for democracies." It is "particularly insidious for democratically organized governments" because voters, taxpayers, and
politicians have no collective image, no concern for their future selves. Instead, they want the quick fix-the easy answer which must inevitably lead to
default.12 According to Hayek, democracies cannot even create an adequate
monetary system.13
Conditions would be better if Keynes's ideas worked, but the conservatives
contend that intervention and the provision of extensive welfare benefits are
necessarily doomed to failure. Intervention in the market cannot work because
it undermines economic freedom and the operation of natural, self-adjusting
economic systems,14 decreases total wealth in society, and assumes that governments can successfully intervene in economic affairs. Government can do
nothing to "permanently stimulate employment," and its efforts usually go
wrong. The result of heeding popular demands for intervention is to grievously weaken political democracy and the economy.15 Why? Because Keynesian intervention is incompatible with spontaneous order and is a major ob-
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stacle to realization of democracy. Either intervention or democracy must give
way. Although it is obvious to the conservative theorists that Keynesian and
welfare economics must be eliminated, democracy does not fare well either,
because of the claim that democratic institutions hinder the efficiency and rationality of the natural economic order.

The Critique of Democracy, Briefly Stated
Who will benefit from which public policies-i.e., the issue of distributionlies at the heart of the debate over democracy and economics. Given their
assumptions about freedom and the nature of markets, critics such as Friedman, Hayek, Buchanan, and Brittan have framed their questions so as to indict democratic politics for modern economic problems. In shifting from
economic assumptions to political prescription, their position is simple: "[T]here
is a fundamental flaw in the Constitution of the United States and of other
constitutional democracies." 16 In answer to the question "whether there is
something self-destructive about the process of political democracym 7 in the
area of economic policy, these authors say yes.
Contemporary democracy is the major obstacle to democratic government.
The conservatives present a picture of democratic man similar to Plato's: blind,
ignorant appetite rules. Citizens demand more than, in the nature of things,
government can supply. "Excessive expectations"-anything that is outside their
market, such as demands for security, welfare, protection, reduced pollution,
readily available medical care, publicly funded retirement systems-are at fault.
People in democracies are peculiarly prone to short-term thinking because they
find it difficult to employ cost-benefit analysis and want only the benefits.
Ordinary democratic politics is too weak to control fiscally damaging demands
without constitutional props. Unrestrained democracy cannot resist specialinterest claims or apply a balanced budget over a period of years, because it
attempts to satisfy majority and group demands which, given human nature
and the political market, can never be satisfied.
Budget deficits are the natural result of democratic politics. They grow unmanageable, undermine investment, cause inflation, and destroy a productive
economy. As a result, the money supply is manipulated by electoral politics,
special interests rule, and the danger of major tyranny grows. Too much of
a redistributive burden is placed upon government because democracy requires prior agreement on a nonpolitical method of distribution. If politics
decides who gets what, its decisions are always arbitrary and disputable, leading to renewed and unending distributive conflict.18 A dangerous dilemma remains. Democratic man must be disciplined, or the economic system will col-
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lapse in an orgy of disastrous intervention, destroying in turn the freedom
necessary to democracy. 19
Both the public and the government are unwilling to accept the economic
system as natural and settle for less in the short run with the promise that the
spontaneous economic order will produce more in the long run . Politicians
naturally wish to remain in office and so attempt to meet demands regardless
of eventual consequences. Thus "the temptations to encourage false expectations among the electorate become overwhelming to politicians." This is inevitable, given the political market and its "inherent and fundamental" bias
toward meeting demands, the "lack" of fiscal restraints, and "governments [that]
are collectivities of utility maximizers" who do not represent any mythical collective or common interest. These economists assume that each official bargains
and trades, based on pure self-interest, to improve his or her position, regardless of long-term effects. They doubt "that government can be safely trusted
to operate in the public interest ... on the contrary, it must be expected to
be generally engaged in operating against the long-term interest by serving its
short-term political advantage."20 As a group, these authors do not discuss role
playing, the constitutional position of counterelites, or the limiting impact of
values. Instead, they assume that each official maximizes personal utilityreelection-by tempting uncomprehending and greedy voters with promises
of more and better fiscal goodies plundered from the creative minority. This
behavior corrupts democracy, undermines freedom, and violates the rule of
law, creating a bias toward intervention, deficits,21 and inflation because only
deficits can finance intervention without raising taxes and deficits are the major cause of inflation. The electorate comes "to expect too much from government action at too little cost:' expectations fed in large part by "competitive
vote-bidding." 22
The economic theorists usually speak of politicians and the government
as general, undifferentiated terms. On the rare occasions when they mention
parties or party competition, they assume that the self-seeking and shortsightedness that characterize individuals typifies group behavior. Indeed, parties are
no more than aggregates of self-seeking individuals who have no corporate identity except their shared loyalty to advancing self-interest.23 Unlike its efficacy
in the economic market, competition in politics is disastrous. Parties compete
for support, each attempting to become the monopoly supplier of public
goods, and the winner is the one who makes the most extravagant promises.
Ideological differences mean nothing.24 Such buying of votes and support is
an inevitable result of elections.25
As with many traditional conservatives, universal suffrage, while accepted
in principle, is seen as part of the problem. Majority voting leads to "overexpansion" in such areas as the social insurance budget.26 "[T]hose with the lowest
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incomes use the political process to increase their income" through coercive
redistribution . Universal suffrage thus "increases the number and proportion
of voters who favor redistribution." 27 This a priori argument, so reminiscent
of Aristotle, appears plausible but has little connection to reality. The poor
tend neither to vote nor to participate politically in any other way. In the United
States, for example, the poor are the most politically alienated, voting less than
any other group.28
As these economists see it, part of the problem is that the United States
has changed from a pattern of liberal democracy, where the duties of government were strictly limited by a fiscal constitution and a confined notion of the
rule oflaw, to corrupt, undisciplined majoritarian democracy. Democratic majorities readily transgress any limits, claim exclusive power to define what is
right, ignore the rule of law, and modify constitutions at will. Democracy
degenerates into a search for pure equality that refuses to recognize economic
differences. According to Buchanan, contemporary politicians believe that it
is legitimate to implement any policy "so long as 'democratic' procedures prevail." To Hayek, democratic majorities reject all limits, claiming the right to
settle issues howsoever they please. They insist "that whatever they desire is
just;' yet the thirst for unattainable "social justice" leads to greater and greater
abuses of power. Buchanan claims that except for "procedural guarantees:' majorities have come to believe they can do as they please and that this is the
"essence of 'democracy."' To Brittan, contemporary majorities believe that
they have a right to impose their will and are limited only "by the fears of
physical resistance or a collapse of business confidence." 29
Though his criticism is based less on economics per se than the others,
Hayek best summarizes this position. Separation of powers has broken down.
Legislatures no longer pass general rules equally applicable to all regardless of
status or position but claim unlimited power to govern and change the rules
of governing. Modem governments and the temporary majorities that support them decide limits to their own power. Unconstrained by acceptable constitutional rules, they literally are lawless. Without recognized limits, coercion, compulsion, and political pressure are seen as cheap ways to force (largely
wealthy) minorities into conformity, shifting economic burdens to the creative
and productive few. Inevitably governments serve special interests.30
These majorities, however, are not real majorities-majority rule being
impossible-but are shifting coalitions of minorities in temporary alliance.
Group politics are the bete noire of conservative criticism. Fear that legislatures
will focus on special or partial interests dates to at least Adam Smith, Edmund
Burke, and James Madison and was part of Aristotle's and Cicero's concern
over democracy. Interest group selfishness helps explain why the older fiscal
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constitution has been abandoned. Though Hayek believes that the barriers
to "arbitrary use of power" were breached for "benevolent" reasons, efforts to
help the less well off inevitably create conditions for the exercise of unlimited,
arbitrary power by temporary coalitions of coercive groups. Friedman charges
that efforts "to promote'' the public good inevitably lead to promotion of"special interests." 31
Unlike those political scientists who consider competing groups to be a
democratic, stabilizing factor, most of these economists believe that "the group
pursuit of self-interest may be inherently unstable" in contrast to individual pursuit of self-interest.32 Self-interested individuals, acting rationally, produce market competition while groups-usually labor unions or welfare seekers-pursuing the politics of compromise, accommodation, and intervention destroy
competition. Indeed, government regulation, which always promotes monopoly
and transfers wealth to groups able to influence government, results almost
exclusively from lobbying against the public interest. The greater the omnipotence claimed by democratic government, the more groups will organize
for both protection and plunder, and the more government will be forced to
buy their support. Legislative majorities must meet sectional demands or be
replaced by other, more compliant temporary coalitions.33
This situation flows from the inferiority of the political market to the real,
economic market. A market model explains both democracy and its problems
for these theorists. The economic market is supposedly responsive and responsible to individuals; it is competitive, free from coercive power, and allows little or no manipulation and no real monopoly. Individuals are free to enter
or leave at any time, free to accept or reject any transaction, with few or no
restraints. The "democratic political marketplace," however, is characterized by
coercive "near monopoly of power," limited choice, and the necessity for losers
to accept what winners want. Unlike the economic market, choice is severely
limited, and the political market cannot provide different services or policies
to meet individual needs. Centralization forces the same products on everyone.
If government could meet separate needs, that would give public officials
dangerous discretionary power. The nature of politics as a zero-sum game encourages further group competition and exacerbates the democratic dilemma.34
Not only is the economic market superior in general terms, some authors
claim it is necessary, in a causative sense, to freedom and political democracy.
Democracy requires that people have free and complete control over private
property, with this autonomy in turn limiting government. Any invasion of
private property rights or market freedom upsets the equilibrium within which
individuals find room to attempt to develop and compete. Once upset, this
equilibrium must be restored by limiting government power to intervene in
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economic relations, or both the market and democracy will be destroyed. The
choice is simple: capitalism and democracy or socialism and tyranny. A mixed
or nonmarket society cannot be democratic and free .3 5
The conservatives also claim that the market is the real realm of democracy,
superior in every way to political democracy.36 The market's "ballot" is preferable to the political "ballot" because it leaves more room for individual choice
and freedom. This makes the market more democratic than the political system. Friedman claims that "the economic market is a more effective means
for achieving political democracy than is a political market." As a voluntary
alternative to inefficient coercion, it gives people exactly what they wish. It
permits "unanimity without conformity . . . proportional representation ."37
Thus proportional representation is not applicable to politics, and its superiority
in the economic market condemns politics.
Other conservative economists also see the market as both free and democratic in a way that politics can never be. For Gilder, it is "ultimate democracy."
Hutt says that its inegalitarian aspect is a virtue. In the market, each person's
dollar is treated as the equal of any other person's dollar, ensuring that those
who are valued most by others will have the most votes. To the extent that
there are restraints in the economic market, they limit the ability of one person or group to coerce another and are natural in that they are "imposed under
the 'democratic' form ... [i .e.,] consumers' sovereignty."38 Equal formal access
to the market guarantees that market relations are voluntary, entered willingly
and consciously. This turns the market into the true realm of consensual, noncoercive relations, whereas politics and the so-called political market remain
the realm of nonconsent and coercion.
The political market, which emphasizes once and for all (for a particular
time period) elections, does not fit with the conservatives' previous picture
of interest-group activity within democracy. The economists correctly imply
that democratic politics is a continuing process of conflict and accommodation, a process much closer to their view of an economic market than they
will admit. Yet they reduce the "political market" to zero-sum elections where
the individual has little voice, choice, or role. The concept of a political market
leaves no room for consensus building, the nonrational and irrational in politics, or the educational role of participation in democratic politics. It denies
the place of manipulation and limited choice in economics. Everything is reduced to a simple exchange, and these exchanges are not intrinsically better
in a democratic system than in a dictatorship. In both they are made for selfish,
individual purposes. There is no moral difference between types of exchanges
unless they involve redistribution or intervention. Unfortunately, it is not
clear why these are significantly different from other exchanges. By reducing
democracy to an exchange procedure-one which, by their evidence, usually
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involves selfishness and corruption-democracy is stripped of any significant
moral content and of its traditional claims to moral superiority over other
forms of government. All that distinguishes democracy from dictatorship in
this model is democracy's allowance for "peaceful change of government," and
given the economic problems peculiar to democracy, that is temporary and
precious little.39 If democracy is justified only as a procedure for peaceful change
of government, does not hereditary monarchy receive superior justification on
the same grounds?

The Economists' Picture of Democracy
The economic theorists never quite explain what democracy is, but they claim
that excessive popular demands and participation coupled with Keynesianism
undermine and pervert democracy. The same critique is repeated over and over
with little variation . Current democracy is described as mass man seeking
through coercion his own immediate self-interest. The massively selfish and
ill-informed electorate demands the impossible, producing a built-in, inherent
bias toward intervention, deficits, and inflation. Budget surpluses are virtually
an accident. They can develop on a regular basis only with conscious decisions
to raise taxes and/or lower spending, but such decisions alienate some voters
and are difficult to make. Democratic politicians decide policy only according
to what they can gain from a choice in terms of voter support.
This is a picture of pure majoritarianism drawn from Rousseau's dreams
and Calhoun's nightmares. It contains every charge made against popular government since Plato. Majorities refuse to be guided by fundamental law. They
decide what is just and what is law. Regulation, welfare, and intervention are
solely in response to lobbying by special interests against the public.40 These
theorists share none of the pluralists' image of government as a balance between competing claims; nor Galbraith's image of it as a counterweight to private power; nor Keynes's premise that government intervenes to promote the
stability of capitalism. Rather, the political market and human nature make
such hopes futile. Under democracy, intervention aids only special interests.
Nothing accrues to the general advantage. There can be no long-term improvement.41 Welfare policy, redistribution, and intervention simply take from one
group and give to another, and in general, the recipients have no legitimate
claim to the wealth confiscated from productive individuals.
The conservative critics agree about how democracy should operate. They
do not repudiate democracy, as traditional property-rights theorists often did.
Instead, they redefine, modify, and limit democratic theory and practice. Democracy has neither goals nor purposes,42 except peaceful change of governors.
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Conservative democracy is a procedural and instrumental means-confined to
voting or choosing from a limited number of alternatives-for majorities to select
governors and affect the general direction of public policy. Claiming that it has
another aim or purpose indicates a belief that there is a truth superior to individuals, which may be legitimately enforced by coercion . Democracy is functioning
badly because of mad attempts to give it positive content.43 As a procedure, it is
limited to politics, and these authors consider it perverse to attempt to expand
democracy to other areas.44 Because pluralism and interest-group politics lead to
fragmentation and government involvement in the economy, the conservative
economists favor a democracy similar to Joseph Schumpeter's, which would limit
popular input and the range of political decisions. Thus democracy is legitimate
if it is not too responsive to popular economic demands. Its survival depends
upon an unrestrained market. To intervene in the name of democracy, as suggested by Keynes, Thurow, or Galbraith, undermines the underlying economic reality necessary for a successful democracy-market freedom.

Proposed Solutions
There are two essential criticisms made by these authors. Intervention subverts
economic efficiency and freedom. Contemporary democracy encourages intervention. What is to be done in the midst of this fiscal and moral45 decay?
Like an errant child, democracy must be disciplined-i.e., made to conform
to correct economic theory-if it is to be saved. Since democratic man is incapable of controlling himself, he needs a guide and limits: a return to preKeynesian public policy. How? Through a "'constitutional revolution' ... to
preserve liberal democracy." We must rescue "the true ideal" of democracy and
"protect democracy against itself," through "modification of the institutional
structure" and limits on the power and resources of government. For Hayek,
contemporary democracy must lead to socialism, which inevitably leads to
totalitarianism; therefore, it is legitimate to deprive democratic governments
of the power and resources that allow intervention and regulation even if these
"may generally be regarded as good purposes.''46 This involves imposing limits
on democratic government, because it is less able to "exercise self-restraint" than
"an autocratic government." Current "unlimited democracy may well be worse
than limited governments of a different kind." Thus, "all government, but
especially if it be democratic, should be limited."47 This is accomplished by
reducing government's scope, size, and activities; depoliticizing distribution
by placing most economic issues off limits to politics; stripping democracies
of the resources that allow intervention, regulation, and welfare; restricting
participation; and modifying majority rule.
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Given the shortcomings and irresponsibility of democracy, where will the
constituency develop for reform? Since there is no acceptable agreement on
political-economic values and approaches, and since these critics do not trust
normal democratic politics or the mass public (Buchanan and Wagner consider
the hope that voters can be educated to support better policies to be "a tiresome relic"48 ), correct economic policies must be imposed by incorporating
them into constitutions. Conservative economic theory must be elevated to
the same, perhaps superior, constitutional standing as basic political rights and
the structure of government already a part of western constitutions. Given
their political market, these conservatives may believe it is easier to generate
one-time support for constitutional change than to maintain support for limits on a year-to-year basis.49
A balanced-budget requirement is one of the most common proposals for
depriving majorities of the means to violate the economic constitution . Most
of these authors support a balanced-budget amendment50 ending deficit spending, to contain what they consider democratic fiscal excesses. Friedman has
actively campaigned for such limitations as California's Proposition 13. For
Buchanan and Wagner, "Budgets cannot be left adrift in the sea of democratic
politics." Citizens must be forced to recognize the full implications of spending.51 Some authors prefer that budgets be balanced each year, regardless of
the business cycle, except in a clearly defined situation such as a war or a major
economic crisis. Even then, it would require a qualified majority-for example,
two-thirds of the legislature-to override the balance mandate. Similar requirements have been called for in both the United States and Britain.52
A balanced-budget amendment is one of many proposals designed to
limit government spending, government's share of the gross national product, intervention, and provision of welfare. Because majorities abuse their
power, and the budget and size of government are "bloated," a balancedbudget requirement must be supplemented by constitutional provisions to
limit taxing and spending power, thereby shifting resources 'to private control, even if this would have no impact on the size of the economy.53 Each
of these authors prefers individual to public spending of resources. To Friedman, ''The deficit in the federal budget is only a symptom of a more deepseated malady: the size of government spending."54 Even if there were no deficit, public spending would harm freedom and the economy. Proposals for
reducing the size of the public sector include5 5 curtailing monetary growth,
perhaps to a rate similar to growth in real gross national product (GNP); a requirement that legislative budget decisions be made by a qualified majority,
such as three-quarters of the entire legislature; tax and expenditure limitations; and even a return to the gold standard, though this is very much a minority position.56 Each recommendation is designed to restrict what democ-
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racies can do in socioeconomic relations by reducing the resources upon which
they draw.
It is now easy to see why all of these authors reject tax increases. Although
tax increases to curb inflation and end deficits were the standard remedy of
pre-Keynesian economists, the conservatives hold that balancing the budget
by increasing taxes would enable democratic government to continue to redistribute resources and intervene in the economy. In an increasingly popular
but unsubstantiated charge, these theorists assert that as long as resources are
available, democratic majorities will continue their selfish and destructive activities. Raising taxes simply gives democracies more resources to spend and
waste and cannot lead to any long-term reduction in the deficit.57 Friedman
believes that it is better to run large deficits-perhaps in the hope that these
will generate opposition to spending-than to allow government the means
to expand through higher taxes.58 Some economists also propose such constitutional limitations for Britain, wanting Parliament to impose rules on itself
to restrain the rate of monetary growth, combine spending and taxing proposals, and adopt a balanced budget.59 Brittan proposes limitations on majorities, electoral reforms to weaken party control, and proportional representation6<Lall to confine the power of majorities to spend for social welfare and/or
intervene in the economy.
However, more radical remedies are suggested by a conservative scenario
in which separation of powers has ended and representative institutions have
failed. Modern legislatures have acquired too much power, making them prime
targets for shifting majorities and interest groups seeking to aggrandize themselves. Given the inevitable pursuit of self-interest and the political market,
legislatures claim immunity from constitutional limits. Self-interested majorities
support them, pushing aside constitutional rules and traditions. The legislature's
power, however, is fragile. It must be used to serve these abusive, special interests, or it will be given to someone else.
This situation requires "basic alteration of the structure of democratic government,''61 particularly the power, function, and scope of legislatures, to
conform to conservative economic theory. Hayek's solution reflects the preMadisonian concept of balance familiar to eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury constitutionalists. In that model, part of the legislature would be
insulated from the mass public, and each interest would have a role in government such that it could virtually veto legislation inimical to itself. Hayek would
do the same by ensuring the independence of one body from the public at large.
Hayek proposes a distinction between the legislature and the government
or governing body, thus creating two different legislative bodies. One, the governing body, would be elected by existing democratic procedures. The other,
the legislature, would pass fundamental rules equally applicable to all, that
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guide, limit, and bind the governing body in carrying out particular acts to
enforce the general rules. Significantly different electorates would choose the
legislature and the "governmental body." In an extension of Schumpeter's
logic, the legislature would ignore party divisions, group interests, and popular
pressures, following its own opinions of right, wrong, and the permanent interest of the nation. Moreover, to curb popular influence and to insulate this
body from public pressures, legislators would be elected for a fifteen-year term
and would be independent of parties. One-fifteenth of this legislature would be
elected each year. Candidates would be eligible at age forty-five and would
be elected by people of the same age. One would vote for these legislators only
once in a lifetime. To help ensure their independence while in office, members
would be guaranteed an honorable and lucrative position upon retirement at
age sixty. Such legislators, having independence from the electorate, political
parties, interest groups, and public opinion, would presumably limit government to obeying the law, enforcing contracts, providing justice, and keeping
out of the way of the economy. Other new governmental units, such as a constitutional court, would help ensure observation of these limits while arbitrating differences between the legislature and the governing body.62
Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek repeatedly claim that these proposals
foster reestablishment of the rule of law, a rule that has a large economic component. Since the rule of law is desirable and since they represent the rule of
law, anyone who disagrees with their position opposes the rule of law. People
who differ with these far-reaching proposals are dismissed as acting in ignorance, bad faith, or narrow self-interest. Buchanan sees opposition to constitutional change as rooted in "constitutional illiteracy" or pure economic selfinterest. In either case, opponents are worthy of no further consideration,
because there is no principled, moral opposition to these irrefutable proposals.63
This argument ignores that much constitutional debate is over what should
or should not be included in a constitution, such as recommendations to
grant constitutional status and protection to some welfare rights. That proposal must be dismissed as special-interest pleading, since all out-of-market proposals fall into that category. It is, however, common to try to have preferred
policies incorporated into the Constitution-examples include the equal rights
amendment, welfare rights, anti-abortion proposals, school prayer, and limitations on child labor- but economic conservatives claim something that these
examples do not: an empirically valid analysis of political and economic reality
that trumps all objections and is also good moral theory.
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Implications
The political element in this economic critique is illustrated by what is excluded from analysis. Although this chapter centers on democracy, democracy
is not the full picture. Conservative theory shifts the focus from economic failure to a critique of political participation and government. There is little or
no discussion of technological change, corporate mismanagement, macroeconomic cycles, or the possibility that natural systems do not exist. There is little
or no concern for social welfare, the social and political impact of conservative
economic policies, or how these policies benefit the already affluent. These
authors pride themselves on analyzing political economy in its institutional
setting, yet that setting is limited to an extremely narrow range. There is no
systematic discussion of why older economic values were abandoned. The entire focus is on misguided greed, mass selfishness, and political failure. Corporate and private market power are dismissed as impossible in a free market.
With the exception of Friedman, none of these authors examines who is demanding what from government. OPEC, international trade and investment,
and foreign policy are rarely mentioned. Defense spending is a great lacuna.
Though it involves direct economic intervention, allocation of a large part of
the GNP, nonproductive consumption of an increasing portion of national
resources and a disproportionate share of scientific and engineering talent, no
attempt is made to measure its impact on the free market. Only civilian spending is a danger.
Economists such as Brittan, Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, and Wagner
believe they can save democracy from itself. The cure for the ills of democracy
is less democracy, not more, which requires substantial changes in democratic
theory and practice to make them conform to and support correct economic
theory. Conservative proposals are based upon unquestioned assumptions
discussed earlier: human nature, evolutionary development of natural order
embodied in the economic market, and the political market. The implications
of this perspective for democracy depend on one's concept of democracy, as
well as its goals, purposes, and possibilities. Instead of reviewing the many conflicting theories of democracy, we can measure the implications of conservative arguments against six common elements found in every theory of democracy. There is no single, agreed-upon conception of these elements, nor
can they be considered in isolation one from another. Each element modifies
and correlates with the others, producing a unique perspective on democratic
theory and practice, depending on how each element is conceived. These common elements are the extent and type of democracy, equality, rights and freedom, participation, majority rule, and consent.
The vype and extent ofdemocracy refers to whether a theory emphasizes direct
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or indirect democracy; whether democracy is a process or is directed toward
achieving a goal or purpose; and whether democracy is (primarily or exclusively) political or if it is applicable to economic and/or social relations. Questions of this type are deeply contentious, for they involve conflicting views
of the purpose and structure of both government and society.
The conservative critics would save democracy by limiting the instruments
that make intervention possible: the scope and resources of government. Clearly,
they reject democratizing the economy, if that means more equality or having
a voice in governance, since that would destroy free markets and the spontaneous forces which generate them. Democracy does not apply to industry,
economic relations, worker decision making, cooperativism, public ownership,
codetermination, greater equalization, or any proposal for industrial or economic democracy. Democracy is limited exclusively to politics, unless one accepts the disingenuous claim that free markets are exemplars of real democracy.
The economic theorists also limit the scope of democracy by claiming that
it is only an indirect procedure for selecting governors and a method "for determining governmental decisions." It is not designed to achieve anything. It
does not involve "putting into effect the people's will" but is simply a competition for votes and, through the ballot, a limited system of elite accountability.
As such, it has neither aim, goal, nor purpose.64 Because politics is merely the
pursuit of self-interest, even within collective goals, its only purpose is to protect that pursuit. This means that traditional democratic goals such as social
justice, developing a community of feeling and civic awareness, citizen education, and a shared good beyond individual goods disappear. There is no social
justice; it is a "mirage." There are no social values, only the values of separate
individuals. Community, equality, and distributive justice cannot be public
goals, nor do they have anything to do with democracy; rather, they destroy
economic freedom, personal responsibility, and the rule of law.65
Limiting democracy to political procedure weakens egalitarian claims and
reduces the scope and potential power of government. Starting with Plato and
Aristotle, opponents and supporters of democracy have agreed that equality
(of some sort) and democracy are closely related. 1raditional conservatives
criticized democracy because of this link. Whether democratic equality referred to an equal right or opportunity to participate, an equal voice in government, equality before the law, or economic equalization to support participation, it upset the natural order. The economic critics believe democratic efforts
toward equalization are a "disease"66 that has gone too far and must be curbed.
A large part of the conservative criticism of democracy is that political equality
allows and even promotes demands for more economic equalization.
Political equality is satisfied by equality before the law and, generally, an
equal right to vote.67 Everyone is not equal,68 and these theorists interpret pub-
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lie efforts to expand political equality or improve social and economic status
as an attempt to impose equality of income and outcome on society-an attempt that must destroy efficiency, freedom, and achievable equality through
personal effort. As democracy is simply a procedure-voting and competition
for votes-and has no higher ends or purposes, reduction of economic disparities is not necessary to democracy. Democratic equality requires no more
equality than whatever is needed to attempt to compete in economic markets.
It is fulfilled politically when people have an opportunity to vote. Friedman
speaks for all these authors when he claims that organized efforts to reduce
inequality undermine the economic freedom necessary to democracy.69
Freedom and rights are integral to democratic theory and practice. Along
with equality, freedom and rights are part of the historical criteria defining
democracy. Whereas socialists and radical theorists have emphasized equality
as essential to democracy, liberals, starting in the late eighteenth century, began
to identify democracy with preservation of freedom . Many people continue
to define democracy in terms of freedom. As we noted in chapter 3, the conservatives' primary value is freedom, not democracy, but political and economic freedom are narrow concepts. Economic freedom-being left alone to
use our resources and property as we wish-is claimed as essential to political
freedom and democracy. Redistribution cannot increase the freedom of those
made better off; it only decreases the freedom of taxpayers. Poverty, few opportunities, and working for others cannot limit freedom under free-market
conditions and are irrelevant to democracy. Since the conservative theorists
believe that the market is free, not coercive, they are unconcerned that economic
differences or control over economic resources may affect political and economic freedom and, through these, democracy.
The limited notion of freedom has profound implications. Determining
how much freedom is necessary depends upon one's conception of the extent
and content of democracy, what can be expected from people;0 how they participate, and so forth. If the people and government have a reduced role, if intervention, welfare, and regulation diminish freedom, if political activity is
inherently coercive, then it is not necessary to have an extended area of freedom and rights. The notion of social and economic freedom -positive freedom,
affirmative action, worker participation, improved education, equal-pay requirements, protection from private power, guaranteed access to employment,
minimum levels of maintenance-becomes unnecessary, dangerous, and irrelevant to democracy. In short, these theorists believe that demands for social,
economic, and broader political freedom or rights undermine economic freedom, destroying the basis for democracy.
The same limitations apply to participation. Having a voice in determining
the affairs of the community is one of the oldest, most contentious elements
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in democratic theory. Equality, the nature and necessity of consent, the type
and extent of democracy, the range and limits of majority rule, the purpose
of democracy, and the scope of freedom shape participation. In keeping with
their individualist pursuit of self-interest and the political market, the economic critics have a minimal, purely instrumental view of participation, applying it exclusively to politics. It is hardly different from plebiscite democracy,
where the public is allowed to vote on issues or candidates presented to them
but have little input in shaping or choosing them. The purpose of participation is to ensure the legitimacy of government through popular selection of
the ruling elite and perhaps to protect self-interest. Participation has no other
role. It does not create or educate7 1 the citizen, decide issues, determine common interest, or serve to integrate the community. Not only do the conservative economists undermine arguments for more participation, such as those
ofThomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill and of contemporary theorists such
as Benjamin Barber, Robert Dahl, C. B. Macpherson, and Carole Patemen,
they call into question pluralist72 and interest-group politics.
These economists reflect the traditional conservative argument that human reason is limited, successful intervention is difficult, and people do not
know their real, long-range interests. The logic of this position is to limit political participation to voting and even to call for reduction in the level and intensity of voting participation because it leads to intervention in the market.
Hayek questions whether government employees, "old age pensioners, the
unemployed, etc." should be allowed to vote. The belief that it may be legitimate to restrict voting rights for such classifications of people reflects the underlying assumption that self-interest is primarily economic, that people sell their
votes for more government goodies plundered from others, and that politics
is a secondary concern and phenomenon.73
Because politics is the realm of coercion and the mass public cannot be
trusted, participation must be limited to limit coercion. Full citizen participation and involvement in politics introduce too much ignorance, resistance to
the dictates of the market, short-range thinking, and destructively self-seeking
behavior into the political system. Once again, these theorists present an either/

or situation: either extensive participation and pressure on government, accompanied by destructive intervention, or reduced participation and protec-

tion of the free economy. Hayek's once-in-a-lifetime vote for the more powerful legislature, as opposed to the governing body, exemplifies this duality.74 Friedman seems to see voting as the only legitimate form of political participation,
but it is not very important. Participation in the market is superior to political
participation. In politics, "Once I have voted, I have done my duty," but there
is continuing participation in the economic market. In politics, little or no
incentive exists to vote or choose with care or to attempt to follow up on out-
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comes. Instead, there is incentive to combine in order to plunder those less
efficient in combining for plunder.75 Though the other authors rarely discuss
participation as such, their criticism of interest groups, responsive government,
and the "political market" illustrate their mistrust of mass participation. In
terms made familiar by Albert Hirschman, the conservative economists employ
the more passive economic argument of exit from an undesirable situation
rather than the more active political voice-that is, complaint and deliberate
efforts to change an undesirable situation.76 If government does not or cannot
do very much, self-interest is protected, and it is unnecessary to participate
extensively in government's limited decisions. As man is an economic not a
political animal, the need for political participation is further reduced. A chastened government also limits the scope of popular choice and reduces the impact of participation.
The inconsistencies in this criticism of participation escape the economists'
notice. Given self-interest and their political market, voting, much less more
complex forms of participation, must be for narrowly self-interested reasons.
Group membership, patriotism, appeals to common interest, and citizen education cannot be reasons for participating, though people may delude themselves into believing they are. The problem is that with any nontautological
conception of individualistic pursuit of self-interest that can be made operational, participation is irrational nonsense for the maximizing individual, especially if the free-rider principle holds. If people pursue self-interest as these
theorists claim, then there is no way to explain why they take the time to combine with others or why they participate, other than that people are irrational
and incapable of seeing that individual participation is a waste of time given
the unlikelihood of having an impact. That may be a defensible argument,
especially within a simplistic individualistic perspective, but it is not the argument that these theorists make. Instead, they claim that there is excessive participation, that individuals combine to pressure and plunder the economy,
and that this behavior must be disciplined by constraining constitutional devices.
All forms of democratic theory associate majmitygovernance with democracy,
but there is significant disagreement over the nature of majorities, who or what
is a majority, and what are the limits to majorities. Majority rule is often justified on the Lockean principle that in a community of persons with equal
rights, each person is to count as one and only one in decisions affecting that
community, making majority decisions the only legitimate means to bind people consistent with their rights and equality.
Majority rule rarely means that a majority actually determines the day-today activities of government. Rather, it can signify either that a majority of
representatives who have been elected by a majority of voters actually rules,
or that the majority is more entitled to rule than a minority, or that govern-
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ments must maintain support or approval from the majority, or that the majority is entitled to determine what government will do, given minority rights.
The majority is often limited to certain categories of people: citizens, male
citizens, or land-owning citizens. In all cases, the ruling majority is smaller
than the number of persons or inhabitants subject to it, without apparent conflict with the fundamental principle. What proportion of those entitled to compose the majority is sufficient to constitute its voice or decision is also hotly
debated, as is the question of what limits majorities.
Although the majority principle is accepted by these economic theorists,
majority rule does not fare well. As noted before, they characterize majorities
as greedy coalitions of selfish minorities. As with Aristotle, they fear that majorities may act foolishly and unjustly. Not only do these conservatives restrict
the scope of majority decision making through limiting constitutional amendments, but the majority principle is dispensable in many circumstances. "[T]here
is nothing hallowed about the simple-majority rule." "The principal fallacy ....
[i]n our age ... is occupied by the principle of majority rule." "Majority voting
is a convenient decision rule; but it has been wrongly elevated into a fundamental moral principle" which allows "elective dictatorship" and rapacious majorities to impose any costs on a minority. Friedman finds majority rule to be
"an expedient rather than itself a basic principle." Buchanan believes that majority decision making might be inserted into a constitutional agreement, but
there is nothing "sacrosanct" about what is only "one among a set of plausibly
acceptable decision rules, any one of which might be chosen with equal validity." In agreeing to a constitution, majority rule must give way to unanimity.
Hayek repeatedly states that he is not opposed to majority rule, but majorities
are usually bought and do not exist in any real sense; therefore, majority rule
must be limited to prevent arbitrary-nonmarket-behavior.77 Majorities required
for addressing economic questions should be greater than 50 percent. Legislative majorities of two-thirds and three-quarters are proposed for fiscal affairs.
This call for increasing the power of minorities is often based on the idea
that there is "a true majority view'' that gets lost in vote trading, bargaining,
and legislative maneuvering.78 This view assumes the existence of a criterion
for distinguishing a true from a false majority, and these authors represent the
real majority, or what a majority should want and must be required to accept
for its long-term good. But such a majority is more likely to develop if a large
number of groups are required to enter a consensus, especially one that involves economics. By focusing on the power of SO-percent-plus-one to oppress
minorities, these theorists ignore the possibility that minority vetoes are a major problem preventing majorities from making necessary hard decisions. The
conservative proposal to limit majorities to force compromise increases the power
of veto groups, especially those with great wealth. Until they, like Calhoun,
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give an adequate explanation of permanent minorities needing protection
through frustration of majorities, one can only assume their limiting principle
can be employed by any minority seeking to oppose majorities.79
There is a still more significant problem with the conservatives' view of
majorities. Buchanan especially, though the others concur, argues that the individual is the source of value.80 If individualism and individual freedom are
considered primary values, there are only two possibilities for government: rule
by unanimity (which as a practical matter is impossible) or the majoritarian
principle, perhaps with limits consistent with the preservation of those values.
If some principle other than equality or individualism is the basis of value,
then majority rule (plus consent and individual rights) becomes less important. Given the procedural nature of conservative individualism and freedom,
the market becomes the extra-individual value source. Preservation of the market model is the primary goal . Despite the description of fair rules as those
that individuals decide upon, or accept, because they evolved, these rules must
conform to the market. The market becomes the only arena for and supplants
individual value-creation, individualism, and equal freedom, subordinating them
to market needs. Thus subordinated, it is illegitimate and impossible for individuals to exercise equal freedom and individualism to join majorities demanding limits to market behavior. Majority rule is inferior to the market.
If participation and majority rule are unimportant, then the last common
element in theories of democracy, consent, loses its value. To the extent that
democracy includes governance by the people, there is no way to avoid consent. Even if one does not link obligation to consent, the essential notion of
democratic rule, governance, approval of leaders, or dialogue between governed and governors implies that in some sense the public can or does give
consent and that its consent is necessary to legitimize government. In general,
consent refers to public or citizen agreement to and/or approval of government, and/or its policies, and/or the system of rules and institutions under
which decisions are made. Consent is a quintessential liberal concept, one that
expresses an individualistic ethic that governments and majorities receive legitimacy from and are limited in their power over individuals.
There is much disagreement over the meaning and adequate expression of
consent, but it is unnecessary to review that debate. Except for their claim
that the market is the realm of consensual relations, the economic theorists
simply do not deal with consent.81 It is a nonissue. This lack of concern for
consent is puzzling in authors professing individualism and occasionally a contractual source of obligation. But the economists' procedural individualism,
lacking substantial content, coupled with their emphasis on spontaneous order,
system needs, and fitting individuals to the system, is a weak support for consent. Given Hayek's and Buchanan's picture of institutional evolution-an
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inherently organic as opposed to individualistic concept-and each author's
emphasis on the development of spontaneous order, consent does not confer
legitimacy. Why people should be obligated to obey, especially when there is
so much potential for losing many of the benefits they have gained in the last
hundred years, remains unexplained .

Some Conclusions
These economists propose to create a free market, and this requires redefinition and remodeling of democracy. For them, existing democracy is objectively
antidemocratic. It is neither pure nor strong enough to resist the popular policies which destroy it. Both the outcomes and procedures of contemporary
democracy must be changed, because it is those procedures which make possible the responsiveness to temporary majorities that these authors find so repugnant. Economic theory sets the limits to what is possible. Liberal democracy
must be replaced with a different model, one that compensates for self-interested
human drives and safeguards conservative economic theory.
Though these theorists sincerely profess support for democracy, they display
no awareness of how their language, attack on, and depreciation of democracy
undermines democratic legitimacy and the legitimacy of democracy. Point by
point, on all the great issues of normative democratic discourse, the conservative economists choose a minimal answer. Their theory provides a minor role
for the public, which should be passive, quiet, obedient to leaders. Moreover,
the power of leaders need not be limited by the selfish public, because there
are more efficient restraints in market and constitutional prohibitions. Participation has no intrinsic value; it is instrumental and confined to voting with little
government responsiveness. There is no notion that democratic participation
educates citizens. Expansion of the "private" sphere and reduction of the area
of public discourse weaken any sense that democratic government is a shared
activity involving common citizenship, loyalty, or community. Among all of
the many theories of democracy, this is a truly limited and limiting theory,
a consumer model 82 in which the public may choose from what is offered
within the limits of the fiscal constitution but cannot attempt to change opportunities or have an active voice in formulating possibilities.
The analogy between economy and polity also breaks down. Politics is
not simply buying or not buying something to consume but has always included changing options and behavior, both as means to ends and ends in
themselves. Protest, with the purpose of participating in a decision, characterizes politics and is an essential difference between politics and economics missed
by these authors. For twenty-five hundred years, principled democrats have
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attempted to expand the number of people who have a role in deciding for
the public. This disappears in the conservative model. With the public reduced to the accidental coincidence of the private, man the citizen disappears.
This theory also requires the reduction of popular political, social, and
economic expectations, pointing to the next two chapters. As democracy is
only a procedure, citizens should not expect much from it. Democratic man
must accept the claim that many political-social-economic concerns such as
social justice, employment, poverty, and private power lie in an area of natural
and exclusively personal relations, outside the scope of collective effort or concern. Problems are not the fault of any identifiable person. Government cannot successfully intervene. This leads to the claim that public policy can be
neutral, and those who lose from the economic theorists' policies should be
willing to play by their fiscally limiting rules. Since economic relations are
natural and political intervention is not, these theorists subordinate social,
political, cultural, and aesthetic goals and values to narrow economic concerns. As such, this model accepts monocausality in human affairs, constricting the range of important human interests to the economic and private while
failing to apply the self-interest hypothesis to its own analysis. Concurrently,
an economic theory is elevated to the same constitutional status as free speech
and distribution of power.
The conservative emphasis on democracy as procedure can be a useful corrective to dreams of unity and solidarity in achieving the one true goal that
makes us democratic, but it is an incomplete picture. First, the argument is
not consistently procedural. The market functions as the one true goal to
which everything is to be subordinated, as illustrated in the next two chapters.
For these writers, the market is superordinate to any other consideration, as
it functions to achieve those political goods people desire-freedom, equality,
democracy, justice, morality, community. Second, procedures do not legitimize
themselves. They must have some goal or purpose. If procedures are selfjustifying, any outcome of that procedure is legitimate. No principle would
exist to limit extension of democratic procedures into other activities, a conclusion these authors reject. Operating rules embody values. They are means
to an end. A procedure is chosen in part because of expected outcomes. There
is no rigid distinction between constitutional order and results. To the extent
that one is actually chosen, a constitutional order is chosen with ends in mind.83
For example, no matter how far we fall short of reality, traditional defenses
of popular government include protecting the interests of citizens, limiting
the power of the aristocracy, educating citizens, and conferring dignity on the
common man. Popular participation and limited government are means to
these ends, not abstract procedures randomly chosen. Democracy is both procedures and goals. Goals may properly be debated, but it is not possible to
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deny the legitimacy of goals by claiming that democracy is simply a procedure.
If it is only that, if it does not promise a better life, at least in terms of more

responsive governments than the brutalities of history, if people are not practiced in these goals and procedures, then there seems little reason for the inevitable losers to maintain a democratic system.
There is much wrong with our democracy, but the conservative picture
of the operation of democracy is superficial and inadequate. Madison in Federalr
ist No. 10 saw two cures for the inadequacies and dangers of popular government, paralleling the two cures for the dangers of fire. One is to end danger
by destroying the element within which it exists; the other is to control its
effects. The conservative cure and defense of democracy destroys the air in
which democracy exists. If their view of how the economic market operates
is wrong in any substantial component-if there is significant private power,
if the costs of exiting an undesirable situation are very high, if self-correction
extends beyond the lifetime of a person or a nation, if competitive self-interest
produces in the economic market half the harm these critics claim it produces
in politics-it would leave political control in the hands of unchecked elites
and the public with little effective power.
Even if these critics were correct in their assumptions, and even if their
political conclusions were logically necessary (both controversial and doubtful
possibilities), that would attenuate neither the normative component of their
supposedly objective and empirical critique of democracy nor the possibility
that welfue, redistribution, and/or intervention are necessary to political stability, economic growth, and a popular sense of satisfaction and legitimacy. These
authors exclude from their analysis defense spending; private and corporate
power; the fact that the United States has nearly the lowest taxes of any industrialized democracy; comparative analysis of Japanese and European experience since World War II; considerations of foreign policy; and the defects
of the old "fiscal constitution." Had they included all these elements, they
would still have presented an incomplete prescription for democracy. But this
is not simply an economic theory. It is a political theory, though based on
economics, with deep implications for politics. Given the popularity of this
critique and its probable ramifications, democrats must ask for more, for this
is a conflict over the scope and guiding philosophy of a democratic system,
including the shape, direction, and beneficiaries of public policy.

Chapter Six

The Good Society:
Justice, Morality, and Community

We are finnly convinced, and we act on that conviction, that with nations, as with individuals, (}Ur interests s(}Undly calculated, will ever be found imepamble from (}Ur mmnl duties.
-Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address, 1805 .

Where this school ofpublic spirit /UJCS not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private
persons . . . owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. . . . The man never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued
jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense. . . . Thus even private morality suffers, while public is actually extinct.
- John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, chap. 3.

All social philosophies, social myths, political theories, and most religions are
concerned with justice and morality within a community. Justice, morality,
and political community are closely interwoven, each delineating the others.
Sophisticated analysis of their meaning and interconnection began when the
ancient Greeks invented systematic political speculation. For Plato and Aristotle, justice defined the nature of community and made the good life possible. Then as now, contending systems of justice and community shared a
common goal: to regulate interpersonal relations in a way satisfactory to whoever counts-citizens, gods, the warrior class-by whatever standards-utility,
natural law, philosophy, will-that could command sufficient accord. However, attempts to achieve agreement on the meanings of justice and community,
and warfare over the failure to do so, has been continuous throughout human
history, because rival pictures of justice support incompatible political, social,
and economic systems. Viewed from the outside, justice, morality, and community are highly problematic, but from within systems that claim objective
truth, they present few difficulties. The firmer the belief that one's system
furnishes inescapable answers, the less apparent need there is for discourse, for
weighing and balancing rival claims, or for admitting the possibility of alterna126
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rives. In that case, justice and community are ensured by following the system's
rules and procedures.
This chapter samples the conservative economists' arguments about justice, morality, and community, briefly noting policy implications. For these
theorists, the market provides answers to questions that have animated public
discourse for millennia. In a seemingly positivist argument, they claim that
there are no applicable exogenous sources of justice or morality and that the
market defines the scope of community and common interest. As in other theories postulating a system independent of human wishes-such as Marxismproper behavior is determined by system needs. The conservative economists'
concepts of justice, morality, and community are indivisible from their pictures of spontaneous order and human nature. People are separate, with few
ties, and generally follow narrow self-interest. Justice and morality are defined
by and limited to behavior necessary for spontaneous market order. Community flows from this order, and human nature prevents development of
truly common or collective purposes. As with freedom, equality, and democracy, justice and community putatively lack substantive content, being limited
to marketlike procedures.
This perspective contrasts strongly with traditional concepts of justice,
morality, and community. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops'
pastoral letter, F,conomic Justice for All,1 is a contemporary example of traditional
religious-based arguments about justice, morality, and community within
political economy. Based on Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophical assumptions,2 and extending papal encyclicals dating to 1891, this letter represents
an argument that was once common in western religious and philosophical
thought.3
The bishops claim that market and economy are not separate, autonomous
spheres of morality. Rather, "(M]ost of the policy issues generally called economic are, at root, moral and therefore require the application of moral principles." Given the market's importance, the bishops assert that it is legitimate
to analyze and criticize economic relations from an external moral perspective:
"to measure this economy, not only by what it produces, but also by how it
touches the dignity of the human person." Economic relations are morally significant because they have profound social and political impact, deeply affect
human interaction, are sources of conflict as well as accord, structure people's
ability to develop, can frustrate and isolate or fulfill individuals, and shape
family life. People are not equally able or free to act or not act in the economy,
ensuring inequality of bargaining position and uneven results. "Serious economic choices go beyond purely technical issues to fundamental questions of
value and human purpose."4
The bishops assert that human dignity is one of the most important moral
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components of the economy. Although wholeheartedly agreeing with conservative critics that poverty destroys dignity, the bishops reject the claim that
market relations are always fair and must be accepted. Human dignity means
treating people as ends, not means. Human dignity requires economic and
social justice, community, respect for persons, solidarity with others, promotion of human rights, participation, and protection of the poor and vulnerable.
Material and spiritual well-being are interrelated. Each sustains the other and
coalesce into a pattern of supportive community. A sense of citizenship, a common good beyond individual pursuit of self-interest, and a justice embodying
more than ensuring that people keep what they earn in the market develop
only within such a supportive community.5
Socioeconomic arrangements are neither inexorable nor inherent in a natural
economic system . Public policies are not neutral. People can choose how to
interact. A free economy and negative freedom are valuable, but people must
"recognize the inescapably social and political nature of the economy." This requires accepting responsibility for all actions, even those filtered through markets.
If economics is not autonomous, it can and must be judged and guided by
customary moral criteria and commutative, distributive, and social justice. The
bishops insist that traditional religious values require economic justice beyond
procedural safeguards ensuring people the right to compete. The economy communicates and embodies morally significant values and has an impact on fundamental human relations. Social and political results are morally significant and
must be considered in evaluating economic policies. Community and common interest do exist, and although they include individualism, they cannot
be reduced to self-regarding pursuit of self-interest. The bishops propose numerous policies that might realize their norms of justice and human dignity.
Whether domestic or international, there is a "fundamental moral criterion
for all economic decisions, policies and institutions" which requires that"[t ]hey
must be at the service of all people, especially the poor?)(,
Most traditionalist arguments agree that work is an integral part of human
development and that external criteria must guide socioeconomic relations.
These arguments share with classical liberalism the belief in "a law beyond the
law," that is, a standard to which all rules and behavior must conform.7 Thus
from the same perspective as the Catholic bishops, Richard Regan insists that
the justice of modern economic systems must be judged by "the general acceptability of distributions, and the compatibility of distributions with the human
development of all contributors:' as well as by the gross national product.8 From
a different conservative perspective, Russell Kirk insists that social justice exists
and must enter into calculations, though he tends to identify it with charity
rather than active government. Kirk claims that economic liberalism - meaning
conservative economics-has degenerated to the point where its economic
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abstractions endanger real freedom, community, and the myths by which people live and interact. In part, he calls for efforts "to humanize the industrial
system" to the extent possible, reducing monotony and lack of pride in work.9
Graham Walker wants to accept Hayek's economic arguments but finds himself deeply troubled by rejection of the transcendent.10
Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek do not seem to have directly addressed
the bishops' letter, but the anguished denunciation of the document by other
economic conservatives is compatible with their position .11 These authors' rejection of the bishops' claims is founded on the effort to give economics scientific status and goes back to the origins of classical political economy. Although it is not possible to measure accurately the influence of classical and
neoclassical theorists on Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, and other conservative
economists, early writers provide a background against which current politicalsocial ideas may be explicated. Classical economics and its descendants attempted to create an objective system of analysis, based upon deductive statements about real-world relations, that denied the relevance of and would not
depend upon transcendent principles, moral criteria, or prescription. That it
was only partially successful is shown by Malthus's assimilation of the laws of
political economy to the laws of God; that is, his claim that intervention in
socio-economic relations based on popular pictures of morality or justice offended both nature and God and his denial of the need for moral choice and
responsibility for others outside one's own family. 12
Malthus exemplifies a widespread tendency among social-political-economic
theorists. Moral judgment often enters description and analysis.13 Whether individual theorists explicitly embrace it or not, political economy has a longstanding concern with justice and morality. Smith, Malthus, Marx, Alfred Marshall, Keynes, and the authors in this book illustrate that political economists
persistently employ the language of good, bad, moral, just, and so forth in
reference to political-economic relations. Marshall (1842-1924), arguably the
most important of the neoclassical economists, believed that economic science
should be employed for moral ends and purposes.14 This belief may have influenced Keynes's claim that economics is also a moral science because it prescribes behavior and people choose outcomes. The essential point is that economists often make claims that have moral content, involve justice, or employ
the language of more traditional concerns.
Simultaneously, these and many other theorists have attempted to make
economics a positive science or at least base it on objective criteria. This effort
to establish the autonomy of economic analysis from philosophy and morality
reaches deep into the history of political economy. Classical theory, and the
later, more refined neoclassical theory, emphasized relations thought to be
based on fundamental human motivation-adjustment of prices to marginal
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costs and changes in purchasing power, self-correcting mechanisms, full employment of resources, naturalness of economic relations, and the autonomy of
economics. Following Malthus, Ricardo, and Mill, William Stanley Jevons
(1835-1882) attempted to reestablish economics on what he considered an exact, scientific foundation, stressing collection and analysis of statistics, in an
effort to move economics from the moral to the natural sciences.15 Knut Wicksell (1851-1926) modified the classical approach to marginal analysis, emphasized that money and credit affected the level of economic activity, and influenced Buchanan's analysis of government operation. The eight editions of
Marshall's Principles of&onomics trained two generations of economists and provided a virtual syllabus of research concerns. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was
even more influential in shaping how social scientists view moral issues.
Pareto is perhaps most famous for the socioeconomic concept of Pareto
optimality. Advocating public policy requires value judgments and interpersonal comparison, but efforts to make political economy into a science decry
the use of moral criteria. Pareto optimality apparently answers this dilemma.
Given strong individualistic assumptions and accepting the existing economic
distribution, this concept states that it is not possible to determine which social
alternative is better, in the absence of unanimous agreement, without violating
someone's rights. To avoid these alternatives, Pareto and subsequent theorists
proposed that it is legitimate to proceed with policy changes making some
people better off without harming anyone or making everyone concerned better off. This allows a ranking of political-social-economic alternatives without
using interpersonal comparisons. Ifsomeone or everyone benefits, and no one
is hurt, we may presume that everyone consents to a change in the status quo.
Pareto optimality is reached when it is no longer possible to improve anyone's
situation without making someone else worse off. Because of its limited application, the concept has been extended to legitimize changes where beneficiaries compensate, or potentially can compensate, losers.16 Though they rarely
refer to Pareto, Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek make Pareto-like claims about
the market: It embodies fair procedures, benefits to all participants, and voluntary action, thus satisfying individualism, unanimity, and presumably Paretotype criteria. They also claim that no one is blameable for undesirable market
results, meaning that all outcomes need not be Pareto-optimal.1 7
Despite the long effort to elude normative conclusions, the concern for
justice, morality, community, and application of noneconomic criteria to socioeconomic relations has persisted. In response, Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek,
and others who accept and amplify the classical and neoclassical emphasis on
individualism tend to solve problems of distribution, moral relations, justice,
and community with an appeal to system needs. If the economic system is
based on objective criteria-human nature, evolution, positive science, or a

The Good Society: Justice, Morality, and Community

131

hypothetical contract-that lend an element of determinism to relations, then
answers to social problems and concerns are justified by appealing to the system's needs and structure rather than to metaphysics. The system of spontaneous order provides answers and limits the number of problems involving justice
and morality. This makes it possible to dismiss exogenous claims, employ
something similar to Pareto optimality, and ignore the moral content of one's
argument. The wish, therefore, to divorce political economy from external
criteria such as that detailed in the bishops' letter combines with objectivity
claims and the normative criteria of individualism and economic freedom to
produce the conservative economists' conclusions about justice, morality, and
community.
Conservative economics is a belief system encompassing public and private
morality, justice, and common interest. Hayek, Friedman, and Buchanan deduce complete models of justice, morality, and community and propose social
policies consequent to their starting assumptions about human nature, order,
and the market. Justice is defined and circumscribed by the market. Morality
and moral relations are shaped by economic relations, so that the morality implicit in the conservative economic system excludes all exogenous systems of
morality as irrelevant to economics. Community in this vision contains neither
public good, common good, nor community except as each is embodied in
the individual interests of each separate person.

Justice
Justice is the oldest and perhaps most common concern of political theory.
Ancient Greek political thought viewed justice as the moral cement holding
a community together. Plato aspired to create a just society and polity in conformity with transcendent standards; Aristotle attempted to reconcile rival
views of justice in order to find general rules, acceptance of which would produce political stability. Their discussions illustrate the common concern of all
theories of justice: treating individuals correctly, according to a knowable standard; maintaining social stability and order; and attempting to reconcile conflicts of interest between individuals and groups. Even when addressing nondistributive concerns, discussions of justice retain the difficult Greek emphasis
on ensuring stability while giving to each person his or her due. The perennial
problem is determining what is owed to each person and by what standard.
Ideologies respond to these seemingly eternal questions with radically different
answers. Finding an acceptable one becomes especially difficult when addressing the interrelation of economics and justice1 8 to the political system.
Previous chapters discussed issues relevant to justice: market distribution,
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self-interest, discrimination, equality, equal treatment, and freedom. While
closely related, equality, freedom, and community are not identical to justice.
Though it is a fundamental value of all normative theories, the spirit and content of justice is always shaped by a system's assumptions and purposes.
The conservative economists are most concerned with justice conceived
as ensuring that people retain free-market winnings. As with individualism,
freedom, equality, and democracy, their picture of justice appears to be procedural and lacking in substantive content. It claims that fair procedures establish justice, not outcomes. If fair procedures-determined by evolution, agreement, or freedom-are followed, the result is just. There are no other standards,
and the market embodies such procedures. Government and politics are not
founded on justice but are generally detrimental to it. Because government
permits unrestrained pursuit of self-interest, any occurrence of fairness or justice
is frequently an accident. 1i:anscendent standards are irrelevant. Even if they
exist, disagreement over content encourages the use of coercion to make people
conform. As repeatedly seen with other values, however, protection of the
market and marketlike relations is a primary consideration, so that little that
might interfere with pure market relations can be considered just. Like equality,
justice is virtually identical to market freedom - keeping and using the resources
one earns in the market. Within the market-constrained concept oflaw, justice
means equal treatment by and conformity to the letter of the law.
Hayek discusses justice more than does Buchanan or Friedman (who hardly
considers it at all). Hayek allows more room for traditional values, but he too
portrays justice as a process: conformity to fair, marketlike procedures and
uniform rules. Justice "has nothing to do with the question whether the application of such general rules in a particular situation may lead to results which
are more favourable to one group than to others: justice is not concerned with
the results of the various transactions but only whether the transactions themselves are fair." Rules of justice reduce uncertainty and conflict; what people
receive is determined by competition. Moreover, justice has nothing to do
with the Aristotelian notion of balancing rival claims, particularly in specific
cases. That introduces human intervention and manipulation and produces
unjust results. On the other hand, an undesirable outcome resulting from
the operation of natural, spontaneous forces is not unjust and therefore is not
subject to intervention. Justice refers only to intentional actions that directly
affect an identifiable other; it can never apply to an impersonal process. Spontaneous orders such as nature, society, or the market can never be unjust because "nobody has the responsibility or the power to assure that these separate
actions of many will produce a particular result for a certain person."19 Irremediable ignorance therefore frees people of the responsibility upon which
the Catholic bishops insist.
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Buchanan agrees that justice is determined by the nature of the process,
not by final distribution. Though his model of justice is more contractarian
than Hayek's, and though he also is critical of utilitarianism, he too accepts
the rule-utilitarian reasoning that emphasizes maintenance of general rules to
the exclusion of particular results. Justice therefore involves fairness, and fairness
means "that all persons are effectively required to play by the same rules" those supporting the market. Government discretion and distinctions between
individuals and groups, except for limited promotion of equal opportunity,
cause injustice.20
Buchanan occasionally links his argument to John Rawls. Buchanan claims
to be a contractarian and bases part of his argument on the possibility of constructing a hypothetical social contract that can be employed to decide the
justice or fairness of political-economic policies such as intervention, taxes,
and welfare programs. Justice becomes the evenhanded application of rules to
which a contractarian would agree. This exercise is based on his radical individualism, which assumes that the individual is the source of both values
and valuations; that there are no outside sources; that the possibility and content of justice are limited to what self-seeking individuals will accept in the
pursuit of their own self-interest; and that the market embodies the essence
of procedural fairness, including equal treatment of equals, and individual agreement, meeting Rawls's equal liberty requirement. Given these assumptions,
Buchanan judges rules and laws by asking if they could have emerged through
agreement "in an authentic constitutional convention"-presumably one allowing full rein to egotistical individuals. In a Rawls-like argument, Buchanan claims
that self-interested people, ignorant of their interests, will choose general political and social rules that guarantee free competition and retention of most earnings. General rules protect property, life, and rights and mitigate against fraud
and coercion while disallowing redistribution against one's will. Because fundamental rules are based on individual valuation, there is no supra-individual_
value that can bind people; therefore, general rules are those procedural rules
to which rational, egoistic individuals would agree to protect the pursuit of
their self-interest. Whereas Rawls stresses both maximum equal liberty and the
possibility of redistribution, Buchanan emphasizes rules that maximize competitive freedom . Because these are rules supposedly acceptable to an individualist seeking his or her self-interest, and because there are no other motivations upon which people can consistently rely, maintenance of these procedures
is the substance of fuimess-"fuimess is defined by agreement"-and thus justice.21
Though the conservatives are seemingly most positivist when discussing
justice and morality (claiming to be descriptive, neutral, and objective), their
argument is as normative as the Catholic bishops' distributive-justice claim.
Government's responsibility for justice is placed in the same category of duties
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as the provision of weights and measures. The entire tradition of justice as a
higher value is abandoned, as it must be, given radical individualism, selfinterest, and individual valuation. By eliminating politically and socially relevant conflict over distribution, the market obviates the problem of justice,22
except for criminal justice. Because the market reflects a spontaneous order,
extramarket concepts of justice are not applicable to it; the individualistic, rulebound market is always fair and efficient, ensuring that equal contributors are
treated alike and guaranteeing to each person the full value of his or her service
to others. For Friedman, the market protects people from arbitrary action.
Moreover, market distribution and ownership are as natural as the inheritance
of genes. Therefore, "The ethical principle that would directly justify the distribution of income in a free society is 'To each according to what he and the
instruments he owns produces."' As such, the market is a theory of equity
and justice, setting the parameters of justice.23
Hayek's argument is more elaborate. Speculation over nonmarket economic
components of a just society is absurd and even dangerous. Distribution cannot
be evaluated by any external criterion, nor can the existing, market-determined
distribution be deliberately changed without violating general rules of justice.
Given his picture of spontaneous versus created order (that is, organizations),
justice has virtually no application to market (spontaneous) relations, though
ideas of justice bind governments because they are not spontaneous and their
actions directly affect others. The results from a spontaneous process "cannot
be just or unjust." To Hayek, when the market is free, "no single person or
group determines who gets what" and questions of justice do not apply where
"no human agency is responsible." "To demand justice from such a process is
clearly absurd," because people do not directly intend or control outcomes of
market processes. Questions of justice are relevant only to deliberate treatment
of one person by another or to clearly foreseeable results of one's actions.
Thus, in a free market, "considerations of justice just do not make sense."
Wages and so forth are not related to desert, personal goodness, or any single
individual's decision but are the workings of the freely entered free market.2 4
Even if market results do not fit preferences about justice, efforts to impose such
preferences are dangerous and destructive.
Buchanan accepts the logic of this position but adds a stronger statement
of individualism. Unjust rules or institutions are those "that would prevent .. .
[one] from making mutually advantageous trades." Though Buchanan allows
more scope than Friedman or Hayek for adjustment of the market through
transfer taxes and limited intervention to promote equal opportunity, justice
essentially means maintaining the distribution results of freely entered market
relations.25
The deductive, definitional nature of conservative theory is illustrated by
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its claims about the market and justice. It exonerates the economy from responsibility for such unfortunate circumstances as low wages, poverty, unemployment, and related problems. Given the idealized, always competitive market, each party benefits, or thinks it benefits, or else neither would enter into
an exchange; therefore, it does not matter if benefits from a voluntary exchange are unequal. Thus the market epitomizes justice. Market distribution
becomes an ethical precept and a statement of what people deserve. As a natural system, a scientific principle, and an ethical norm, the market cannot be
questioned. Nonmarket standards endanger self-interest-driven free exchange,
making nonmarket standards inapplicable to economic relations. At the same
time, because the market-generated concept of justice reflects fundamental
human nature, it legitimately judges politics and government.
The Catholic bishops, some traditional conservatives, and many liberals
argue instead for social justice. Social justice implies an exogenous distributive
standard by which to judge both the procedures and results of economic exchange. Liberal economists assert that it is both possible and necessary to combine efficiency and nonmarket equity concerns. The idea of social justice permeated Keynes's work. He was deeply concerned with the economic causes
of political and social upheaval and believed that stability required creation of
a widespread sense of social justice within which people would be assured of
jobs and minimum standards. A notion of social justice is required to maintain
free institutions and the broadly based spending power, cooperation, and
sense of fairness necessary for economic efficiency-as well as to alleviate the
destructive impact of single-minded pursuit of self-interest.26
The conservative economists consider such notions of justice irrelevant,
and attempts to implement them are destructive nonsense that violates freedom, individualism, modem morality, and efficiency. Hayek is most emphatic.27
Justice is applicable only to relations among identifiable individuals, not to
groups; only individuals are moral, not groups or government. The general
pattern of distribution can never be discussed in terms of justice, because,
again, no one directly controls the market. Social justice is a dangerous myth,
a "mirage;' a "primitive" concept, the result of "naive thinking," "a quasireligious superstition," "empty and meaningless," "a sign of the immaturity of
our minds;' "intellectually disreputable, the mark of demagogy or cheap journalism ... dishonest," and "destructive of moral feeling." Social justice "is at present probably the gravest threat to most other values of a free civilization."
It presupposes the power to order values or rewards and "can be given meaning
only in a directed" system. It has "an anti-ethical effect," by destroying "the
feeling of personal responsibility" and freedom.28 Evolution of a workable concept of social justice is impossible. Continuation of the market order requires
abandoning social justice to prevent socialism and totalitarianism.2 9
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Buchanan and Friedman concur in rejecting the existence of social justice.
Because of pervasive self-interest, social justice is impossible for Buchanan.
Separate valuations, as opposed to a nonexistent common good, make redistribution illegitimate. Though justice requires evaluating starting positions when
considering distribution, perceived maldistribution can be addressed only by
promoting the ability to compete and requiring uniform, though limited, antidiscriminatory policies from business. Otherwise, involuntary redistribution
is the virtual equivalent of theft, and thus clearly unjust.30
Since there is no social justice, business has no "social responsibility." Hayek
alludes to this, but Friedman is explicit. "Moral responsibility is an individual
matter." Social responsibility for business, as with the broader idea of social
justice, is "a fundamentally subversive doctrine." It can "undermine the very
foundation of our free society" by creating power which free markets prevent
business from having. If business has any social responsibility, one person or
group must determine what it is. This would subject business to central control and probably lead to the appointment of businessmen by government,
bringing the political market and concentrated power into the economy. Social
responsibility is opposed to the reality of a market economy-"a fundamental
misconception of the character and nature of a free economy." In "a competitive market [no participant] has appreciable power to alter the terms of exchange." Given their resources, people must accept the position in which they
find themselves. Each participant "is hardly viable as a separate entity." No one
has the power to significantly alter pay rates, working conditions, or hiring
practices set by the impersonal spontaneous market. Coupled with claims that
the market restrains our worst behavior, this assertion shifts attention from
firms to individuals. That no person has the ability or means to alter the terms
of economic relations ensures that no one has responsibility, freeing business
people from accountability for the impact of any legal activity. What responsibilities do market participants have? The primary duty of "corporate officials . . .
[is] to make as much money for their stockholders as possible .. .. making
maximum profits." Second, they have the responsibility "which is shared by
all citizens to obey the law of the land and to live according to its lights." This
includes staying ''within the rules of the game'' and engaging "in open and free
competition, without deception or fraud." Labor has the same responsibilities.
Only monopolists could have any strict social responsibility,31 but in a free market there is no monopoly.
Important policy conclusions follow. Ifjustice is solely an attribute of relations among individuals, specifiable only in that context, then it is illegitimate
to discuss public policies to encourage justice for groups. In fact, groups as
such do not exist. Composed of self-seeking individuals, they may signify identifiable categories but have no corporate identity. Progressive taxation and pub-
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lie policies to encourage consumer protection, equalization, or redistribution
are also spurious. Speculation on nonmarket components of the good society
is futile and perhaps dangerous. Justice considerations require direct, personal
responsibility for outcomes, and the market absolves people of direct personal responsibility. If outcomes are unsatisfactory, people must accept them as natural and inevitable and even change their concept of justice to conform to
necessity. Once again, politics is deflated and downgraded, as the customary
political role in the creation and promotion of justice is taken over and reduced by the market. Though law enforcement remains, the state neither encompasses nor actively promotes justice.
Emphasizing procedures, the conservatives avoid the possibility that evenhanded application of rules may cause injustice. Beyond limited expansion of
equal opportunity, they cannot imagine that seemingly acceptable procedures
may lead to terrible outcomes, or that terrible outcomes require reevaluation
of procedures and rules. Ostensibly having no substantive measure by which
to judge the justice or morality of outcomes, their market supplies this standard.
Because the market embodies justice, anything in conflict with the market must
be unjust. Once again, their procedures are not simply neutral but lead inevitably to an overwhelming conclusion: The ~arket embodies and promotes
justice; justice requires the market; and there is no real justice beyond the
possibilities and limitations contained in the market.

Morality
Most of the conservative economists' arguments apply equally to justice and
morality in that they reject traditional theories and substitute an individualistic,
market ethic. Self-interest and the market determine morality-including truth
telling, promise keeping and not harming others-in the same way that they
shape justice. Though people may dream of broader, more inclusive relations,
the self-interest that creates the market ensures that moral behavior cannot extend beyond prudential self-interest.
These authors do not attempt to specify the meaning of morality as they
did for justice, although they freely label as immoral such policies as high taxes.
They would deny that they are offering a moral theory on the ground that
these are empirical deductions, which makes their conclusions not a matter
of moral choice but of necessity. Only Buchanan attempts to explain how he
employs morality, and his use is eclectic. Buchanan employs the concept in
three ways: to describe unscientific thinking, as a term of approval, and in
reference to what he calls traditional morality.
Buchanan's first usage virtually identifies morals and morality as those as-
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pects of life that cannot be predicted. In a position Amartya Sen identifies as
harmful to economists' ability to analyze and understand reality, Buchanan
states: "I define moral philosophy as discourse that embodies an explicit denial
of the relevance of scientific explanation." This conception - his major attempt
to specify the meaning of moral-is simultaneously too narrow, in rejecting
the factual basis of moral theorizing; too wide, in fitting many things that are
not moral philosophy; and factually questionable. Though it does not explicitly
deny the relevance of moral considerations, it alludes to an unspecified middle
ground "between empirical science and moral philosophy," leaving the strong
implication that the one does not inform the other. Whereas theorists such
as Sen insist that a closer linkage is necessary to the development of both,
Buchanan limits the arena of morality with what he considers to be empirically
valid propositions.32 Given Friedman's insistence that economics is or can be a
positive science, we may assume that he agrees with this conception of morality.
If moral concerns do not or should not inform recommendations based on
empirical science, then it is not possible to analyze or criticize the conservative
argument from a moral perspective.
In its second sense, "moral" is a term of approval emptied of normative
content. Buchanan claims that political economists operating as political economists are "ethically neutral." 33 As with other political normative terms, "moral"
is drained of widely accepted and traditional meaning, leaving an_unspecified
term for which one can expect approval. Thus Buchanan entitled one essay
"Moral Community, Moral Order, or Moral Anarchy," in which "moral" is informed in each case by the second term and seems to mean any area of interaction and agreement. "Order" is Buchanan's preferred term, conceived as policies
that support his concept of a market. What function does the addition of
"moral" serve over the bare use of"community," "order," and "anarchy"? Moral
embodies the favorable connotations with which it is typically associated, but
Buchanan avoids specification by claiming his usage is not normative. Although
he asserts that his essay has no moral content, he provides no clear explanation
of how, or even why, he employs the word. It serves no function except to
provide a warm and fuzzy feeling of approval. "Community," "order," and
"anarchy" do carry a freight of meaning, but as patterns of interaction with
limited substantive content.34
Buchanan shares his third use of morals and morality with the other authors.
He states that it is necessary to deal with and be concerned for moral questions
that arise from economics, but it is an odd morality, not concerned with "social costs and social benefits."35 Occasionally, he claims to be employing morality
in its traditional, unspecified meaning to attack policies of which he disapproves, such as debt financing. Agreeing with Hayek, Buchanan believes that
moral standards evolve over time, but, as with Schumpeter, rationally con-
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structed ideas undermine these standards. Deficit spending is an example of
the destructive constructivism that causes traditional morality to break down
and is itself immoral because it destroys capital.36 Buchanan's specific contention, however, is less important than his willingness to construct and then appeal to neoclassical economic arguments as the embodiment of morality. Whatever its content, traditional morality justifies restrictive public policies because
interference in the market is immoral. Nonmarket morality cannot be employed
to criticize either the content or result of market relations because the market
does not raise moral questions. Appeals to previously existing moral rules
seem legitimate only in support of the conservative vision.
This attempt to empty mo~ty of normative content while employing the
term is in marked contrast to broader concepts which emphasize guiding
behavior through autogenously developed normative rules. Morals and morality
refer to images of what people believe to be good, desirable, and of value in
influencing behavior. The essence of moral rules lies in the provision of a standard to guide people when they confront choices. Any issue is a moral one
when it involves choice among values, especially when there is the possibility
of harm to others. Though moral issues frequently involve questions of humanity's relation to God, even these often entail the specification of norms
for interpersonal conduct. From this perspective, one cannot escape moral
choices in either politics or economics because there are no truly neutral policies. For our purposes, therefore, morality refers to attempts to regulate human
behavior, based on an appeal to a standard higher than temporary convenience
or even prudence.37
A deterministic, lawlike system has scant room for moral issues. The conservative economists solve and transcend moral questions by defining problems
away. Their market produces harmony and eliminates the possibility of deliberate economic decisions affecting others in a morally significant sense. This
removes responsibility for outcomes, obligation on anyone's part to address
problems, and concern for persons and future generations who are not part
of current bargaining. The system itself sets the requirements for, parameters
of, and limitations upon morality. It is impossible to exceed system possibilities; therefore, as with justice, limits of morality are set by nature-expressed
in a particular political-social-economic institutional arrangement and interpreted by conservative economists. Coupled with an emphasis on procedures,
the market settles all seemingly moral conflicts over distribution.
Is this a moral theory? Yes. Its basic ideas carry moral overtones, and moral
values are inherent in the system, which functions as a guide to behavior and
provides answers to questions that many people label as moral. As such, it
is a remarkable belief system providing assurance on disturbing issues of distribution and interpersonal relations. It contains three basic claims: There are no
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exogenous sources of morality by which to judge market relations; the market
is moral or is the realm of real morality; and interference with the market is
immoral. Assumptions about acquisitive human nature and harmony ofinterest provide strong ethical justification for the market.38 The claim that individuals
need not be good or have good intentions, that differences are reconciled and
bad motivations neutralized, implies a moral structure. Despite frequent claims
to be value-free, this economics is founded on a metaphysics, in the sense of
accepting and employing a description and explanation of underlying reality,
including human nature. At minimum, emphasizing individual ends and individual pursuit of self-interest, though not individuals or satisfaction of individual
ends, implies a theory of morality.
Frequent attacks on taxation and debt financing as immoral indicate the
belief that conservative economics is not only efficient but a superior form of
morality. Buchanan claims that Keynes was a "Moral Revolutionary." Echoing
Hayek, he asserts that by allowing debt financing, Keynes's economic theories
encourage reversion to "tribal morality." Fiscal virtue has eroded under Keynesian tutelage, producing moral anarchy and putting "traditional" morality under seige. Government spending is "partially responsible for the erosion of
the traditional moral order in the United States." Restoring moral order requires reducing the size and scope of government. Buchanan also contends
that there are "Ethical Limits of Taxation." This limit is specified by what individuals will rationally allow in pursuit of their self-interest. A right of secession measures this limit. If an actual or theoretical right of secession was allowed, then the costs of peacefully leaving a community would set upper limits
on the amount that a community was morally justified in extracting from individuals. In proposing an "ethical limit on taxation," a limit coterminous with
what self-interested individuals will tolerate, Buchanan again employs a normative term stripped ofits commonly accepted content. The moral limit on taxes
has nothing to do with mythical common interest or nonmarket morality but
is rather ethical egoism. Individually determined self-interest is the limit ofindividual moral requirements.39
Friedman seems to believe that the conclusions of "positive economics"
should take precedence over normative values if these conflict.40 He, Buchanan,
and Hayek all label as immoral policies with which they disagree, claiming that
active government induces immorality. Intervention, such as wage or price controls, is "deeply and inherently immoral" because it substitutes "the rule of
men" for what Friedman considers "the rule oflaw and voluntary cooperation
in the marketplace." Given the nature of individualism, social goals do not
exist apart from those people who find it to their advantage to proclaim such
goals. Appeals to values like patriotism are irrelevant to pricing decisions, while
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efforts to influence such decisions are both immoral and destructive of the
fundamental values upon which the Republic was founded.41
Hayek also contends that government intervention, including measures to
promote egalitarianism, is immoral. Although he stipulates that a free society
needs strong moral convictions and standards, he fails to specify the content
and meaning of that morality beyond the evolved behavior that maintains individualistic market relations. Because democracy leads to the growth ofgovernment, the expansion of modern democracy is a threat to morality and peace.
Welfare demands undermine morality by stealing resources from producers,
destroying freedom, and eliminating responsibility for personal conduct.42
Hayek and Buchanan equate nonmarket-based concepts of morality that
call for intervention, an extensive welfare system, or collective responsibility
with primitive morality: the morality of the tribe instead of that necessary to
a great society. They are not concerned with taking popular notions of moral
and community relations in contemporary society and creating an economics
to accommodate them, but rather with claiming that ideas-such as the Catholic
bishops'-of morality, justice, solidarity, and needs satisfaction in economic
relations are wrong and destructive.
In making this argument, Hayek has invented an anthropology to explain
social evolution. The morality of small hunting bands, struggling for existence
in a hostile world, has evolved into morals appropriate for a modern, impersonal market society. He claims, however, that primitive morals became and
remain part of human instinct. Hayek postulates that the premarket values,
sentiments, and behavior appropriate to a tribal, face-to-face society are being
applied with destructive results to contemporary society, where size and anonymity prevent caring and responsible relations. These instincts are inappropriate in a spontaneous order because they introduce human will in place of the
rule oflaw-i.e.', the invisible hand. Thus for the ignorant masses, "it is necessarily their prejudices which would determine" demands for government in-_
tervention. Though motives may be "benevolent," such demands are inevitably
destructive. Social evolution has left behind primitive desires for social justice,
solidarity, and a sense of duty to other members of society. Such instinctual
"moral feelings" evolved during the long millennia of human development and
made sense "in more primitive conditions . . . [when directed] toward the fellow members of the small group." All that modern society requires is conceding to others "the same protection of rules of just conduct," that is, rules and
procedures conducive to market relations. "Our inherited or perhaps in part
even innate moral emotions" are "inapplicable" in a modern, open, market society that will lead man to a "great moral adventure," a "new morals" in which
obligations and moral relations are limited to market rules, under which "we
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generally are doing most good by pursuing gain." Here, Hayek allows constructivism to intrude, because in transcending the state of primitive morality, ''we
make our rational insight dominate over our inherited instincts."43
For Buchanan, humanity's "Tubal Heritage" is the cause of deficit spending, necessitating limits on the role of government. "Biologically, we remain
tribal animals . . . our natural instincts have not evolved beyond those that
emerged" in the primitive small group. What is called moral thinking usually
reflects this early behavior, a "communitarian sense of loyalty to fellow members of the tribe" and hostility and willingness to exploit those outside the
tribe. This is in contrast to the culturally evolved morality of his moral orderthe market.44 A moral case for a market economy is common among other
conservative writers such as Robert Nozick and George Gilder.45
What is the result? Nature in the sense of humanity's caring self is not a
guide to human goodness when discussing morals, but human nature-radical
individualism-is a limit on morality, justice, and community because the
early essay of morality is no longer applicable. Greed is more evolved than compassion, as concern for others releases destructive passions. In rejecting primitive morality, Buchanan and Hayek are selective. Altruism and solidarity are
rejected; long-standing concern for truth telling and promise keeping are not.
The relation between humanity's "primitive" instincts to care, share, and promote solidarity and continuing self-interest remains unexplored. So also does
the possibility that "compassion has been a key to human survival."46 Ultimately, the invention and criticism of primitive morality repudiates claims that
capitalism undermines traditional moral relations and social structures.
Buchanan identifies the behavior needed to support markets-"moral order" -with Hayek's "great society." For both, this is the system of evolved rules
which guide people in pursuit of self-interest. Reflecting Nozick's distinction
between the minimal state, utopian efforts to create a redistributive state, and
anarchy, Buchanan's moral order differs both from what he calls moral community, where individuals identify themselves with a community and lose
their separateness and individualism, and from moral anarchy, where people
are completely apart and lack mutual ties. In a moral order, people place minimal requirements on one another but agree to follow the same procedural
rules. Government in such an order is drastically reduced from that in moral
community-a point Friedman also makes-where it would have the impossible task of fulfilling primitive moral expectations.47
This eliminates the nation as the focus of morality or loyalty, and cultural
evolution can never make it such. Moral feelings and behavior can never apply
to a large unit which is sustainable only with minimal rules for conduct-again,
primarily those of the market or those convenient for supporting the market.
The market becomes the primary example and embodiment of moral rela-
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tions. It exists independent of human will, and behavior should conform to
it. Attributing a higher stage of moral development to the market helps account for the vehemence of attacks upon those who disagree with the conservative world view: they are outside the pale. Demands for extensive welfare,
economic justice, redistributive taxation, women's liberation, or corporate
responsibility are virtually moral outrages violating a natural order.
These authors do not always specify the justification that would allow equating economic recommendations with morality. Hayek identifies "our moral obligations" with "benefiting from an order which rests on certain rules,"48 but it
is difficult to imagine anything that this could not justify. Normative criteria enter
through claims that people's real interest entails accepting market order rules. A
partial answer to why people should obey or accept market rules is found in the
conservatives' sometimes contradictory pictures of the source of morality.
Discussing the hypothetical source and nature of morality, Hayek rejects
all rationalist, supernatural, and transcendent explanations. He claims that
morality is a product of the gradual evolution of individual behavior in a
marketlike process, with superior morality being that behavior which has survived. There is no criterion for moral rules other than their survival, yet Hayek
opposes changes in these rules. Given human nature, morality cannot evolve
beyond market behavior. He asserts that his evolutionary position is antirationalist, not based on any construction of morality but rather on acceptance
of the process by which people gradually learned to adjust to one another.
Despite individualism, however, people are obligated to this order. Individualism is the key to morality-there is neither "goodness nor badness" outside
of individual responsibility-but individuals conform to rules they have not
made. These rules have developed gradually from individual confrontation with
problems and "have proved more successful than those of competing individuals or groups." Morality, law, political and social institutions, intelligence,
language, writing, and the market all result from a similar evolutionary process, propelled in each case by self-interest.49 In rejecting the possibility of
either deliberate change or spontaneous growth beyond these rules, Hayek ignores the role of cooperation and force in the development of rules and the
expansion of groups.
Buchanan also argues that "[a]bstract rules ... have evolved unconsciously;'
and while they cannot be restored when abandoned, it is possible to create
functional equivalents in formal, "rationally chosen constraints" on immoral
behavior, such as a balanced-budget requirement. Morality therefore grows and
evolves and is not grounded in or justified by higher standards. Like Hayek,
Buchanan believes that rationally constructed ideas can undermine this morality.
However, the overriding point is that he accepts moral and social evolution.so
Friedman concurs.s 1
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Buchanan is also a contractarian . Although he does not assert that a hypothetical contract will be compatible with evolved values and morals, it probably
will be. In terms of justification, evolution and contract are never integrated.
There is real potential for conflict between Hayek's and Buchanan's evolutionary
argument and Buchanan's contractarianism. First, people may agree to something other than the conservative market. If one asserts that human nature
requires the market or that alternatives are impossible, a contract adds nothing
to the discussion. If human nature is not so deterministic, contractual arguments allow the possibility of alternative arrangements and would then be in
agreement with individual valuation . If not, individual valuation also adds
nothing. Second, a contract holds contracting parties responsible for outcomes,
making it no longer possible to claim that outcomes result from natural behavior, and thus relieve individuals ofresponsibility-though one may still claim
that the contract fits basic human drives and allows one to reach conscious
agreement.
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile acceptance of moral evolution up to
but not beyond the market, with either Buchanan's proposal to create functional equivalents of abandoned rules or individual valuation. Buchanan describes two sources of morality. Though both limit redistribution and reflect
the market, they are not consonant. The first source of morality is culturally
evolved norms, which appear to develop from self-interest but apply to everyone. The second, and apparently favored, source lies in the individual, especially
in self-interest. Buchanan claims that there are only two possible sources of
value: "supra-individual" norms-something like Rousseau's General Will-or
the individual. Since there are no supra-individual sources, all that exists "are
the separate and several objects of the individuals." Individuals "are the ultimate
sources of valuation." Politics, for example, should allow "individuals to express their own values, the only values that exist." This position depends upon
"criteria that are internal to the individuals . . .. It becomes illegitimate to invoke external criteria for evaluating either processes or end-states."52 The market
maximizes individual values, while politics imposes conformity, again making
the market the primary arena of public moral relations.53
Hayek does not make individuals the source or purpose of morality to this
extent, although he believes that morals and morality are always a question
of individual conduct, having no collective content even if collectively they
create a moral system. Society simply does not "behave morally." To a greater
extent than Buchanan potentially allows, however, individuals must work
within accepted rules and behaviors. In an argument reminiscent of Burke,
Hayek contends that the gradual development of rules "greatly reduces the extent to which the private moral judgment of any individual" can improve upon
established rules.54 Friedman hardly raises such issues, but the general tenor
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of his ostensibly positivist argument is consistent with this position. He too
believes that rules of social intercourse do not come from God or traditional
natural law but are preferred rules created and accepted through individual
interaction .55
There is unresolved tension between Hayek and Buchanan-and between
evolution and individualism-not because individual behavior cannot propel
evolution, but because these authors do not allow individualism to develop beyond the point already reached by evolution. Buchanan's contractarianism
contains the theoretical, if unrealized, possibility of judging the process by
which rules are or were made, thereby evaluating the justice and morality of
both rules and their results.56 Hayek's emphasis on evolution of rules and
morals-and the extent to which Buchanan and Friedman employ evolutionary
language-undermines this possibility. Individuals are the source of values, but
human nature prevents further development of common morals. In either case
the result is the same. Intervention into socioeconomic affairs is impermissible
because it violates fundamental evolved rules of justice and morality. Society
must acknowledge these rules because evolution beyond them is impossible,
and heeding them is natural when a truly individualistic-nonmajoritariancontract is employed.
Thus these theorists draw no radical conclusions from seeing the individual
as the source of value. Individual valuation is a variation on negative freedom.
Although individuals may be the source of value, this involves neither conscience nor valuing individual purposes outside market competition. An individual is the source of value when functioning in the market in conformity
to valuations and the behavior of others in the market. Morality is what rationally self-interested people do, or agree to have imposed upon them, and
nothing more can be said. Individuals are not, however, the source of justification. That lies in the market, because once again the market is the standard
beyond individuals which defines and embodies morality and acceptable rational self-interest.
What does economic morality include? It is largely rules that allow market
competition without fraud or deception and negative freedom-staying out
of one another's way. There are no positive duties, no obligations to groups,
and no higher justification than avoiding jail and following long-term interest
in maintaining the rules of the game. If self-interest is the only passion that
can be relied upon, can we have a socially viable or politically relevant morality?
Or does an emphasis on self-interest lead to and encourage only self-interest?
This question cannot be answered here. Perhaps there is no answer. Friedman tends to identify morality with independence in a market economy. The
market is "a mechanism for the development and not merely the reflection
of value judgments." Individual cooperation helps establish "common values."57
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Gilder believes in the "redemptive morality of capitalism."58 For each, most
questions and choices that seemingly involve morality are decided by the market: obligation, freedom, equity, harmony, and desert.
Hayek seems to believe something more is required of morality. Given these
theorists' image of psychology, however, it is difficult to see how there can be
a shared morality. If one is guided by individual preference, rejects the possibility of aggregating and upgrading preferences, and denies intersubjective validation of preferences, then how can collective preferences be enforced? These
authors confront a dilemma. They want traditional morality,59 but their nominalistic psychology, definition of freedom, and economics will not allow it.
Their psychology is more atomistic than classical liberalism-Adam Smith allowed a role for sympathy-ending any possibility of internalizing morality.
They claim that people are independent in choosing and developing their
preferences. They assert that morality is often a cloak for self-interest or for
imposing upon others. As such, are cheating, lying, or insider trading wrong?
Each would answer yes, but that answer is separate from their analysis. The
market does not justify its own morality or answer why it is wrong to harm
others if one can get away with it, and individual pursuit of self-interest, even
if limited by others' pursuit of self-interest, is not morally coherent.
This does not deny that morality exists in economic relations. My claim
is narrower, limited to the statement that this theory lacks a basis, model, or
justification for wider moral behavior. Failing to link moral justification of the
market to its other values, this position finds the moral value of the market
in the market, but the moral value of the market must come from another
value.60 Moral questions, in the sense of prescribing behavior and choosing outcomes, disappear. There is no more room for them here than in any other
natural system following its own laws. There is no higher purpose, moral end,
or social cement other than allowing each person to pursue self-interest. Arguing that the conservatives make moral claims raises basic normative questions
which these economists put aside. Admission of choice and morality acknowledges that people face ethical and political questions,61 bringing up the possibility that welfare, intervention, social justice, and equalization may be legitimate. These theorists cannot accept such a possibility. The spontaneous order
relieves people of personal responsibility for unpleasant side effects of their
market behavior because everything is treated as an individualistic, voluntary
exchange. Taking advantage of another's desperation is not immoral. People
are morally responsible for only a narrow and unspecified area of personal
behavior and for following system rules. By regulating behavior, the market's
neutral, natural criteria legitimize distribution and determine obligations and
duties. Self-interest guides us to serve others. Any attempt to introduce other
considerations, such as those in the Catholic bishops' letter on the economy,
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runs counter to human nature and is immoral because it allows full reign to
individual self-interest, enabling passions from the political market to enter
economic relations.
This perspective eliminates political or public morality, because all public
acts are reduced to individual motivation. Civic and social morality cannot and
do not exist. Self-interest ensures that there will be neither common interest
nor community beyond the self-defined self-interest of egoistic individuals.

Community and Common Interest
Individual pursuit of self-interest coupled with limited morality, justice, and
social responsibility eliminates the possibility of an expansive concept of community or common interest. Though there is harmony and order in the conservative model, these are achievable only through competitive markets.
The Catholic bishops' and similar arguments assume the existence and reality of society as distinguishable from each individual composing it. This is not
an organic concept but a claim that the community as a whole can and does
have responsibility, for example, for human dignity, human rights, and the
poor.62 In traditional conservatism, as exemplified by Burke, society is a partnership in all that is good, and community represents continuity across time,
in which imperceptible ties link together the innumerable levels of society.
Reform liberals such as Keynes or Galbraith have a simpler image, emphasizing
individuals, but their arguments for social justice and shared responsibility for
outcomes indicate concern for society and common interest.
The conservative economists strongly reject this approach. They identify
the economy with society. Buchanan believes that"[t ]he implications" of spontaneous order "for social philosophy are straightforward". It combines freedom
with order, creating society, without the need for deliberate, conscious planning or strong public direction .6 3 For Buchanan and, to a lesser extent, Friedman and Hayek, individuals enter voluntary market relations, producing all
the order and harmony possible given human motivation . Community is a
place to live; corporate bodies reflect the self-interest of individual members,
not a collective or shared identity; each person pursues self-interest; and, with
few exceptions, people have limited ties. They are alone in the crowd, the mass
man that more traditionally minded conservatives of the 1930s, including Jose
Ortega y Gasset and Walter Lippmann, warned against.64
According to Hayek, society does not first exist and then create law; observing common rules creates society. The former view is an "erroneous" example
of destructive "constructivist rationalism;' which ignores the individualistic
evolution of society and law. Whether or not people are naturally social in a
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classical liberal sense, order and change are possible because the "elements" (individuals) possess "capacities to follow rules"65 developed while pursuing selfinterest, which produce society. These are abstract rules that do not refer to
any person, group, or outcome. They make it possible for people to peacefully
pursue separate ends, especially "monetary impulses." There is not, however,
a single society but a "network of voluntary relations" defining an individual's
associations. Pursuit of self-interest does not isolate people, because they follow
shared rules, even if they do not understand them: rules that derive ultimately
from individual pursuit of self-interest but take on the character of traditional
morality in defining and limiting the self-interest that is their source. Society
therefore consists of individuals pursuing self-interest within a framework of
rules that each individual takes as given, even while shaping those rules in conformity to the market.66
Friedman's society is more minimalist. It is nothing more than a "collection of individuals." Individual freedom is the primary objective of social arrangements, and anything abridging that freedom is harmful. Friedman agrees
with Buchanan (despite his contractarian approach) and Hayek that society
does not develop out of a mythical social contract or central direction. Ordered
society is neither planned nor created but is the unintended consequence of
pursuit of self-interest, evolving out of the activities of millions of people pursuing their own interests in marketlike situations.67
The individualistic market theory and its picture of human nature is also a
theory of community disguised as an economic argument. Community is limited.
The desire for close, supportive association is a primitive emotion having novalidity in a large society. Empathy and understanding do not curb self-seeking.
Communities are created by and based on voluntary exchange which produces
cooperation. Consistent with the market, no one has general responsibility to
others. Individuals have few duties, certainly none to look after the welfare of
others. The group is simply individuals in association-whose only tie is following common, evolved rules-each pursuing self-interest. Size limits the arena in
which community can command personal loyalty or ethical behavior; regions
and nation-states, much less the world, are too large to encourage moral identity
or behavior.68 There are no public or common purposes, goods or values apart
from individual purposes and the total of separate individual goods.
Political theory has traditionally attempted to find some common ground
that could be called the public interest or commongood,69 though Buchanan's interpretation that such theories claim everyone seeks the common good is simply wrong. Common good may benefit each person not in their separate capacity but rather as a member of a community, in their shared or corporate capacity.
The conservative economists reject both the possibility and legitimacy of that
enterprise. Ignorance and self-interest doom attempts to identify and secure
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common interest. Individualism and common interest are dichotomous concepts. A separate, recognizable public interest does not exist. To claim that
there is a common interest beyond the interests of distinct individuals is to
claim the existence of a separate, exogenous, supravalue or supra-individual.
But these theorists accept only the interests of individuals.
Wagner and Tollison, two of Buchanan's collaborators and associates, claim
that "[p]ublic interest is an outcome of the pursuit of personal interest within
a given institutional framework." Friedman believes that "[t ]he sum of all the
private goods is the public good, but the sum of what all the people think
to be in their private good is not necessarily the public good." Efforts to
deliberately promote the common interest necessarily serve only special interests.
Under a free market, however, private interest creates the public interest.
Buchanan asserts that the market "allows the transformation of private interest
into 'public interest."' The search for a distinct public interest, however, is
equivalent to a belief in the general will, an "organic conception of society."
For Hayek, social ends are the "coincidence of individual ends" and do not
exist apart from them. Appeal to a common interest indicates lack of agreement.7°
According to Buchanan, "[E]xpansion of government's role under the
folly that some national interest exists" has undermined the moral order of
markets. Only self-interested allegiance to market rules and the political system
that polices them unites people. For Friedman, a "country is the collection
of individuals who compose it." There are no national goals except the sum
of "goals that the citizens severally serve"; no national purposes except "the
consensus of the purposes for which the citizens severally strive.mi Given selfinterested human nature, public purposes are reducible to private self-interest
in the market. Public interest and the common good do not and cannot exist
apart from the individual purposes of which they are composed. Common
good is nothing more than widely sought ends.
These theorists accept the logic of Kenneth Arrow's 72 limits on interpersonal utility comparisons. Starting with strong individualist assumptions, when
a group of people choose by rank ordering their preferences it may be impossible to arrive at a consensus or a majority. Indeed, it is probably impossible
to reach a common preference because no collective decision can satisfy everyone's preference order. For the conservative economists, individual valuation,
pursuit of self-interest, and lack of common interest create incommensurable
individual valuations and preferences. Social values cannot be constructed from
these elements. Thus government has no role in meeting or fulfilling such fictitious collective preferences, or individual preferences that may clash with the
market-the real preference-satisfying mechanism. Given this situation, the ideal
polity must work toward achieving unanimity. Happily, the market already
functions to create unanimous agreement.7 3
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It is not quite accurate, however, to say that no common good, common
interest, or national interest exist. Rather, they exist in a special way-in conjunction with and in the market. This argument incorporates a hidden picture
of real private good, weakening the claim that individuals are the source of
value. Private good does not mean doing anything that will advance one's self,
if that implies hostility to the market. Private, and therefore public, good is
contained in and must be advanced through the market. To the extent that
there is a common good, it is satisfied by maintaining spontaneous order: the
procedures for pursuit of individual interest. Common good requires maintaining property and the conservative market system, regardless of harm to particular individuals or groups.
This world view eliminates higher purposes, moral ends, and the moral
cement holding society together.74 Morality and justice do not set goals and
boundaries for proper conduct but are defined and limited by self-interested
human nature. Indeed, there is nothing to check self-interest except others'
pursuit of self-interest in a virtual war of each against all.7 5 The age-old question of the nature of the just society is answered obliquely, as competitive
individualism-as each person defining his or her own good in conformity with
the market. Wider public order is relegated to a supportive backdrop. Indeed,
a picture of public order hardly exists.
Buchanan, Friedman, and Hayek employ several justifications in reaching
these conclusions. Though claiming to be based on scientific and empirical
theory, they offer a combination of naturalist philosophy and claims based on
evolution, contracts, utility, and positivism, with little attempt made to sort
out or reconcile inconsistencies. Each author rejects any appeal to transcendent standards, and except to the extent that rights may be the same as negative
freedom, this is not a rights-based claim. In appealing to their common version of human nature, each offers a naturalistic argument. In addition, Hayek
constructs a hypothetical evolution, one that Buchanan and Friedman accept.
Buchanan adds the possibility of social contract. Friedman emphasizes what
he believes are conclusions from positive science. Each author criticizes utilitarianism but makes utilitarian claims that the market is the primary means
to achieve human ends and freedom. Though employing sometimes incompatible justifications, each reaches the same political-social conclusions-justice,
morality, and community result from relations among self-seeking individuals,
and intervention in market relations is inefficient and immoral.
The social context and impact of economic relations is missing from this
model. Social and political dislocations and other consequences of economic
activities are discounted for the present and the future. These theorists ignore
Frank Knight's warning that trustworthiness and a sense of responsibility for
others are necessary to the functioning of society.76 They will not recognize
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Robert Heilbroner's point that economic relations are also "a social act.m 7 They
refuse to see interconnections between behavior that cannot be captured by
individuals in the market because all moral and social connections dissolve
there. People must accept their fate with slight expectation of help from others.
If people are individualistic, self-interested, and have only contractual, market
ties, then society is a congregation of local interests-a conglomeration producing a limited-liability corporation, not a nation . If so, many people are excluded from full participation in both polity and economy. Those who have
little to offer in the market are lesser members of the community, set apart
from full membership. Their nonmarket needs and demands must be ignored.
Without civic or public virtue to guide them, with only each individual's small
stock of private virtue, winners and losers have little stake in the system and
less reason not to pursue their own image of self-interest.
Human nature, the market, freedom, justice, and the nature of community
and common interest set limits to the scope and duties of government. They
determine that active, interventionist government is both impossible and dangerous. We turn now to the conservatives' image of government.

Chapter Seven

Conservative Economists'
Theory of Government

In this present crisis,government is not the solution tv our problem. Government is the problem.
-Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, 1981.
[M]an is by nature a political animal.
-Aristotle, Politics, bk. 1, chap. 2.

It is a political truism that conservative economists want limited government,
but it is not clear what that means. Upon what is their argument based? Why
should government be limited and to what extent? What may government
legitimately do and why? How do these economists propose to limit modern
governments and what follows from their limits?
The conservative theory of government is based on the assumptions examined previously. Two are of crucial importance: the conservatives' picture
of human motivation and their distinction between economic and political
markets. In the first instance, these theorists portray individuals as utility maximizers who cooperate solely for self-interest in marketlike situations. Pursuit
of self-interest in the market produces spontaneous order. In the second assumption, the economists create ideal types of political and economic relations and
then employ them to explain and criticize reality. The economic and political
markets are mirror images in which market good is reversed into political harm.
The spontaneous economic market compensates for human limitations by controlling and channeling self-centered impulses and correcting for limited knowledge and ability. Politics is dominated by the political market, where the invisible hand of self-interest leads to coercive conflict, dominance, and conformity.
Political pursuit of self-interest is hannful because there are neither spontaneous
limits to potential abuses of power nor systematic checks on self-interest. Vote
buying, manipulation, and lack of fiscal restraint create "inherent and fundamental biases" for intrusive intervention which undermines natural economic
processes and stability. Governments "are collectivities of utility maximizers"
whose freedom from market control permits self-interest to become exploitive,
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creating an inherent "propensity to truck, barter and exchange" at the expense
of the public good. This generates constant growth in public services, so that
western political institutions "threaten to destroy the market economy."1
These starting, metaphysical-like assumptions provide the basis for good
order and restrict the proper scope and content of political and governmental
activity. They create the requirements for politics and government, shape essential government duties, and determine what governments may and should
do. They ensure that very little political or governmental activity will be legitimate beyond a narrow range of activities that support the economic market
and correspond to the conservative economic view.

A Theory of Government Failure
The conservative model of government is based upon a theory of government failure and private, market efficiency. As in the classical liberal distinction
between society and government, the value of government is drastically reduced when people have a natural, spontaneously generated virtue-here the
market-which tends to produce order.
This position must be stated unequivocally. The conservative economists
are not claiming that government may fail. Rather, government must fail. The
certainty of failure is infinitely more important than the remote possibility of
success. These authors mistrust both the competence and motives of government. They are in complete agreement that government is inefficient, ignorant,
coercive, and driven by selfish passions that necessitate inevitable government
failure in any attempt to intervene in socioeconomic affairs, harming freedom
in the process. Government failure is always more common and destructive
than market failure. The market is inherently stable and self-equilibrating. It
needs no intervention, and if it did, governments are incapable of providing
it.2 Even when performing acceptable duties, governments are less successful
and efficient than private business performing the same activity. This is not
a hypothesis advanced for discussion, but an unassailable, a priori truism,
based largely upon anecdotal evidence and definitional presuppositions, uttered
with certitude akin to a religious fundamentalist's belief in God or a Marxist's
conviction in the dialectic. This act of faith provides a powerful explanatory
paradigm for rejecting all socioeconomic intervention and drastically limiting
the scope oflegitimate government activities. The government-failure theory
makes four claims: All behavior is self-interested; when free from market checks,
self-interested behavior inevitably becomes corrupted; intervention undermines the market; and intervention harms freedom. There are no circumstances under which expansive government can succeed.3
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To the conservative economists, government must fail because human passion is uncontrollable in politics. Unchecked pursuit of self-interest undermines
natural market relations and human freedom, which is ultimately dependent
upon the conservative market. Without carefully examining the meaning and
manifestation of self-interest, these authors make it the key to government
failure. For them, it is inconceivable that public policy can serve anything other
than narrow self-interest. If everything follows from individually defined valuations of self-interest, then all intervention must serve self-interest. Thus government cannot achieve publicly stated ends and mythic common interest because
it will be subverted to serve the individual self-interest of those running a
program.
In this image of political behavior, nothing is done for the public interest
because it does not exist in a politically or socially significant sense. To Hayek,
"Government cannot act in the general interest." Government, for Friedman, is
"literally uncontrollable ... feeding on itself-and us-and getting larger and
larger like some enormous tumor." Without explaining what these emotive
terms mean, or suggesting empirical and/or comparative evidence of actual
behavior, government is simply "excessive" or, in Gilder's argument, "overweening" or, in Buchanan's frequently repeated term "bloated."4
Echoing their criticism of democracy, the economic conservatives assert
that legislative decision making is always "characterized by a short-term horiwn."5 Popular governments are incapable of long-term thinking or planning
but always serve the immediate interest of acquiring and holding power. Without competitive market control, there is no independent test of efficiency,
guaranteeing egotistic pursuit of self-interest accompanied by coercive, inefficient, and often corrupt use of resources. Even if people intended to do good,
fragmented power, the need for bureaucracy, the large size of government, and
concentrated interest groups guarantee the failure of altruistic purposes. Stated
colloquially by Friedman and more elegantly by Buchanan, without market
controls and cost allocations to identifiable individuals, bureaucratic use of
someone else's money ensures that it is wasted. The ostensible purpose of public programs is always subverted to serve the interests of those initiating or administering the program, while taxpayers and supposed beneficiaries at best
receive no real benefits and in most cases lose freedom, dignity, and the chance
to participate in competitive markets.6
The chief conservative indictment of government is that intervention interferes with the operation of the spontaneous market. Conditions in the
market are the best that can be because individual self-interest impels people
to make the most efficient possible use of resources to further their self-interest.
Intervention cannot improve people's lives. Though government may rob some
to reward its supporters, redistribution and intervention are harmful and inef-
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ficient. In all cases, intervention destroys the freedom to use one's property
as one chooses, decreases work effort, and destroys resources.
Government is always the problem, rarely if ever a solution. Intervention explains why the market does not operate according to market theory
and why the ideal market system does not yet exist. Uncomprehending people
demand intervention, which worsens the situation. Failure perpetuates the
abusive cycle, as government-induced market failure sparks demands for still
more intervention. In all but the simplest cases, government is always the enemy, always serving special interests, always crippling the spontaneous forces
which sustain the market and freedom. To Hayek, any interference in a spontaneous order impedes the operation of that order. In a simultaneously empirical and moral claim, he states that intervention must create disorder and
be unjust, removing some grievances by causing new ones elsewhere. Buchanan believes that fine tuning the economy or relations within it is impossible. Public policy is incapable of adjusting for differences between people.
The market does not require it, and government cannot make such adjustments. The reason, says Friedman, is because public policy forces identical
services onto everyone, which is unjust. And services cannot be different
because that is also unjust. Hayek believes that giving public officials discretionary power to attempt adjustments between persons subverts the rule of
law, freedom, the constitutional order, and the spontaneous economic forces
that sustain them.7
Friedman addresses this specific issue more than the others. Once a problem
is defined or discovered, government is induced to address it; inevitably the
problem grows worse, which is the fault of the government's intervention. The
logic is irrefutable, even if the empirical connection is asserted rather than investigated, as in his claim that the quality of education in the United States
has deteriorated because of increased federal spending. Whether discussing
schools, consumer protection, inflation, labor unions, unemployment,
monetary policy, or welfare policy, public intervention has worsened problems
by providing resources for self-interested individuals to seek their interests
unimpeded by market limits. In each case, taxpayers and the supposed beneficiaries of these programs would be better off-in some ultimate, undefined
sense-if the public programs created to address these problems had not existed. Beyond the limited duties noted below, Friedman sees no benefits from
government spending. Though he concedes that there are occasional market
failures, most instability is caused by government, resulting in more harm than
if government had not intervened. Even inflation is a government phenomenon. "The real obstacles to ending inflation are political, not economic."8 In
contrast to liberals such as Keynes and Galbraith, Friedman, Buchanan, and
Hayek agree that the Great Depression was caused by government failure, not
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by any intrinsic propensity or problem in spontaneous market forces, and efforts to deal with it compounded and deepened the crisis.9
The certainty of harmful government failure is a commonplace among
other conservative economic theorists. George Gilder, Ludwig von Mises, David
Stockman, and William Simon all assert that government inevitably forces a
decline in economic progress. It cannot increase aggregate demand, positively
aid the private sector, successfully intervene into socioeconomic relations, or
permanently increase employment, and it is always at fault when the market
falters or economic problems develop. In each case, public intervention is not
the answer to problems but the cause of worse ones.10
Each author agrees that the inevitable failure of government means that
Keynesian efforts to stimulate aggregate demand and promote employment are
bad economics and worse policy advice, necessarily causing more severe problems than they attempt to address. Intervention is harmful not only to the
economy but also to government, robbing it of the resources and time required
to perform its legitimate functions. Thus these theorists would have no problem in rejecting calls for government aid in, for example, development ofhighresolution television: Government is inefficient and must fail; all intervention
promotes individual self-interest; all interests are private and only individuals
have interests, therefore promoting an industry cannot be in the public interest; and if a profit is to be made, private industry will make the necessary
investment. Hayek concludes that with such policies, "decent government is
impossible."11
The damages from inevitable government failure are compounded by the
crippling impact on the spontaneous forces that sustain freedom. Intervention
is the cause of authoritarian government and is inevitably unjust. If, as Buchanan
claims, "abject slavery" is the "pure form" of political relations while economic
relations are free and cooperative, then government must always endanger
freedom while "markets tend to maximize freedom." For Friedman, taxes, such
bureaucracies as the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Endowment for the Humanities, or the National Science Foundation, and the power
to intervene in business are destructive of freedom. Hayek believes that government may be unjust, but not spontaneous order.12 Government's inability to
do anything positive to aid freedom reinforces the conservatives' empirical-like
claim of inevitable government failure.
Intervention, regulation, and welfare are distinct policy areas, but if government must fail, all are impossible. Welfare illustrates this argument. Welfare
is a broad concept for the conservative economists. It extends beyond aid to
families with dependent children or income support to include unemployment
compensation, social security programs, all transfer payments, education subsidies, farm price-supports, and any program where people-"special interests"-
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receive aid or services outside a market framework. Limited provision for those
who fail or are incompetent is acceptable, but welfare must be kept to a minimum. Why? Because any transfer payment violates freedom and individualism.
Self-interest and natural economic relations do not allow extensive aid. Political
and economic freedom and equality are not enhanced by welfare, which is
viewed as morally,13 politically, and economically destructive.
Welfare supposedly promotes the behavior it attempts to eliminatedependence-because it is in the self-interest of recipients to not work, of politicians to buy votes by providing welfare, and of bureaucrats to expand the welfare budget. The conservatives believe that in a free market, most welfare
measures, especially income support such as unemployment compensation,
would be unnecessary. Moreover, Friedman asserts that welfare programs undermine the ability of the United States to finance defense and that "[t ]he traditional functions of government have been starved by the rapacious appetite
of the welfare state." He sees the Soviet Union as a lesser threat to the United
States; "[t]he real threat is the welfare state." Friedman and Hayek agree (though
Buchanan disagrees) that welfare spending is another guise for collectivism and
socialism, destroys initiative, and forces people into identical molds. It causes
"loss of self-government and freedom .... financial crisis leads to a loss of
self-government." 14
A major conservative economic attack on welfare, if it can be separated
from the political emphasis on freedom, is that social welfare programs are
obstacles to equality because they sabotage efficient labor markets and freeze
people into inferior status by discouraging initiative. The argument is true by
definition. If economic self-interest motivates people, welfare payments discourage work. In a market free of minimum wages and income support, everyone could find a job; there could be no involuntary unemployment. Poverty
is caused by personal failure-unwillingness to work and compete-that is compounded by welfare. As with the nineteenth-century liberal Malthus, the greatest kindness is to force people to work, not to give them aid. That is why
Gilder attacks the welfare system and argues that "the current poor . . . are
refusing to work hard." If they did work hard-and to overcome their poverty,
they must work harder than other groups-they would not be poor.15 "The
actual outcome of almost all programs that are sold in the name of helping
the poor ... is to make the poor worse off."1 6 Thus intervention creates conditions that cause more demands for welfare.
In proclaiming one law for all and no special categories of people, the conservatives state that public policy should treat everyone alike and ignore individual differences. Individualism and equal treatment by the law preclude
welfare. What can be done? A minimum income floor is acceptable, but charity
is superior because it is private, voluntary, local, and discriminatory and re-
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duces the need for coercive public involvement.17 (By definition, anything that
is voluntary is free and does not involve coercion.) To claim that welfare is a
right subordinates individuals to the group, but the group is simply the sum
ofindividuals, each pursuing his or her own interest. Welfare thus subordinates
individuals to the purposes of other individuals. People have very different
preferences, and community membership creates no obligation to maintain
the poor. Therefore, no one can have an obligation to another unless it is freely
accepted.18
Friedman proposes a negative income tax as a "transitional" program until
welfare and the social security system can be eliminated entirely. This proposal
would replace most welfare programs with a direct cash grant. After determining minimum incomes necessary for a family, those who fell below this level
would be subsidized for up to 50 percent of the calculated minimum. Thus,
if a family had no income, they would receive half of the minimum, with the
difference presumably coming from charity. The program would not reduce
payments on a dollar-for-dollar basis with earnings until the combined total
of earnings and negative income tax equaled the minimum income. This proposal is acceptable to Friedman because it involves less intervention into the
market, would be administered by the Internal Revenue Service (reducing the
need for bureaucracy) and encourages individual responsibility.19
The conservative argument leads to an inescapable conclusion that if welfare, regulation, and intervention must fail, socialism of any type is absolutely
unworkable and undesirable. Again, the reasons focus on government failure,
ignorance, and freedom. Goods and services cannot be allocated on any rational, planning basis. Human nature makes socialism unattainable. According to Buchanan, Marxism's greatest shortcoming is "its failure to construct its
analysis within an individualistic frame of reference." If it had, neither Marx
nor socialists could have believed that people who are individual "rational
utility maximizers" could "behave so as to further the interests" of their class.
Inevitable pursuit of self-interest always overwhelms collective decisions, bending them to the interests of individuals and dooming planning, central control, and presumably cooperation.2°
Hayek goes further. Planning, mixed systems, and the welfare state inevitably lead first to socialism and then totalitarianism. High ideals do not
guide behavior. There is a stark choice: capitalism and limited democracy, or
the welfare state and eventual totalitarianism. As with Friedman's invisible hand
of self-interest that always produces harm in politics, efforts to shape the future
according to "high ideals" "unwittingly'' and relentlessly yield "the very opposite of what we have been striving for." Both self-interest and human ignorance make successful planning impossible. Planners serve their own interests
and can never know enough. Human ability is too limited to make production
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and distribution decisions without the autonomous market. Thus socialism
is impossible and represents a return to "primordial instincts." Socialism violates
freedom, the rule of law, and treats people not according to their worth as
determined in the "self-forming" impersonal market but according to unachievable abstract concepts of merit and morality.2 1
This is a common theme. Gilder believes that socialism is morally bankrupt,
static, and dead. Capitalism is morally superior, the only creative system and
the only form of organization providing the drive to grow and change. Human
ignorance and the need to strive for "initiative, sympathy, discovery, and love''in the economy-prove that socialism cannot fit the human condition, that
it is forever a fond dream denying the best in humanity for a faulty insurance
against risk and life.22 Von Mises insists that we must choose between private
and communal ownership, but that given human drives and the need for
freedom, socialism is impossible. It is a scientific "fact" that conservative capitalism and its requisite, a limited political system, are the only possible form
of social organization.23 Friedman sees "an intimate connection between politics
and economics," such that all combinations of political and economic systems
are not possible. Specifically, democracy is inseparable from capitalism. Extensive control of economic activities-"detailed central economic planning"-puts
"ordinary citizens . .. in political fetters," produces "a low standard of living,"
and ensures that people "have little power to control their own destiny." 24 In
all cases, the political system is absolutely incapable of managing or successfully intervening in natural market relations.

The Role of Government
Given the political market and human nature as negative limitations and the
economic market's positive role in rewarding and organizing people, there is
little that government can or should do. If the market is the premier harmonizing mechanism, government should be reduced to the minimum necessary to
support the market. The conservative economists propose an automatic political
system parallel to their automatic economic system, one without discretion,
intervention, or extensive public choice. The market furnishes the unquestionable criteria to determine if "tl1e intended results" of a policy "are ones
that it is proper for government to seek and, further, whether the action will
in fact achieve these results." The market "defines the role that government
should play in a free society." 25
Adam Smith provides the historical base for the conservative position,
though their argument is closer to those of Malthus,26 William Graham Sumner, and Herbert Spencer. Smith believed that the duties of government de-
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pended on the state of economic development, and he did not advocate uncompromising laissez-faire. A primitive level of development required smaller
expenditures for defense, a legal system, public works, and education than a
more developed society. Though this opened the prospect for more extensive
government as societies industrialized, Smith did not project his observation
into the future, and subsequent laissez-faire writers have ignored this possibility.
On the surface, the duties of government were quite simple and
plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of
the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it,
or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly,
the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public
institutions.
Government was, therefore, instrumental. It had no grand goal or purpose.
Government's primary duty was to facilitate market relations but not to interfere in exchanges with any preference or restraint when individuals were competent to advance their own interests. Defense and justice were valuable to all
members, though some of the expenses of justice could be borne by litigants.
Smith viewed a limited number of public works as legitimate, that is, those
advantageous to the whole society but unprofitable for any individual or group
to undertake. This duty of government depended heavily on the state of development-as did the next duty, education. Some public support for education
was essential, especially for the lower orders in a modern society. Specialization and the division oflabor could cripple people intellectually. ''A man without the proper use of the intellectual facilities .. . seems to be mutilated and
deformed." Requirement of minimal educational attainments and even some
public provision of educational opportunities could go fur toward addressing
the stultifying nature of a modern economy and the rebelliousness of the lower
classes unaware of the real source of their problems.27 In this argument, Smith
set a pattern for later claims that governments fulfill their primary duties by
protecting property and enforcing basic rules, regardless of who gets what.
The conservative economists accept Smith's policies, if not his observation
that the role of government varies with the level of the social economy. Government has little or nothing to do with responding to popular demands, pressures, or wants. Popular will is neither the measure nor the source of governmental duties. There is nothing in the conservative model to indicate that
government is natural to people, as suggested by Aristotle or Aquinas; or that
it is a punishment and corrective for sin, as in Augustine or Martin Luther;
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or that it is necessary to curb our worst impulses, as in traditional conservatism indeed, it magnifies them. Government cannot make society better, and there
is none of Smith's implication that government may successfully achieve important things. Nor is there the liberal economists' role for government as a
corrective to market failures or a counterweight to private power. Beyond reasserting Smith's policies, the conservatives, despite their vehement denunciations to the contrary, have not clearly thought out the role of government.
Moreover, they add propositions that Smith did not imagine. Where he saw
a tendency toward harmony through pursuit of self-interest, they see spontaneous order as established fact. Where he saw problems, they see absolutes:
Government must fail, intervention always harms freedom, and the market
is always more efficient.
The logical question for the conservatives is, why have government at all?
Why not accept a fully libertarian or even anarchist position? Their answer is
that although the market is the primary organizing institution, it cannot do
everything. For von Mises, "Human society cannot do without the apparatus
of the state, but the whole of mankind's progress has had to be achieved
against the resistance and opposition of the state and its power of coercion ."
Hayek believes that government should render a narrow range of services which
the spontaneous order cannot produce "adequately." Though it is "conceivable
that the spontaneous order . . . may exist without government:' there are insufficient guarantees that people will observe the rules; therefore, "in most circumstances the organization we call government becomes indispensable in order
to assure that those rules are obeyed." However, this does not give government an exalted position. Its role "is somewhat like that of a maintenance
squad in a factory"-to oil machinery and clean the floor but not to produce
anything, determine what is produced, or intervene in running the productive
apparatus.28
It follows that all intervention is not harmful, or at least some intervention
is more beneficial than harmful, though how the need for government outweighs its inherent inefficiency is never discussed. The frequently used, emotive
word "interference'' implies a standard for proper public involvement, a clear
demarcation of what is private from what is public. Some intervention is at
least useful, and as with all utilitarian or quasi-utilitarian claims, the scope of
exceptions to the primary rule-here, no intervention-should be decided by
empirical analysis and not by a priori reasoning. Surely, if government is as
bad as asserted, these theorists should be willing to give up some market efficiency to have less government. Private police forces and private court systems
are conceivable, if the market lives up to its reputation for efficiency. Buried
in a tangle of inconsistencies, exceptions to the rule of nonintervention are
stated rather than justified. Government's role turns out to be the same as its
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traditional role among such late nineteenth-century theorists as Sumner: It
provides the coercive apparatus to support the market, making the market
into the natural standard by which to judge government.
Every normative political theory contains arguments for the proper role
and structure of government. Conservative economic theory also spells out
the purpose of government: to protect the spontaneous order from coercion
and fraud. Government may do those presumably neutral things which narrowly support the abstract market. It may act where individual self-interests
coincide, such as with road building, but may not attempt to forge a common
interest. It can do nothing positive or anything that benefits specific persons.
Government duties are simple: Get out of the way of the market; protect people from crime; dispense justice; maintain national defense; enforce private contracts; and provide limited support for public works, public welfare, and education-all things that individuals and voluntary groups cannot easily do by
themselves. None of these elements has any other purpose than to ensure a
framework within which individuals may attempt to pursue their self-interest
through competition in the market.
Von Mises epitomizes an extreme form of this position. Government's
primary duty is "the protection not only of private property, but also of peace,"
because "the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing
the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this," such as unemployment compensation or regulation of alcohol and drugs, "is an evil," in that it is inefficient,
harmful to freedom, and, in attempting to protect people from themselves,
treats them as incompetent.29
Hayek potentially allows government a wider range of responsibilities but
in practice restricts legitimate public activity. As with Friedman, Buchanan,
and others, his primary presumption is against government involvement in
socioeconomic relations, with the overwhelming burden of proof placed on
those who favor action. Hayek claims that the important issue is not what
government does but how and how much it acts. An inactive but clumsy government would be a disaster while an active one that remained within its appropriate sphere might be legitimate and useful. He distinguishes between coercive functions, which include any activity that is enforced by the law, and
service functions, where government administers "resources placed at its disposal" merely as one among competing organizations serving the market. Coercive functions, which include all taxation, must be kept to the absolute minimum, while service functions may expand if there is widespread demand and
if government makes no attempt to become an exclusive supplier or to use
tax money to provide those services. Exceedingly vague about the specific content of service functions, Hayek does not develop this possibility.30
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Hayek distinguishes the state (the created realm of coercion) and society
(spontaneous organization) . The primary duty of government is to support
the right ofindividual decision making within the market but not to intervene.
The state, as one among many organizations, should "provide an effective external framework within which self-generating orders can form." "[M]aintenance
of a spontaneous order ... is the prime condition of the general welfare."
Monumental ignorance prevents anything else. Government has no right or
ability to attempt to plan for the entire economy, aid specific persons, control
prices, limit who can enter a profession, determine the content of normal contracts, or redistribute resources. Such intervention puts human will in place
of spontaneous economic relations, makes one person directly subject to another, is inefficient, and attacks freedom. What can government do? Only those
activities that promote spontaneous forces: Protect people against force and
fraud; enforce laws equally, including antipollution regulations and pure food
laws; maintain roads; and provide services the market cannot easily furnishsuch as weights and measures, building regulations, limited public works, some
enterprises on the same terms as private citizens, education for the young,
minimal welfare for the incompetent, and defense. Government issuance and
regulation of money may not be required. In all cases, local taxation and decentralized government are preferable to national government, and private provision of services is superior to public provision.31
With the possible exception of limited public entetprises that would compete
on the same basis as private enterprises and a preference for private monetary
systems, there is little or nothing in Hayek's discussion with which Friedman
or Buchanan disagree. Friedman also sees government as providing support
for the market. Its primary duty is that of"Rule-Maker and Umpire"-something the market cannot do for itself-though the range of rules is narrow,
supplementing and modifying custom and tradition. Government is to facilitate "voluntary exchanges," not any specific exchange. Government may do
the same things that Hayek allows plus provide a stable monetary system .
Indeed, that is its most important activity. Governments may also regulate to
overcome the worst effects of "technical monopolies" and spillover or "neighborhood effects," but this power must be as circumscribed as possible. In Free
to Choose, Friedman accepts government provision of a small number of public
works, associating this with protection from neighborhood effects, but states
that this "raises the most troublesome issues" of Smith's government duties.
Friedman is quick to assert that this duty does not justify very much intervention because of the greater likelihood that government, not the market, will
fail. He seems to assume that all harms can be compensated for and that compensation is less detrimental to freedom and the market than prevention. This
argument supposes that only individuals can be harmed and that harm must
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be specific and readily identifiable, not a long-run statistical probability. If the
market cannot identify those who pollute and compensate those who are
harmed, government is even less likely to do so. As is usual whenever he concedes a role for government, Friedman trivializes it with a simplistic example
to illustrate neighborhood effects or market failures needing regulation. His
primary example of air pollution is a dirty "shirt collar." Such an innocent example misrepresents the health and environmental dangers of pollution, reducing the regulatory need to unimportance. Coupled with reiterations about
government failure-government will make matters worse and impose "costs
on innocent third parties"-such marginal concessions ensure that little will
be done to regulate the market. As always, the overwhelming burden of proof
must be on proponents of regulation, and given the incompetence of governments and the superiority of markets, there is little chance that a case for regulation will be made.32
If Friedman regards the provision of public works and regulation as the
greatest problem in Smith's government duties,33 perhaps he should have considered defense more closely. These authors see defense spending as a simple
issue. It is not. If their picture of self-interest, human nature, and government
operation has any validity, they should be deeply worried about defense spending. It is government spending, allocates a large part of the gross national
product, and presumably should present the same problems of government
inefficiency, danger to freedom, and failure as every other intervention. Government spending on defense arguably causes more distortion of private markets and has greater direct economic impact than any other government activity.
In the United States, it consumes approximately 6.5 percent of the GNP.
Because it involves direct public purchases of goods and services, rather than
redistribution which allows beneficiaries to buy in the market, it entails authoritative public control-a virtual command as opposed to a market economyover what will be produced and by whom. The decision to build a major new
weapons system not only determines the fate of specific companies but also
draws large amounts of resources, including capital, labor, and engineering skill,
to an activity that is usually outside market control. In addition, defense spending is under the administrative discretion and direction of those much-maligned
bureaucrats whose self-interest, according to conservative theory, impels them
to serve interest-group clients, such as labor unions, corporations, military factions, and politicians, in place of the hardly existent national interest. Growing
scandals and indictments in 1988-89 over defense procurement, bribery, illegal trading of information between defense contractors, cost overruns, and
systems that do not work properly indicate the magnitude of the conservative
oversight.
Defense spending, therefore, should be highly distressing for the conserva-
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tive vision of market and government. It represents the ultimate form of coercion; consumes large amounts of resources; requires regulation of and intervention into the economy; is a major source of bureaucratic and government
growth;34 is filled with special interests cloaking themselves in an image of the
national interest; may undermine freedom in the demand for conformity when
confronted with perceived foreign threats; 35 and increases government power,
especially the power of control and surveillance. Unfortunately, the analysis
these authors apply to welfare spending or regulation of air pollution is never
applied to the much larger area of defense spending. On the positive side, defense spending may stimulate an economy, as with Britain during the Napoleonic Wars or the United States during World War II, but this too does not
fit the conservative world view and remains unexplored. Hayek, as did Smith,
admits that war-which is very different from our current permanent war
footing-is the great exception to laissez-faire, but he makes no attempt to
analyze defense's impact on his political economy.36
Only Friedman discusses defense, and his sole concern is that public provision of defense is more costly than ifit could be provided by the free market.
According to Friedman, defense spending is not the chief cause of high taxes
and deficits. As if it were somehow exempt from having an adverse impact,
he makes no attempt to explain why defense spending is less harmful than
other public expenditures or why it is unnecessary to worry about its economic impact. He overlooks the possibility that defense bureaucracies and
related "private" businesses have a vested interest in expanding weapons systems
and military spending, exaggerating threats, or perpetuating tension. Friedman accepts defense claims without subjecting them to even the simplest costbenefit analysis. As if priority claims either excluded other claims or are selfexplanatory, he believes that "defense must take priority over every other
function of government" and that it is welfare spending, not the Soviet Union,
that is "the real threat to our national security." Friedman would drastically
reduce other spending to increase defense-a political decision having no eco- nomic justification in his model-and regrets that the private market cannot
provide defense, though he does not explore any market organization of defense.37 Surely, if the market promotes the values these theorists claim, they
should be willing to sacrifice some military security for its advantages. They
strive to limit the power of government, but they leave its greatest coercive
power untouched and unchecked. This failure to address the criteria that
presumably distinguish defense spending from other public spending undermines conservative claims about government inefficiency.
Given the generalities that these authors employ and their collective failure
to specify concrete examples of legitimate public spending, their description
of limited government duties sounds convincing to people raised in the liberal
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faith . That is one source of their attraction . These limiting and radical proposals are wrapped in platitudes and the commonplace of classical liberalism without its expansiveness and concern for actualizing liberties-and repeated
until they become a truth rather than propositions to be examined. It is only
when one looks at actual people and the lack of concern for the losers from
conservative policy that the full implications of their position become apparent.
Instead of reviewing specific policy proposals, my discussion turns to how the
conservatives would limit what governments may do. The conservatives intend to make impossible any repeat of the Great Society. They will do this
in two closely related ways: by expanding the role of the market, and by stripping government of the resources and ability that allow it to respond to popular demands for welfare, regulation, and intervention .

Prescriptions: The Market as a Substitute for
and Limit on Politics and Government
The conservative economists claim that the market is superior to politics and
government. The free market is order producing, noncoercive, in accord with
human nature, more efficient than government, and less likely to fail than public policy. This assertion has the status of metaphysical truth. The market must
be more efficient because, by definition, government cannot test any of its proposals and is not subject to market discipline or limits on self-interest. Governments do nothing creative, neither producing material goods, positively assisting
in their creation, nor evolving new arrangements and compromises that develop
collective and individual welfare.
The conservative economists offer their market as the substitute for a wide
range of current government activities. The market renders three services: It
supports freedom, requires limited government, and provides countervailing
power to that of government. The market does this by performing functions
frequently given to government by people who do not understand their real
interest or government's limited ability. It also defines what problems require
government intervention (and few or no economic issues qualify) and legitimate
policies to address those few problems susceptible to intervention, as well as
policies on wider political-social issues. By taking over these tasks, the market
can drastically reduce the area of politics and coercive conflict over distribution. Government failure does not doom western civilization. The free market
can save it, but we must modify popular behavior and reduce expectations.
For conservative economists, the market is omnifunctional. They push the
market's frontier far into politics and public concerns. Not only does it explain
all behavior, as with the political market, it can solve most public issues that
require a solution.
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Because government failure is the cause of most intervention demands, its
failure and market efficiency encourage market expansion. Only the market
can direct, limit, and control greed and self-interest,38 producing cooperation.
Expanding on Adam Smith, Buchanan's market is "a perfectible social organization" that channels self-interest to serve others. To Ryan Amacher, markets
allow society to "minimize the need for 'good action' to solve social problems."
For Friedman, unavoidable greed does less harm and more good under capitalism than in any other system .39
Whereas political scientists such as Charles Lindblom, Robert Dahl, and
Benjamin Barber4° see the removal of economic issues from public debate as
weakening democracy, economists such as Dan Usher claim that this has positive advantages. Usher contends that popular governments need a nonpolitical
system of equity, such as the market, to save democracy from the politically
destructive and impossible task: of assigning income. Political systems cannot
determine incomes because that supposedly makes every issue subject to majoritarian decision making. The resulting conflict and tension destroy peace,
stability, democracy, and the consensus upon which society depends.41
The conservatives expand upon Usher's argument, going far beyond economists' traditional view that the economy promotes peaceful conflict resolution among families and firms .4 2 Market and government are irreconcilable
organizing principles.43 The conservative market has a specifically political function in depoliticizing socioeconomic struggle. The conservatives do not annihilate politics but turn numerous public decisions 44 over to the market, taking them off the agenda of public debate. The market replaces government
in many areas and limits it in others. It can order a broader range of human
relations than are assigned to it in most existing systems. Reducing the amount
and extent of resources allocated by government and relying on the market
to solve social and distribution issues decreases divisive conflict and inefficiency
and fosters individual freedom .
The market accomplishes this in a seemingly automatic manner, distributing
desired goods non politically while avoiding face-to-face confrontation. Buchanan
claims that it is perverse to argue for extension of democratic decision making
to "previously non-politicized areas," presumably the market, because that will
enhance "interpersonal and intergroup conflict." For him, "the principle of
spontaneous coordination suggests" that the economy can peacefully reconcile separate interests, drastically reducing the scope of government. Hayek
agrees. To even remotely replace "the ordering function of the market;' governments ''would have to co-ordinate the whole economy . . . from a single central authority." This would require arbitrary judgments in place of impersonal
markets. One intervention must lead to another, and another, ending in chaos.45
Friedman is very specific. The market limits government by transmitting
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information, providing incentives, and distributing incomes, thereby lessening "greatly the range of issues that must be decided through political means."
It diminishes conformity and concentrations of power by "reducing the area
over which political power is exercised" and provides a counterweight to political power. By eliminating and distributing power, the market acts as "a system
of checks and balances" upon government that decreases the amount of coercive power in society. "It enables economic strength to be a check to political
power rather than a reinforcement." He does not explain to whom private
power is responsible if it can check popularly elected government.46
Politics is again seen in zero-sum terms. Unlike the theories of Aristotle,
Thomas Jefferson, and John Stuart Mill, political participation does not enlarge
capacities and perspectives, encouraging understanding and the shared bonds
and moral sensibilities that unite a nation. Political participation has no educational, citizenship-creating role. Politics means plunder, coercion, and conflict
over basic values because it imposes uniformity upon people. Winners and
losers must accept the same policies, regardless of preferences. As Friedman
claims, "The use of political channels, while inevitable, tends to strain [never
enhance] the social cohesion essential for a stable society." Instability is increased in proportion to the "range of issues for which explicit agreement is
sought" and decreased when the political system makes few specific distribution decisions. Because the market requires much less agreement and is by
definition voluntary, it "reduces the strain on the social fabric" by allowing
people to fulfill their separate preferences, reducing conformity and conflict
over conformity. The market relieves government from making decisions which
no minority is willing to grant to a temporary majority, while these minorities
are protected in and by the impersonal market. The choice is simple. Either
limited government through the market or civil war.47 That the market is not
subject to direct popular control becomes a point in its favor.
Privatization-private sector provision of public services, including garbage
collection, staffing airport control towers, running prisions, and the sale of
such public assets as Amtrak, Conrail, parts of the National Weather Service,
the loan program of the Rural Electrification Administration, public lands,
parks, and naval petroleum reserves (or, in Britain, British Airways and British
Petroleum)-is an answer that the conservative economists strongly favor. By
definition it is better because the alternative is impossible and undesirable.
Though this widespread proposal has had mixed results,48 privatization simultaneously fills three desiderata: It expands the market; it shifts emphasis from
public to private purposes; and it reduces the size of government by stripping
it of the resources that allow regulation and intervention. In each case this
putatively expands freedom while limiting the destructive aspects of the pursuit of self-interest.
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Hayek argues that while government may provide a wide range of services,
we must always look for alternatives to public provision. He quotes Richard
C. Cornuelle: The market could produce jobs for everyone, end poverty,
eliminate juvenile delinquency, replace numerous government regulations, take
over the entire research effort, eliminate air and water pollution, provide efficient education to everyone, and end segregation. He favors Friedman's voucher
plan for schools and argues that it could be expanded to other areas. Even
money can be provided by the market. In all cases where government is necessary, the private market must be allowed to attempt to provide similar services.49
Friedman finds extensive public concerns that can be left to the market.
These include provision of most education at the primary and secondary level
and all postsecondary education, old-age security programs, determination of
wage rates, industrial regulation, licensure, public housing, national parks, mail
delivery, toll roads, consumer protection, and protection from inflation (though
he believes that inflation is exclusively a government-caused phenomena) . Even
crime would be reduced if there were fewer government programs. The overall
result will be to decrease government power, which must of necessity increase
freedom and efficiency. There will be no long-lasting adverse impact.50
Despite its Hobbesian view of self-interest,51 conservative market theory
assumes that competitive markets produce harmony because people must and
will learn to accept their outcomes. The expanded market requires that distribution issues and all forms ofintervention must always be excluded from political
consideration and that people accept market distribution. This shift from a
descriptive to a prescriptive statement further implies that the market is, or
should be, the only legitimate harmonizing mechanism because it alone ensures and requires voluntary cooperation, not coercion. Peace, harmony, justice,
and order through the market would exist if there were no government, no
force, no coercion. However, these do exist, and the line between market and
government remains undetermined. The market can be a conflict-reducing
mechanism in the conservative sense only if people accept its distribution
mechanism as natural or make an antecedent decision-or nondecision-to give
it precedence over politics. As in the myth that public administration can be
nonpolitical, depoliticizing issues requires a prior commitment-a constitutional
decision-as to what will or will not be included in political debate. The decision to concede this power to the market, however, is not subject to discussion. It is not a conscious choice. Given human nature, evolution, and the
political and economic markets, it follows naturally.
How could any rational person debate the necessity of reducing government
in scope and size? The market, guided by the invisible hand of competitive selfinterest, will take up the areas vacated by government, thereby eliminating conflict. If it does not, this means they were not problems to begin with.
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Prescriptions: Limiting Government Resources
As created, not spontaneous, institutions, governments need to be greatly controlled. The conservative economists propose stripping governments of the
ability and resources that allow them to respond to popular demands for intervention, protection, welfare, regulation, and aid, thereby placing these issues
off limits to public policy. Taking away resources and power expands the market's role, preventing selfish majorities and ignorant political leaders from
intervening.
These theorists claim that all existing political systems and constitutions
are corrupt because they escape market constraints and market concepts of
political legitimacy. Traditional limits on government power are not adequate,
and even separation of powers "has not achieved what it was meant to achieve."
Hayek accepts the aims of Montesquieu and the American founders, but "their
means have proved inadequate." He believes that the "division of power" and
modern representative government have failed because they do not protect
economic freedom. Buchanan agrees that western democracies and pluralism
have failed and that they undermine moral order, threaten freedom, and are
headed for destruction. They are an out-of-control "Leviathan;' ruled by "bias"
for public spending, that must be constrained. Friedman contends that government power will always be abused. Power exists because "people are afraid to
leave things alone." This causes "Tyranny of Beneficiaries," "Tyranny of Politicians," and "Tyranny of Bureaucracy" resulting in a "Tyranny of the Status
Quo." The only way to end abuse of power is to eliminate power.52
If ideas, institutions, and constitutional rules are inadequate and destructive, it is not enough to elect good leaders. Friedman had great hopes for the
Reagan presidency, seeing its opposition to large government as the harbinger
of"a renaissance of freedom and prosperity." A little later he noted that "[u]nder the best of circumstances, a massive government cannot be reordered and
reduced overnight" or "dismantled in one or two years;' but Reagan failed to
make sufficiently far-reaching proposals for reducing government. Ultimately,
however, it does not matter who is elected. Individuals fall short, and policies
cannot be changed unless institutions and constitutional rules are altered radically. Buchanan asserts that the Reagan administration had "a noble agenda,
and one partially if not fully met," but too much had been expected of it.
More important, it focused "on a prepared agenda" instead of attempting "a
structural revolution" to modify "the basic structure of politics and government." It failed to change the Federal Reserve system, enact a balanced-budget
amendment, or eliminate the Departments of Education and Energy-meaning
that "the only opportunity to change the structure of politics" has been "forfeited." President Reagan's most important legacy will be deflation of the "Mass
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Delusion" that politics and bureaucracy can accomplish great things. His constant opposition to government has illustrated that government is a failure,
that it cannot positively improve people's lives, that Camelot is impossible.
Friedman echoes this belief with his claim that the Reagan administration's
policies have "altered [the] political atmosphere'' so that the opposition's "political position" has been modified.53
Regardless of who is elected, good intentions are swamped by corrupt
political pursuit of self-interest. The only hope, as noted in chapter 5, is a constitutional revolution to change the form, structure, function, and resources
of government to prevent this corruption from reoccurring. If no passion other
than self-interest can be relied upon, institutions to channel self-interest away
from its current, politically destructive path must be created. For Buchanan,
this requires major "institutional reform" providing "constitutional protection
for a morally legitimized sphere of human activity"-market freedom.54 Hayek
calls for "new institutional invention" to replace discredited western governments with a new model of politics "which could be realized by the consistent
application" of market principles.55
In the same way that the Bill of Rights is a limit upon government in the
United States, depriving it of resources is also a limit. As with all theories, the
proposed constitutional rules enshrine a theory of distributive justice; essentially negative, they forbid government from doing some things and remove
the resources to do others. The conservatives expect much from this policy.
Hayek sees it as a key to "The Containment . . . and the Dethronement of
Politics" because "politics has become much too important . . . costly and
harmful." Friedman wants to reduce the size of government, whether or not
deficits and debt are problems. He believes that"[t ]here is nothing wrong with
the United States that a dose of smaller and less intrusive government will not
cure." Writing in the context of his proposed balanced-budget amendment,
he argued "to limit the government in order to free the people'' and expounded
the "importance of limiting government in order to preserve and expand individual freedom." 56 The primary idea is to eliminate the means and resources
that allow economic intervention. As examples, I will briefly examine proposals
for taking away resources, the concept of a fiscal constitution, government issuance of money, and the conservative notion of rule of law.
1a.xation and levels of taxation are fundamentally political decisions. They
shape distribution and limit public policy and the size of government. Tax rules
reflect basic civic principles and help promote those principles. Debate over
taxes and budgets is a debate over the philosophy of government-its chief
beneficiaries, proper role, structure, functions, duties, and national priorities.
Realizing this, conservative economists demand that taxes be reduced. Though
the United States is one of the least taxed of industrialized democracies, lower
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taxes are more of a political and philosophical than economic issue for these
authors. Without the resources for intervention, government can no longer
accede.to the public's demand for intervention. Friedman confirms that "the
relation between taxes and the scope of government . . . reflects a political judgment rather than an economic judgment." Given their preference for consumption that is private-which they claim is more democratic and just-as opposed
to public- which must deprive individuals of the freedom to use their resources
as they choose-reduced taxation expands the private while curtailing the public
sphere. This is important because all taxes are seen as coercive. Thus, Buchanan
emphasizes that choosing a tax system is "analogous to the choice among rules
or to constitutional choice." Analyzing this option within uncertainty about
future individual economic status presumably leads to choosing a tax system
that limits redistribution and ensures that individuals keep most of their earnings.57 Friedman is more blunt about reducing government's ability to meet
popular demands. "Truly simplify the tax system and all of a sudden a major
source of patronage for politicians would disappear." With fewer resources, temporary majorities can no longer coerce governments into destructive, unworkable, and costly programs.58 It is so important to reduce the size of the federal
government that Friedman would "accept large deficits as the lesser of evils"
compared to higher taxes.59
Reducing taxes and spending requires a criterion. The market provides the
essential constitutional and moral standard through the conservatives' fiscal constitution, discussed earlier. The market is a mechanism for reducing conflict and
government power only when a fundamental, constitutional decision has been
made to exclude categories of economic issues-as was achieved in the political
exclusion ofissues respecting religion or the press-from normal legislative and
administrative jurisdiction. The conservatives maintain that this decision has
been made, though apparently many people who are, or should be, bound
by it are unaware ofits existence. The fiscal constitution is the rule of conduct,
part of the rule of law, that "forbids" deficit spending and high taxes. In an
often repated phrase, the "fiscal constitution''6° is a "constitutional constraint"
that bars such matters as redistribution, deficit financing, and steeply progressive taxation. Principles such as the fiscal constitution are not created but are
"culturally evolved rules of fiscal prudence," unwritten rules that are the result
of cultural and moral evolution. Adhered to in the past, this evolved standard
limits intervention into the natural economy and is "a set of fixed principles
antecedent to and controlling the operating institutions of government." A
balanced-budget requirement is one of these constitutional norms to restrict
intervention. More than separation or enumeration of powers, the fiscal constitution limited the budget and therefore the size of government. Repeatedly
violated, it still "had constitutional status. For expenditures in excess of receipts
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were considered to be violations of moral principles." Although not written
into the Constitution-most of these authors want it included-it represented
a customary or unwritten rule having the same status as political parties, "the
actual operation of the electoral college," and judicial review. Violation of this
constitutional norm, made possible by Keynesian economics combined with
democracy, eliminated limits on the size and scope of government, embarking
western nations on their current suicidal path.61
For these theorists, interventionist and/or welfare government is not only
impolitic, coercive, counterproductive, inefficient, and freedom destroying but
immoral and unconstitutional. Conservative fiscal concerns are prior to and
more important than normal political activity. Their economy equals fundamental political rules and values composing the constitutional order. Deficit
spending and/or intervention are subversive of fundamental law-of the real
constitutional order represented by "The Old-Time Fiscal Religion." 62 Reducing government's role implies restoration of a legal order undermined by the
irresponsibility, greed, and democracy of the political market. As with Hayek's
rule of law, this is spontaneously generated moral law beyond that written by
legislatures responsive to temporary majorities. Thus the role of enlightened
economists is to return the nation to the higher reality embodied in market
relations.
This argument is flawed. The fiscal constitution is not simply a principle
employed to explicate positive law but confuses positive law with social norms
and what are claimed as moral rules. These theorists convert what they perceive
as a fundamental principle to the legally binding status of positive law. It is
not sufficient to claim that the fiscal constitution is a tradition or customary
behavior similar to political parties; if it were, people would be aware of it.
It is a moral rule, generated by the economy, and as noted in chapter 6, there
are no exogenous sources of morality that can challenge moral rules generated
by the economy. Making the fiscal constitution a moral rule differentiates it
from other practices and institutions which custom and usage have elevated
to constitutional status. The latter can be changed or modified by statute or
constitutional amendment, but the elements that make up the fiscal constitution are prior and superior to the political elements of the constitution and
therefore unchangeable-a permanent limit on government. Though supposedly
based on the evolution of custom and tradition, no amount of evolution can
change these fiscal rules.
If there is, or was, a "fiscal constitution" whose rules are at least as fundamental as human rights and the structure of government, the rest of the system
must correspond to it. This claim justifies the demand for const#utional amendments to make government conform to economic rules and needs, allowing
the spontaneous economic order to provide most of the goods and services
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that people wrongly expect from government. These authors have numerous
proposals to limit resources and the power to intervene in order to make the
political constitution conform to the fiscal constitution. Their most important
shared proposal is a balanced-budget amendment, because it would eliminate
deficit spending. As their political faith leads them to assert that democracies
are incapable of adequately taxing themselves to pay for services, a balancedbudget requirement reduces the size of western governments, correspondingly
expanding the role of markets. Friedman suggests additional amendments to
limit government's role that are consistent with the position taken by the
others: a flat tax; free trade; a presidential item veto; limitations on the growth
of the money supply; forbidding wage and price controls; ending laws requiring a license to practice a profession; elimination of corporate taxes; inflation
indexing of contracts; and termination of such policies as public housing and
social security.63
For the conservative economists, these changes in the role of government
embody the rule of law. The rule of law is a classical liberal principle designed
as protection from arbitrary government action and limitation on the scope
of government. It specifies the principles by which other rules are judged. The
rule of law includes impartiality, removal of vagueness, nonarbitrariness, neutrality, and advance notice of new rules and rule changes. It refers to treating
people by known standards and to constitutionalism-adhering to basic limits
and rules. The idea of rule of law is favored by each of these authors but
elaborated most by Hayek-and then more through repetition than detailed
analysis of content and consequences. Moreover, this ideal is given a peculiar
twist by these writers, to emphasize their version of proper economic relations
as the key to freedom, limited government, and the good life.
Hayek and Friedman both express the desire for general rules and law to
guide action and limit human will and discretion in politics, especially where
it impacts on economics. Along with Buchanan's "fiscal constitution;' which
is the functional equivalent of Hayek's rule oflaw or "rules for just conduct;'
general rules are the essential means to maintain freedom and prevent excessively responsive governments from giving in to what these theorists call specialinterest pleading for intervention. The rule oflaw is a standard superior to the
mere will of majorities embodied in statutes, to written law, even to the written constitution, in that it provides norms of conduct to protect the conservative market, based on an underlying economic reality that orders other
behavior.64
Hayek's rule oflaw limits what government and majorities may do. It stresses methods and procedures in the belief that these produce the best outcomes
over time, not results to specific individuals or classes. It is another example
of either/or thinking: People must choose between his notion of rule of law
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or tyranny. Hayek's rule of law offers general, established, unvarying rules,
"fixed and announced beforehand," that allow virtually no discretion - the
essence of tyranny-to government and no differentiation between people. Prohibiting discretion excludes intervention in economic or social relations because
such intervention treats some people differently from others. Rule of law
assumes that government and public policy can be impartial and neutral if they
treat people identically and do not benefit any identifiable person. To do this
it must follow those general rules which support the abstract market order.
Governments are precluded from legislating for specific problems or persons.
If it is possible to see the effects of a policy on specific persons, that policy
is illegitimate, a violation of the rule of law. In no case is it legitimate to differentiate between people in the name of justice, equality, or freedom, because
such differentiation must destroy freedom, justice, and equality along with the
spontaneous market order upon which these depend.65
Formal equality before the law-identical treatment regardless of differencesis, therefore, the essence of the rule of law. "(E]quality before the law is in
conflict, and in fact incompatible, with any activity of a government deliberately aiming at material or substantive equality of different people" (i.e., any
aid or reward given outside the structure of the market) or at "distributive
justice;' which must destroy the rule oflaw and free markets. The market-based,
natural-law-like character of this position is illustrated by Hayek's claim that
constraining rules, like the fiscal constitution, need not be written or even apparently known to be binding. They include "not only articulated but also
not yet articulated rules which are implicit in the system or have yet to be
found." As in the development of capitalism, when people followed rules
without expressing or even knowing them, evolved rules of the market set the
limits to political possibility and legitimacy.66
In claiming that public policy cannot benefit identifiable persons, Hayek
is referring to the impact of specific rules-say, welfare legislation, where it is
possible to identify who will benefit. He wants general rules, like stop signs,
which everyone must equally obey and of which everyone may attempt to take
advantage. He is not referring to the socioeconomic environment where property owners, children of the affluent, or white males have built-in advantages
in market competition or competition resulting from general rules. Hayek insists that such context must be ignored. Law cannot take cognizance of individual
differences or circumstances. In short, it is not a violation of rule of
;law if, based on socioeconomic characteristics, one can identify beforehand
particular likely winners. But it is a violation of rule of law if government attempts to aid likely classes of losers, that is, those people who lack the resources or ability to effectively compete.
As an abstract concept, the rule oflaw does not specify the content of rules
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but rather the form they must follow. To conservatives, however, the rule of
law does have specific content: the rules of conservative political economy. It
follows from spontaneous order and human ignorance, requiring that people
comply with a form of rule utilitarianism produced by market needs. Anything
that violates these canons, even if applicable to all, violates the rule of law.
The measure of the rule of law becomes conformity to these economic rules
(which specify the principle of neutrality), not its conformity to abstract rules
of procedure, which to be made operational must be informed by moral
judgments. Yet people and philosophers insist on such judgments to ensure
that a decision that is impartial is acceptable. Their judgments might distinguish
between people because of their different position in the socioeconomic lottery and would have to be justified in exactly the same way that conservative
rules need justification.
Circumscribing government's ability to issue money is also an effective limitation on its scope and power. Friedman and Hayek differ on the best meansBuchanan does not discuss this option - but agree that the public ability to
issue money must be constrained. Friedman's monetarism removes public discretion, so that issuing money becomes a seemingly administrative task, innocent
of political involvement. Monetarism assumes that the money supply (quantity of money), not fiscal policy, is the key government support for the economy. Monetarism claims that long-term prosperity and stable prices can be
ensured by creating an automatic monetary system under which the money
supply grows 4 to 5 percent a year.67 Friedman believes that this rate will prevent inflation by not providing money to finance higher prices and will have
no undesirable consequences, at least in the long run.68 Creation of a fixed
monetary rule ends the possibility of discretionary intervention into economic
affairs and supposedly removes the means of financing intervention and welfue.
To be successful, monetarism requires an additional politically difficult policy:
wage and price flexibility.
Hayek's proposal to reduce government's monetary role reflects his mistrust
of government and his concurrent belief that the private market is superior
to and is an effective limit upon government. Whereas Friedman supposes that
government can be efficient enough to adhere to a fixed rule of monetary
growth, Hayek doubts this. Instead, Hayek wishes to denationalize money;
that is, take away government's exclusive power to issue money and allow private firms to issue alternative and competing currencies. Hayek claims that
government has always abused its money-issuing monopoly. "[G]overnment
power over money facilitates centralisation," allowing it to deliberately squeeze
resources out of the public. "[T]here is every reason to mistrust government . ..
there is no reason to doubt that private enterprise whose business depended
on succeeding in the attempt could keep stable the value of the money it
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issued." A detailed discussion of this proposal is unnecessary. It is another example of attempts to remove resources which allow extensive welfare, regulation, or intervention. It is the corollary of the belief that the market is always
more just, fair, and efficient than politics and that people must learn to passively accept market outcomes.69
Proposals to remove resources from government control require a radical
change in the structure of government, its operations, and the public to whom
government presumably responds. Politics becomes an adjunct to economic
theory. The market restricts and defines the scope of government and the public sphere and introduces greater purity into politics. For example, public choice
theory, which Friedman applauds, "offers the normative understanding necessary to lay down 'better' rules." Such theorists "should begin to advance their
own versions of the ideal constitution for society." This includes "institutional
reform" to fit man's "moral-ethical capacities" and "genuinely constitutional
rules that will, to an extent at least, be immune from ordinary political pressures.'"'0 Change will take a fair amount of time, since the perceived corruption
has sunk deeply into the political fabric .71 But change will come, even though
"new institutional invention is needed." 72 Hayek's proposals include a new
legislative structure, with much reduced power for the branch that is subject
to regular elections. To Friedman and Buchanan, there should be more local
and less national government. For Hayek and Friedman, structural changes
such as the line-item veto will shift more power to the executive.
The reasoning is simple. Either we have a free market and limited government or total government and a command economy. There are no intermediate
possibilities. Inefficient and coercive, government must be limited to its essential duty of protecting the harmonizing market mechanism. Despite acceptance
of a limited welfare system and Friedman's demand that government maintain
a stable money supply, government duties are no greater than those listed by
Adam Smith and, given vast socioeconomic changes since Smith, are proportionally less: internal and external security, a judicial system, defense of private
property, enforcement of contracts, and provision of limited public works and
minimal support for public education.
This model can operate best in a system that has little popular political
participation, a passive or docile population, and few resources to support protest. Some of the possibilities and dangers implicit in the conservative position
are illustrated by Friedman's comments on Hong Kong and Chile. Despite its
limited local self-rule or political participation, Friedman considers Hong Kong
as "[p]erhaps the best example" of government kept to its proper duties. It
is a paradigmatic market society with neither tariffs, minimum wages, nor limits
upon buying and selling, entering a business, or hiring practices. Though tiny,
it is an example for the United States.73
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Friedman's discussion of Chile is more naive and ominous. Friedman's initial support for Gen. Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship illustrates the conflict
between his notions of freedom and the purpose of government and wider
concepts of freedom, democracy, and legitimate government. Friedman visited
Chile in March 1975, eighteen months after a military coup overthrew the
elected president, Salvador Allende. The exact nature of his six-day visit is controversial, but while in Chile, he met a number of government officials-some
economic advisers to the ruling junta were either former students or close
adherents of the Chicago School of Economics-gave talks, and subsequently
wrote a paper recommending spending cuts, sale of nationalized industries,
and other steps to curb inflation.74 Friedman did not ask if Latin American
conditions made it difficult to apply his advice, or if cultural, political, social,
and religious circumstances might affect a supposedly universally valid monetarist model.
Friedman saw in Chile what the United States and Britain can become if
they continue to expand intervention and welfare. Thus, "[t]he present state
of Chile [1977], in my opinion, is the end result ofan expansion in the role
of government" in socioeconomic problem solving, especially "an increase in
government spending."75 Presumably this is the ultimate cause of the 1973
coup. Because of his presupposition about the inevitably destructive impact
of government, he was slow to attack brutality and violations of human rights
and quick to praise the junta's efforts to return Chile to a "free" economy.
Friedman advised what came to be called the shock treatment to curb inflation: drastic cuts in public welfare, services, and subsidies; reduced employment; a slower rate of growth in the money supply; and so on. His "only concern" was "that they [the junta] push it long enough and hard enough,"76
though their method of doing so seems at first to have escaped his notice. He
believed that "the economic policy adopted by the Chilean government has
been well adapted to the problems it inherited from the Allende regime." That
the policies he supported required political repression in Chile and could be
imposed only under an authoritarian, antidemocratic regime seems not to have
troubled him. Friedman said that though he deplored the political situation,
the economic solution was absolutely necessary.7 7 In response to critics, Friedman initially claimed that Chile was an exception, that strong government cannot normally impose a free economy, and that critics of Friedman and Chile
are inconsistent in not also criticizing communist states. In the end, after much
censure, he admitted that preservation of the free market requires restoration
of political freedom.78
There is moral and political callousness in Friedman's early association with
and later partial repudiation of the Chilean junta. Despite his protestations,
Friedman's argument illustrates greater concern for the conservative version
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of a free economy than for politics or political freedom. I cannot attribute
Friedman's position on Chile to other conservative economists, even if their
starting economic and political assumptions are similar. They did not comment on Chile, and one expects that they too disapproved of the junta's political repression. Yet Friedman epitomizes a potential in the conservative economic contempt for government and politics: the belief that political and social
relations must conform to economic theory, regardless of costs. The economist's purpose is to enforce the economic limits to politics, unlike the Keynesian claim that economists should attempt to find workable means to meet
popular demands and reduce economic pressures on political stability.

Politics as an Adjunct to Economics
The message is always identical, repeated with persistent regularity. Politics is
inferior to economics. Politics is a self-serving exchange mechanism. Politics
is coercive. Politics is uncontrollable. Government is the enemy. Government
power is always abused. Government always fails. Government failure is always
worse than any imaginable market failure . Public support for correcting market
imperfections through regulation, intervention, welfare, labor unions, most
health and safety regulations, and so on must be terminated. In a caricature
of Marxism, the political constitution must conform to the underlying economic constitution .
The conservatives' free market requires a particular political system, though
not necessarily a minimal state. For example, Buchanan accepts some of Robert
Nozick's arguments but considers the possibility of a minimal state to be a
dream.79 Hayek leaves open the possibility of active though limited government. Potentially, this state is minimal only in terms of its nonintervention
in the "spontaneous" market order. A strong state may sometimes be necessary,
but one responsible to a higher value than popular demands. Given the conservative view of self-interest and their failure to explain why people will accept
losses when interventionist-regulatory-welfare government is dismantled, a
strong government-and possibly a revamped, centralized educational system
to teach acceptance-may be needed to control unrest and contain or ignore
redistribution demands if consensus breaks down.
The conservatives seem to believe that all that is necessary is to remove
the source of what they consider abuses, yet there will be losers from their
proposals. Entitlements, most welfare, a wide range of business, price, and environmental regulations will disappear. There will be fewer opportunities for
advancement, aid, and education for groups and individuals who fare poorly
in the market. The conservatives' own picture of human nature warns that

180

Market-Based Politics

losers will not go quietly to their reduced position and status. Thus when an
economic policy requires ignoring popular fears and demands and reducing
popular impact on decision making-given the conservative picture of the
political market and the place of self-interest in politics-suppression of dissent
is probably inevitable. Losers must be forced so that they can be truly free
in the market.
Moreover, the limitations these authors place on democracy and popular
control of government and the deliberately reduced responsibility of government to respond to popular demands would leave modern governments unchallenged in foreign and military policy, areas that have increased the power
of government more than have demands for welfare or economic regulation.
A further result of limiting access to government would be to increase the influence of those who now have ready access that does not depend on popular
pressure or voting, such as business executives who must be placated to fulfill
much government policy.80 This could lead to a greater asymmetric relation
between groups to government than now exists. These theorists believe that
their limits on the power of government will end all economic intervention,
but the more probable result will be expansion in police powers, a shift in the
beneficiaries of public policy, and more inequality, where traditional business
claimants for public aid will become even more dominant than at present.
There is, therefore, a potentially large role for government in maintaining internal order and other supports necessary to the market.
This possibility of a particular kind of strong state may not, however, be
the entire story. As with all elitist theories, the conservatives assume that there
is an elemental reality to which behavior must conform for justice and harmony to be realized. Despite conventional wisdom and the conservatives' own
claims, two points support this contention. First, the system as a whole is determined, operating virtually as a natural order, and individuals have little impact on outcomes. Second, the conservative market is not a proposition put
forward for debate and analysis but a true and objectively correct standard to
which people should adhere. It functions for the conservatives in the identical
manner as natural law and objective truth asserted by other systems. As in Plato's Republic, the criterion of good government is not political. Existential
reality is inadequate. Mass wants reflect ignorance and are irrelevant to what
should or must be. People must be made to conform to the disciplining/liberating spontaneous order. They must adopt a political system which reflects this
reality beyond their desires; the political-economic system cannot conform to
what people desire or how they actually behave. The underlying reality is not
Plato's transcendent forms; these authors are good enough liberals to doubt
the validity of that intellectual enterprise and to realize that it requires a morality
different from their own. Instead, the foundation is the market, which is to

Conservative Economists' Theory of Government

181

be the arbitrator of politics and government. Polity must conform to economy.
In the same way that a cancer patient must comply with a medical regimen
(against his/her will?) to be cured, modern governments must observe and be
limited by market discipline for order, freedom, and efficiency to prevail.
This rationalist picture is sorely lacking. Buchanan and especially Hayek
defend the market as the result of evolution,81 but apparently only the market
can evolve. Since it has evolved in conformity with fundamental human drives,
there is little or no likelihood for further evolution to social market systems
or successful, close government-market partnership. Governments are created,
and though they are also human institutions and important for solving problems and overcoming conflict, they are not capable of evolutionary growth
or improvement. As government is a constructed system, these authors discount the possibility of political evolution. Thus it is no defense to say that
the present range of public activities is the result of popular demand, or to
claim that duties have evolved over time. That is irrelevant, because only the
market provides the mechanism-competition-to propel evolution and curb
both appetite and the natural political disposition to plunder whomever one
can. If government evolved-in a sense, Buchanan's contractarianism, if it allowed other possible contracts-then it would have equal claim to consideration with spontaneous orders such as the market.82 But this would undermine
the idea that the market is natural and politics destructive.
Conservative evolution operates in and through the market, having as its
goal protection of the market. It is employed as a descriptive and prescriptive
concept. Evolution can proceed according to only one pattern: individualistic
competition in spontaneous orders such as the market. Any other pattern is
a blind end, a return to primitive emotions and organization and harmful to
freedom. Institutional evolution of markets has stopped in that no amount
of change or evolution can make the free market more free or efficient.
All evolution of tradition arguments share a common problem: Either one
must be morally neutral and accept everything that develops, or one must abandon the argument in order to criticize recently developed political and social
forms. The conservatives accept neither of these alternatives, leaving them with
several problems they fail to address. First, if, as these authors believe, survival
is the criterion of success, what is the time frame in which success is measured,
within which one can determine if a practice is or is not the newly evolved
norm? The welfare state is more than fifty years old in the United States and
a century old in democratic Europe. Is it the path that social evolution is currently following? If procedures have simply evolved, it is not legitimate to argue
for reinstatement of previous procedures because they evolved. Can there be
dysfunctional evolution, and if yes, what are the criteria? It cannot be found
in the process of evolution. Second, the conservatives seem to be asserting that
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history has ended, that evolution stopped with their political economy, that
for example, the nineteenth-century fiscal constitution is the limit of sustainable
evolution, given human nature. Why and how can this be? Are not the democratic practices and institutions these authors criticize also the result of evolution? Third, why and how has change occurred outside the acceptable evolutionary path? The answer-bad men and desires-does no.t address the failure
of their tradition. Fourth, discussion of political, economic, and institutional
evolution is of course a metaphor, because unlike nature, social evolution is
not the result solely of chance. Even if people are as ignorant as the conservatives claim, reason, goals, purposes, and planning-as well as the force, power,
and predatory practices ignored by these theorists-shaped and continue to
shape the development of human arrangements. They may not produce the
results people wish, but results are not independent of purposes. If people can
understand the process, they may be able to direct or at least deflect it. Then
the evolution argument ceases to be a naturalist argument and becomes a
purely rationalist one.
All that is desirable is promoted through the market. What cannot fit will
be ignored or suppressed. Because there are only individual interests, they can
be made to mesh together in the market where an extended view reveals that
the world is harmonious, orderly, coherent, and at bottom, one. This position
fails to appreciate the sociopolitical dislocation that results from rational individual decisions that are harmful in the aggregate. It may be perfectly rational
for an individual to ignore the long-term impact of actions but disastrous for
society; examples include toxic waste disposal, use of chlorofluorocarbons, pollution, refusal to serve in the armed forces, discrimination, selling secrets to an
enemy, ignoring interests of future generations, or Garrett Hardin's "tragedy
of the commons."83 Even if the market can address such issues, future generations cannot participate in our market and are therefore unprotected. The
theory is unable to address harm that flows from sole dependence on markets
when costs cannot easily be allocated to individuals or when people cannot
adequately be compensated for harm but are protected only if the harm is
prevented, as with acid rain or disease. The conservatives rightly insist that
government failure is too often ignored in calls for regulation of market failure,
but that should be a caution against expectations of perfection, not a reason
for doing nothing. Instead, for these authors, that simple observation is magnified into the basis for an entire theory of government, one where government
and politics are to conform to market theory, never to interfere into spontaneous order.
Because these theorists see politics and government as coercion, neither
government nor politics have anything other than narrow instrumental value.
They cannot accomplish great things, there is no creativity in politics, there
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is no value in unity or participation, and humanity will never share a common
image of a common future. Government is condemned for being centralized
and for failing to impose uniformity on public policy.84 Power has no moral
justification, except as it contributes to market efficiency. Legitimacy, legitimate
authority, and ultimately popular control-despite claims that the market is
the true realm of democracy-are missing. Tuditional political concern with
what is rightful, as in legitimacy, is reduced to individual rights largely in a
market context. There is no attempt to account for obligation. The citizen
is gone. Politics and participation are the pursuit of self-interest as determined
outside a social or collective context, without debate, deliberation with, or
concern for fellow citizens. High politics is never addressed. There is no sense
for, reference to, or understanding of diplomacy, war, and peace, those concerns which a slightly older generation referred to as the great issues of politics.
They are not missed, because the market will satisfy most issues formerly left
to politics.
By limiting expectations, the market supposedly reduces conflict and solves
problems that the democratic masses foolishly expect government to address.
If people are convinced that the market is neutral, that inequality is necessary
to its operation; that market outcomes are the best individuals can attain given
their resources, and that such outcomes are natural, they may feel disappointed
but not discontented. If, however, the power to affect outcomes does exist;
if people are unwilling to believe that the market is neutral between men and
women, black and white, poor and rich; if many people have little or no equal
and effective choice about important exchanges; if inequality undermines efficiency; if welfare and intervention are the price of social and political stability; iflarge numbers are unwilling to remove issues important to them from
the public agenda, then the market does not limit conflict but becomes a pivot
for expanded conflict.
Leaving aside the rich tradition in normative theory that man lives not
by bread alone but becomes fully human through participation, popular protests demanding democratization in South Korea in June 1987 and the subsequent election there (as well as popular demands for more democracy in the
People's Republic of China in June 1989) illustrate that economic growth
alone is not enough to satisfy popular aspirations, that people want a sense
of control over their futures, that demands for political reform and some sort
of democratic participation cannot be satisfied by the phrase that the market
is the real realm of democracy because people can choose to buy whatever they
wish, if they can. This reality will be lost on the economist theorists. With
their preference for theory over existent reality, for making behavior conform
to their economic model rather than altering their assumptions to reflect behavior, and for a unified solution to all dilemmas, they are unconcerned with
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the problems that confront individuals and governments. All that the conservative theory of government has to offer is the promise that in the long run,
things will be right with the world; on the average, people will be better off
or at least living as they should without handouts, intervention, or regulation
to cripple their freedom; and that there will be more economic efficiency, defined as whatever results from their natural market process. Much is missing
from this attempt to find a single answer for all public concerns.

Chapter Eight

Conclusions

What is still more important than even this matter offeeling, is the pn,ctical discipline
which the character obtains, ftvm the occasional demand made upon the citizens to exercise,
for a time and in their turn, some social function. It is not sufficiently considered how little
there is in most men's urdinary life togive any largeness either to their conceptions or to their
sentiments. . . . If circumstances allow the amount ofpublic duty assigned him to be considcmble, it makes him an educated man. . . . Still more salutary is the moral part of the
instruction afforded by the participation ofthe private citizen, ifeven rarely, in public functions.
-John Stuart Mill, Omsiderations on Representative Gwernment, chap. 3.
Every man will submit with becoming patience to evils which he belieiJes arise from the general laws of nature."
-Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principles of Pvpulation, bk. 2, chap. 2.

Ideas, belief systems, and operational concepts mold what people see and how
they respond to events. Disagreement over the content and public definition
of political ideas is a major part of political conflict. Within broad limits, ideas
can control or liberate people, promote unity or conflict, or determine winners and losers in political-economic clashes. The authors whom this book
examines are highly influential and implore us to accept a theory which seeks
to transform western governments and widely held political and social values.
Since their politics have received little discussion, I have attempted to explicate
their political ideas and claims instead of making a detailed criticism. This
chapter, however, points to some of the social and political difficulties inherent
in conservative economists' political theory.
Despite contrary protestations, conservative economic theory is also a
normative political theory that has serious implications for widely accepted
ideas, values, and policies. The conservative economists are keenly alert to
unintended results and implications of policies, theories, and proposals with
which they disagree, as in their continual claim that even with good intentions, intervention is always harmful. Given this concern, it is proper to ex185
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amine the implications and results of their political model. In the same way
that economic analysis creates new possibilities for understanding politics, looking at conservative economic theory as normative political theory advances
understanding of its meaning. It also produces an entirely different result from
treating it (or any other economic theory claiming to be a guide to proper
public policy) as empirical, verified, and purely economic. Such an approach
makes the character of conservative theory more apparent and opens it to
analysis and criticism.
Conservative economic theory is a political theory and ideology in that
it provides a coherent view of man and human relations, one that explains
reality to those who accept it, determines goals, furnishes adherents the means
to measure and judge others, and provides a guide to action.1 As a normative
political theory, it attempts to subordinate and incorporate much of politics
into economics; defines politics and government in narrow instrumental terms;
determines the legitimacy of political and social behavior by its impact on
economic efficiency and the spontaneous economic order; envisages human
nature and the human condition so that public goals and purposes become
impossible; and redefines individualism, freedom, equality, democracy, morality,
justice, and community in cramped, procedural terms that strip them of substantive content and obviate their expansion. The result is a logical, deductive
theory which solves complex problems by defining them away. In its fear of
government power, it leaves people defenseless before private power; condones
inequality; accepts social relations as given and immune from positive intervention; denies the relevance of traditional moral and ethical theories to political
economy; reduces all relations to private relations; and sees humanity's highest
good and true nature in the pursuit of private self-interest.
Conservative political economy is founded upon an optimistic and proud
belief that it is an accurate, empirically correct, and morally superior model
of how the world operates. The order-producing market promises that things
will turn out as well as they possibly can, if people accept their fate and leave
the market alone. Being optimists in a world where many things are going
wrong, conservative economists offer the illusion of hope to people who must
forgo public protection, cherished freedoms, and democratic practices to pay
the costs for conservative ideas. Such sacrifices seem necessary because these
theorists have virtually monopolized the public discussion and definition of
social and political ideas, claiming that their limited political view is the only
legitimate conceptualization of and means to reach the good society. In the
process, they have shifted the language and focus of debate away from Keynesian, liberal, and social democratic philosophy to their revolutionary picture
which emphasizes the inevitability of government failure; limited government,
political participation, and public expectations; reduced welfare, intervention,
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and regulation; conceptualization of political and social concerns as narrowly
economic; and the superiority of the private over the public aspects of human
existence. Some of the political nature of this theory can be illustrated by what
is missing.2

Neglected Issues and Concerns
Theories are like road maps, giving a schema of where one is going, what to
expect, what one must pay attention to, and what can safely be ignored. As
with maps, they are abstractions from reality that focus on some things and
ignore others, that are useful for some purposes but inappropriate for others.
Conservative economic theory, however, is like an abstract map for all situations, regardless of terrain, local landmarks, direction of travel, means of transport, and purposes. Despite pretensions to a universally valid psychology, the
market theory of politics is a normative theory, a new version of natural law
whose conclusions and prescriptions proceed from the conservative economists' image of unchangeable human motivation. This picture is not subject
to debate but is "the premise on which debate is built." 3 Society and politics
must be as asserted. Discrepancies must be ignored or made to conform. The
theory claims to explain all domestic political behavior and offers elaborate
political and social prescriptions. It is not, however, an adequate normative
or empirical political theory. In its pursuit of a single explanation for all social
phenomena, these theorists' shared political theory neglects too much behavior
and has little room for the impact of widely held ethical and moral rules and
beliefs on how individuals define self-interest. The theory overlooks the social
nature of economic relations and fails to examine circumstances when general,
abstract rules may discriminate against persons. Its impaired image of human
motivation is too narrow to support a working political system or an adequate
morality. Previous chapters noted specific missing elements, such as substantive content for individualism, democracy, freedom, equality, morality, justice, community, and inconsistency over defense. Here I note more general
difficulties.
The importance of what I assert to be missing from conservative theory
cannot be proven but represents concerns from contemporary political debate
and historical political theory. These omitted elements have been considered
important by traditional conservatives, theorists in the historical core of modern
liberalism, socialists, and Marxists. Is it fair to criticize a theory for what it
does not address? Yes, if that theory goes beyond manipulation of abstract symbols to recommend real-world institutional, value, and policy changes. When
large numbers of people are concerned with certain issues and problems and
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a theory claims comprehensive and universal validity, that theory should address those matters, even if they are illegitimate, irrelevant, or unfortunate
within its confines. At minimum it should explain why such concerns are unimportant. This is especially true for a theory which limits government and
replaces political accommodation with the operation of a supposedly autonomous and automatic system. Instead, conservative political economy banishes
these concerns to a category of nonproblems.
The conservatives correctly remind us that everything is interconnected
and that to change one part or one relation in a system has an (often unforeseen) impact on others. Unfortunately, they apply this insight only to politics
and government, not to the political-social changes resulting from the market
or from their market-based advice. They have little concern for social equilibrium as distinct from market relations and act as if the stability and safety
of the Republic have a narrowly economic base. For them, human systems
and relations are derivative from and analyzable as economics. Areas that conservative theory inadequately addresses include: social costs, cohesion, political
considerations, legitimacy, patriotism, public goals, participation, more expansive individualism, efficiency, class, transition to their political model, the nature of public alternatives, and problems of procedures without substance.
Keynes criticized neoclassical economics for "its general regardlessness of
social detail."4 This charge is applicable to contemporary conservative theory.
Social costs and losses are not simply overlooked but, given procedural individualism, do not exist; therefore, the possibility of adverse sociopolitical impact
is excluded from policy advice. Private and social costs and benefits coincide.
Buchanan, for example, believes that economics should emphasize markets
and exchanges, not "social costs and social benefits."5 This is a defensible position, but it is incompatible with making sociopolitical prescriptions.
Though it is plausible to argue that the conservative defense of the market
is based on its results,6 these conservatives take a nonconsequentialist position
when it comes to actual results. It is the economic order that matters, not
consequences to specific individuals, to the social system, or to politics and
government. These authors do not believe that conditions other than coercion prevent people from acting. Those who cannot compete are largely ignored, and the children of unsuccessful competitors present few problems for
equal opportunity, long-term political-social stability, or justice. Because the
system is seen as natural and neutral between people, there is no need to
choose between groups and claimants. Each receives what he or she deserves.
No one can have more without stealing from others. Market outcomes determine fairness. To the extent that this system exempts individuals and firms
from responsibility for unintended consequences, it cannot address problems
of ecological degradation or the imposition of small costs on many individuals.7
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How the interests of future individuals can be protected is unexplored. People
must learn to accept the results of market relations. All relevant social phenomena are expressed by prices.8 People have no right to expect welfare or
aid in adapting to adjustments and losses, which are natural. Given the conservatives' picture of man and politics, it makes sense to depreciate the social costs
of economic failure, falling wages, or unemployment because these costs are
purely individual. Efforts to address them through collective action must serve
individual interest, not the common good.
The conservatives' world view prevents them from seeing the nature and
relevance of common identity that many people take comfort from and which
encourages cooperation . Procedural individualism, lack of a common interest
except those interests that each person possesses, narrow self-interest, and
freedom conceived as doing with one's possessions as one wishes encourages
the slighting of social cohesion. This is absent from the conservatives' model.
They make no effort to explain deference to the interests and concerns of
others or not pushing one's self-interest when that is detrimental to others.
Indeed, they have no way to account for such feelings and actions except as
masks for self-interest or the mistaken understanding of one's real interest.
These authors never discuss cooperation outside the market nexus, causing
them to miss the cooperative element in much social, political, and economic
interaction. They believe that cooperation is for narrowly self-interested reasons and can be bought. Learning curves, shared skill development, labormanagement trust, job satisfaction, group loyalty, upgrading the consensus,
pride, and satisfaction are merely components in individual self-interest that
are captured by market prices and have no other relevance. Private ownership
and pursuit of self-interest in the market are ultimately indistinguishable from
cooperation, freedom, and efficiency.
Politics, political considerations, and political stability are also missing from the
conservative model and policy advice. These authors ignore that the boundary
between politics and economics is translucent, permeable, and located not in
the nature of things but at man's convenience. They are concerned only with
what they see as a one-way adverse relation-from politics to economics-and
a one-way beneficial relation-from market economics to politics. The two remaining relations-the adverse impact of economics on politics9 and the
beneficial impact of politics on economics-do not exist in any significant sense.
For the conservatives, politics cannot have a positive impact on market
economics, even by helping people achieve their goals or avoid situations such
as the "prisoner's dilemma"; 10 and economics has no harmful, destabilizing
consequences for politics confined to its proper sphere. Economic discontent
should not, therefore it does not, harm democracy and free government. They
miss Jefferson's argument that relations of superordination and subordination
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in the economy can create conditions for political stability or instability, for
a republic or tyranny. Keynes in the 1930s and Thurow in the 1980s repeatedly
claim that economic dislocation encourages the development of despair and
extremism. Keynes believed that severe unsolved economic problems could
discredit democratic government, making destructive and radical changes inevitable. Most students of developmental politics and of revolution concur.
The social and political impact of debt repayment by developing countries may
soon provide a case study. That debt repayment is destabilizing for newly
reestablished democratic regimes in countries such as Brazil or Argentina because it requires reducing already low living standards, causing social strain,
political unrest, and a sense of loss of national sovereignty, is not discussed.
Keynes addressed this problem for Germany in the 1920s, and the United
States will face it in the 1990s, but the conservatives provide no advice except
reduce popular expectations and let the market prevail.
The conservative economists are unconcerned with possible economic
sources of political instability. Their political theory sees politics as static. They
seem to assume that the political system will continue as before regardless of
economic shocks. Problems are defined away as misperceptions of human
possibility. This makes sense within their hermetically-sealed, deductive model,
where people must learn to passively accept their fate. Political stability will
then presumably follow, because the economic market is an unchallengeable
standard of proper conduct. If allowed to function without intervention, and
if people defer to economic forces, political freedom, equality, democracy,
government, and apparently political stability will be the best that can be, given
limited human ability. Deviation from the market destroys these goods. Economics is, therefore, separate from social and political concerns. As with Marx,
economics is the fundamental reality, and politics is epiphenomena!. Political
and social institutions must conform to the natural economic system, which
needs no modification to fit political needs. Maintaining social and political
stability, support and a sense of legitimacy through welfare1 1 is immoral. The
stability of the Republic depends only on an economic base.
This casual attitude to political order is illustrated by nondiscussion of
legi.timacy and authority. Legitimacy is a nonquantifiable, quasi-mystical concept (though hardly more than spontaneous order or efficiency) that reflects
real attitudes without which no political or economic system can survive. It
refers to popular acceptance of community, governmental institutions, rules
and procedures for distributing power and status; public values; and/or the
belief that public officials, who fill roles within the structure of rules and institutions, have the right to govern. The concept of legitimacy is captured in
the distinction between de jure and de facto-the difference between proper,
legal rule and the fact of ruling or having power to impose rule or will. The
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conservatives acknowledge only de facto power. Power and office as a public
trust are impossible. They virtually duplicate Marx's claim that politics reflects
the interests of the dominant class. Though the players are different-capitalists
are the victims in conservative martyrology, since wealth does not produce
political power-modern governments are still tools of group oppression. For
the conservatives, majorities and special interests employ the political system
to exploit and oppress unorganized minorities. Negligent of their long-range
interest and ultimate dependence on the peaceful operation of spontaneous
order, ignorant and selfish majorities disregard the law and follow temporary
self-interest by imposing intervention and high taxes on the creative minority.
Given the view of politics as coercion, a political system is legitimate if it conforms to the market but always remains suspect and open to destructive misuse.
No system can survive for long without a sense of legitimacy, at least
among a regime's armed followers. Unlike Keynes, the conservatives do not
discuss how democratic legitimacy is promoted by government attempts to address widely felt problems.12 These authors cannot explain popular acceptance
of a democratic system - especially if democracy is only a procedure- or, having
stripped government of the resources with which it may attempt to address
popular discontent, any means by which it can allay dissatisfaction with economic performance. Policies, intervention, or restrictions reducing the "efficiency'' of free markets, no matter how much they might contribute to political
stability and legitimacy, are suspect, dangerous, and forbidden.
These authors make legitimacy claims for and about their economy-for
example, that market competition is the only legitimate way to distribute goods
and status-and their economic system depends upon a popular sense of its
legitimacy. However, they have no way of convincing self-interested economic
losers that the system is legitimate or of defending it peacefully. Moreover,
authority can be justified only on moral grounds, such as justice, common
interest, public benefit, and so on, not by efficiency and system needs. The
conservative model has no such justification. With its restricted individualism,
celebration of pursuing self-interest, and assertions that public officials always
seek their narrow self-interest and that public policy inevitably fails, conservative political economy deeply corrupts politics. It undermines feelings oflegitimacy and rightful authority13 while legitimating self-seeking behavior, because if one expects government to serve self-interest, one can safely conclude
that it will.
The conservatives' clearest failure lies in not explaining why people, characterized as ignorant and narrowly self-interested, will accept the market system,
especially if they lose from market relations. Clearly many people believe that
they are not winners. People on the edge of poverty, those threatened with
job loss, and those experiencing chronic insecurity often feel powerless, hope-

192

Market-Based Politics

less, alone, defeated, and alienated. Family and social ties weaken and deteriorate. Child and spouse abuse, drug use, crime, and physical and mental illness
are normal correlates of these feelings. Buffeted by adversity and unable to improve their lives, they can become internal dropouts or the raw material for
movements of despair. Conservative psychology cannot explain why these people, who can have little personal self-interest in doing so, will support the
political-economic system. For example, Friedman's and Hayek's claim that people should willingly accept their fate, that because they experienced good conditions in the past they should accept adversity when it comes, or Hayek's admission that some must suffer during economic change, ignores their own
assumptions about human behavior and motivation. Except for Hayek's belief
in traditional rules which individuals neither understand nor articulate but
simply follow, there are no ties except self-interest with which to maintain
stability.
Why and how self-interest remains confined to the market, why it does
not lead to more and brutal expressions of self-interest and how even markets
can survive with only self-interest are questions answered by a promise that
the market curbs and limits self-interest. Why the inherent selfishness of those
who have not but want, or of those who have but want more, does not destroy
the social system remains unexamined and unexplained. If losers or winners
cease to see their self-interest as being promoted by the market, they are bound
by no other ties or moral rules in the conservative model with which to hold
society together, resulting in chaos and/or demands for a strong government
to repress antimarket behavior. Dedication solely to self-interest and private
affairs is more characteristic of authoritarian regimes than democracies. 14
This does not imply revolution, though the conservatives occasionally warn
about the violence and rebellion that will result if their system is not enacted
or maintained.15 The real danger lies elsewhere, in the destruction of the civic
virtues that hold society together-seen in the continuing decline of voting
in the United States and the accelerating unwillingness to consider the needs
of others. Anger, mistrust, discontent, breakdown in social ties and stable expectations, and noncooperation are sometimes harbingers of violence and extraconstitutional changes. More often they portend a generalized loss of support
for social and political institutions, basic values, and authorities. The greater
this breakdown in social ties and consensus, the greater the probability that
Arrow's dilemma for democratic decision making will be realized and Buchanan's search for unanimity frustrated.
These observations apply also to patriotism. Patriotism can exist in the conservative world only as a response to external enemies, and there is little in
this for the average individual. Love of country, willingness to sacrifice, the
primal sense of belonging to something larger than oneself, identification with
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something beyond self-interest, loyalty to an ideal, and what the founders of
the Republic referred to as civic virtue ill fits the conservative world view.
Indeed, with their model of human motivation and individually derived valuation, these attributes have no collective value and usually are masks for selfishness. Patriotism and the place of patriotism in social cohesion, political legitimacy, and cooperation would have to be discussed in terms of self-interested
psychic income, and would otherwise be inexplicable within their psychology.
Throughout the centuries, political theorists, including individualists, have
insisted that politics has a largergoal or purpose than individual self-gratification.
The conservative economists dispute this contention. They have no concern
for authority, consent, citizenship, nonmarket legitimacy, obligation, or public
goods separate from individual interest. The customary purpose of politics and
government-to promote justice and strengthen community and a shared
order-is impossible. In making policy recommendations, they are concerned
with narrowly economic ends. Other considerations are either unimportant
or contained within, subordinate to, and identified with economic means and
ends. Political science's long-standing concern for power, role playing, nonrational activity, socialization, and macrosystem relations is subsumed under
individual self-interest. Moral issues have disappeared, and defining democracy,
freedom, or equality as procedures eliminates moral concerns from politicswhich is no loss to these theorists because those values are divisive and frequently disguised self-interest.
Participation integrates democracies, expands awareness, modifies old and
develops new preferences, and encourages people to enlarge their interests and
understand the position of others. It frequently encourages commitment-a
nonexistent concept for the conservatives- to improving the system, as opposed to the market notion of exiting from an undesirable situation. Participation creates the citizen. Given their depreciation of politics and their fundamentally economic reality, the conservatives play down the significance of
citizenship and participation and eagerly anticipate a drastic reduction of the
political sphere. Politics is not an arena of extensive human choice and development. It is not a means to change individual utility functions, perceptions,
and notions of interest. It is not designed to help people attain ultimate goals
and the good life. It has no value in adjusting rival claims or reconciling differences. Politics does not fulfill human needs.
In conservative economic theory, the group is simply an aggregate of separate, distinct egos, having no other existence or identity. This perspective ensures that these authors cannot explain even the simple act of voting. In their
model, people vote for politicians who promise the most plunder. But, as
noted earlier, this violates the conservatives' own free-rider principle and view
of human motivation. A simple cost-benefit calculation cannot explain either
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voting or differences in participation rates between economic groups within
a country or differences between countries. In any large election, it is rational
to not vote because one vote cannot affect the outcome proportionate to the
trouble of leaving home, traveling, waiting in line, and eventually casting a
ballot. Yet approximately half the eligible voters in the United States vote on
a fairly regular basis, and the proportions are significantly higher in other open
systems such as Britain, Canada, or France.
A completely self-regarding person would not vote. Cultural influences,
ethical principles, and a sense of group membership or duty, however, can
motivate participation. People routinely distinguish their private from their
public selves, and behavior appropriate in one forum is not always appropriate
in the other. 16 People may not want to see their private desires established as
public policy applicable to the entire society; and they may support a measure
that does no direct personal good because it is beneficial to society. A person's
decision to support a tax increase to finance pollution control (though he or
she will not live long enough to benefit from it), or a bond issue for schools,
or a lower wage increase to shift funds to a university library may express seriously held convictions as a member of a community-as a public person-as
opposed to narrowly self-interested behavior. Individuals live in two intersecting realms and have two persona, the private and the public. They may sometimes be in conflict and sometimes consonant, but one is not subsumed under
the other.
Voting is different from buying in a market for at least three other reasons.
First, in politics there is no equivalent to prices,1 7 but there is a strong effort to
eliminate the buying and selling of influence. Second, the economic market
responds to unequal preferences expressed in dollars, pounds, marks, and yen,
giving each person a different number of ''votes." Political participation emphasizes formal equality and, when limited to voting, actual equality that at
least occasionally upsets the plans of political-economic elites. Third, when
purchasing an item for personal satisfaction, change in others' behavior is incidental. In participation, it is personal satisfaction that is often incidental and
other-directed purposes that are paramount. Voting has many functions, from
expressing community to inducing behavior changes so that people conform
to a moral or political ideal. It is not simply a private act even if the motivation
is private. The element of deliberately choosing wi-th and for others makes this
into a different sphere with different purposes and consequences than private,
market behavior.
Theorists such as Buchanan or Friedman have one great truth: self-int:erest
and individualism. Conservative individualism is both a starting assumption and
an explanation. Individualism-"private behavior"18, expressed by pursuit of
self-interest-is the fundamental reality and motivation, accounting for all
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behavior; there is rw motivation beyond personally defined self-interest. It explains the success of markets and the inevitable failure of politics and public
policy. Public policy, customs, group norms, institutions, and traditions result
from and exist exclusively in the motivations and behavior of individuals acting as individuals. Individualistic self-interest structures the conservatives' concepts of markets, freedom, equality, democracy, government, morality, justice,
and public policy and determines their policy proposals.
These theorists have one great error: This is all there is. They look at
groups and see only individuals acting as individuals, with only a single motivation. This image presents an inadequate, nonempirical, and incomplete psychology19 which, because it does not, cannot, or refuses to specify the meaning of self-interest beyond asserting that whatever an individual does is in his/
her self-interest, becomes a tautology unable to explain real-world behavior. Even
if self-interest is quantifiable in an empirically valid sense, it is assumed and
asserted in such a way as to prove whatever the authors wish. Institutions,
public policies, political activity, and all forms of cooperation are reduced to
individual purpose and explained in terms of individual motivation, with insufficient reference to the environment.
In explaining human behavior, these theorists leave little room for internalization of shared beliefs or social and cultural influences. Although institutions may be the result of individual behavior and exist only in the minds and
behavior of individuals, reification is not the only alternative. One needs only
to accept the conservative insight that outcomes and institutions may be independent of anyone's intentions to realize that individual self-interested behavior does not account for all outcomes. Even if people always pursue narrow
self-interest, individuals are not completely free to choose their behavior or
to blatantly seek self-interest within an institution. Behavior is constrained.
Though institutions limit how self-interest is sought, most constraint on the
pursuit of self-interest outside the market is missing from the conservative
model. Their depreciation of participation leads them to ignore how concepts
of self-interest develop with and are modified by interaction with others. Judgments change as people attempt to convince each other of the best course of
action. In shared decision making, people modify, develop, and upgrade their
perceptions and understandings of self-interest, frequently merging them with
a perceived common good. At that point, explaining behavior in terms of
utility-maximizing self-interest becomes so vague as to lose all explanatory value.
Moreover, self-interest is a motive, not a justification. It is advanced only
through conformity to at least some of the rules, roles, and norms of the institution and values within which one operates-the environment within which
we define self-interest and we respond to one another. There is a big difference
in how people react to demands justified by "I want that"; "I want that be-
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cause a voice told me I deserve it"; "I want that or I will bash your head";
"I want that because according to our mutually shared values I deserve it or
it is mine"; or "I want that because it will be mutually beneficial for me to
have it." The person who internalizes norms or pursues self-interest by conforming to a found set of rules and values-which seem to exist only in spontaneous
order for the conservatives-advances self-interest in a very different way from
the person who has no constraints. Unless self-interest is reduced to a tautological truism, rules and the behavior and beliefs of others affect how a person
behaves. These writers overlook Mill's insight, in such arguments of his as the
tyranny of the majority, that individuals are constrained and shaped by the
ideas and behavior of others until they cannot imagine an alternative thought
or behavior. In the real world-witness the conservative picture of a nonmarket society-people face limits which their self-interest must heed.
In terms of actually explaining behavior, little is gained by reducing all
behavior to narrow self-interest. But the reduction is integral to the conservatives' project. Their concept of individualism and freedom eliminates concern
for private power2° and the fate of individuals and denies a view of individualism as encouraging individual development. If there is nothing but individual
self-interest, there is no justification for public efforts to protect the losers from
conservative policies. They can have no claim on the resources of others, because they too have acted from the same self-interested motives. If everyone
acts from the same motives, has the same formal chance, and there is no power
to discriminate against individuals in the market, then everyone deserves what
he or she gets. No one is responsible for the fate of others. Collective, deliberate
controls over selfish behavior disappear. Conservative markets, individualism,
and freedom prevent active government and redistribution because maintenance
of the market system is the highest priority to which individuals must conform.
The conservative economists consistently claim that the market is more
efficient than government. Claims about efficiency2 1 are closely related to selfinterest, inadequate conceptualization of individualism, and individual valuation. Though Buchanan occasionally acknowledges that efficiency requires
a criterion,22 the conservative economists share a widespread misperception that
efficiency is a neutral, obvious concept, yet they repeatedly employed it in a
blatantly ideological manner. Because of its alleged scientific status, invoking
efficiency often ends normative policy dialogue. Efficiency, however, is the start
of a discussion, not its end. It is neither self-justifying nor meaningful in the
abstract; rather, it is an instrumental value. Though efficiency considerations
may help one choose between goals, they cannot determine desirability or tell
which goal to choose.
The meaning of efficiency depends upon exogenously determined purposes. One must always ask, efficiency in terms of which goal or purpose?

Conclusions

197

What do people wish to conserve? Maximize? Achieve? Efficiency differs depending on what we wish to maximize: individual negative freedom, effective
individual freedom, collective freedom, individual equality, equality between
nations, class peace, social stability, maximum capital accumulation, building
a pyramid, putting a man on the moon, or putting pyramids on the moon.
To claim that there is an inherent conflict between freedom or equality and
efficiency simply means that one has a goal other than freedom or equality,
such as wealth maximization for some. To define efficiency as maximum output given available resources is insufficient until preferences among goods are
specified-free time, washing machines, fine art, computer games, or nuclear
missiles. Selecting the relevant time frame is also crucial, since what is efficient
in the short run may not be so in the long run, as illustrated by concern over
the cumulative impact of environmental degradation. Answers to these concerns are normative judgments.
The common conservative answer is that the market determines what
will be produced based upon satisfying individual preferences, but this is an
evasion. Individual choices are made only from options presented by the market, by those able to pay. The chain of reasoning runs as follows:
There are only individual choices, preferences, and evaluations.
Preferences have the same value; there is no legitimate way to distinguish
them.
Preferences should be satisfied.
Preferences are to be expressed in the market.
Markets are accurate measures of individual preferences, are fair, and are
the only means to measure and aggregate preferences.
Preferences are expressed through money, which is fair because people earn
money (rewards) in proportion to individual contribution to the welfare
of others. The market compels people to satisfy the wants of others and
requires the most effective use of resources.
The market therefore guarantees maximum utilization of resources, even
as it expands the given resource base and technology. That is efficiency.
The market thus guarantees efficiency, or, in a very short step, market results are efficient.
Intervention must be inefficient.
This argument confuses the goal (achieving the maximum amount of what
is desired with a minimum of resources) with one means of reaching it (the
market). It is a circular but effective claim that the widely shared value of efficiency can be achieved only in the market. The typical use of"efficiency'' focuses on individual choices in only the most superficial manner. Efficiency does
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not mean preference satisfaction but satisfying preferences in the market. Efficiency and individual choice are frequently procedural concepts having nothing to do with individuals achieving their ends or with autonomously determining preferences and ends. Individualism and individual preferences are
satisfied if people are allowed to attempt to choose and to attempt to compete
without coercion. It does not matter if they actually achieve their ends. Advertising, inequality, demand manipulation (which is impossible given the picture of freedom), or a small number of choices are irrelevant, as long as the
framework of procedures exists to allow people to try to achieve purposes or
express preferences. Outcome is secondary to system maintenance.
All individual preferences are not taken into account in efficiency calculations, but outside the market, what can be done to help people achieve their
goals and preferences? For the conservatives, the answer is little or nothing.
To emphasize all preferences, not just those realized in the market, opens the
unacceptable possibility of collective intervention or action to help people articulate and achieve preferences. Thus it is logical for these authors to criticize
all intervention and popular political participation. Such policies as environmental impact statements invoke nonmarket concepts of efficiency. The original attempt at limited participation in community action programs illustrates
a wider conceptualization of efficiency than market efficiency. According to
the conservative economists, these efforts cannot be efficient, not because
they do not achieve their purposes, but because the purpose achieved is illegitimate according to the market model. This is, however, inadequate. The
economists' efficiency cannot be a model for and critique of politics and public
policy until it is justified morally and specified in terms of an acceptable goal.
Much else is missing from the market model of politics-for example, class.
Given individualism, the belief that everyone benefits from market exchanges,
and the conservative picture of freedom, class, along with race, ethnicity, and
gender, do not exist as relevant or legitimate policy classifications. They contribute nothing to understanding and are erroneous, divisive, and ultimately
destructive concepts inviting disastrous intervention. Neither does int:ernational
politics figure in the conservative model, except for an occasional reference to
defense and a general preference for free trade. The impact of international
events-which deeply worried Keynes-is missing. However, if government is
to do nothing to intervene in the economy, this omission is logical, even
though dangerous in its passive acceptance of possible external manipulation.
These authors seem unconcerned with how the -cransitwn will occur from
the current chaos to their preferred system. Though very critical of existing
conditions and providing copious comment on what must be changed, they
are curiously abstracted from the actual, real-world, political process through
which their desired transformation can take place. They do not explain how
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changes will be made, what existing elements can be built upon, or how a new
coalition can be created. If human nature is as these authors claim, how will
public behavior change to accept the conservatives' system? Surely there can
be no motivational metamorphosis, no sudden awareness of common interest,
no willingness to sacrifice one's interest for another's, no likelihood that politicians able to end this chaos can be elected, and no chance that constitutional
amendments limiting the power of majorities will be passed by rapacious majorities. None of this can occur if the assumptions upon which these authors
build are accurate. Is disaster the only way? Perhaps. Unremitting claims that
government must fail, coupled with the destruction through deliberate budget
deficits and tax reductions of the resources that allow intervention, could
change popular expectations. But that is a dangerous game which could just
as easily lead to policies rejected by those who counsel such expedients.
The conservatives' microeconomics encourages this lack of concern with
other issues. Keynesian macroeconomics promised the possibility of successful
intervention and manipulation to address economic dislocations. Conservative microeconomics emphasizes individual units and fatalistically assumes
that the system as a whole will take care of itself. Paralleling their economics,
there is no macrotheory of system-wide political behavior. This shifts responsibility for addressing problems away from government and restricts the size of
tile public arena by reducing politics to individual behavior. Each theorist seeks
to reduce government discretion. Hayek's evolution and adherence to unknown
rules; Friedman's monetarism; Buchanan's contractarianism; and the shared
arguments about government failure, self-interest, constitutional reconstruction, and the rule oflaw add up to leaving the economy alone. By eliminating
the resources which allow system-wide intervention and by narrowing the scope
of public concern, they hope to make permanently impossible a recreation of
Keynesian intervention or Lyndon Johnson's Great Society.
This micro-outlook is related to the conservatives' predilection to view the
world in ideal-type, procrustean dtherlor terms. These men see few shades ofgray.
Given the certitude of their universally valid market and self-interest principle,
they divide institutions, policies, and interpretations into legitimate-those that
agree with the market model-and illegitimate-those that do not. These dichotomies are not merely useful "for organizing thought"23 but are seen as categorically true statements about the world: either individualism or collectivist
conformity, self-interest or impossible altruism, economic freedom or slavery,
justice or distribution of property, limited government or slavery, and so forth .
These are "alternative principles.m4 There can be nothing in between, no continuum between policies, no viable or stable compromises among different positions, no reinterpretation of policies to achieve agreed-upon values, and no evolution of policies and attitudes beyond those necessary to their market.

200

Market-Based Politics

As with their either/or fallacy, the conservatives do not allow any substantive content for ideals such as democracy, freedom, equality, or individualism.
These are merely means to an end: choosing governors or allowing market competition . Beyond supporting the market, outcomes are of little concern . This
emphasis on procedure, however, is without substance. Procedures are not neutral
"but [are] morally charged and therefore morally problematic."25 No procedure,
not even an evolved one, is self-justifying or justified separate from the results
it encourages or allows. If procedures are, were, or could be self-justifying, the
conservatives could not limit democratic decision making from extending into
any area. Procedures and operating rules always aim at some goal or purpose
and are usually chosen or accepted because people assume that they promote
a desired outcome, such as popular participation educating citizens, protecting their interests, and limiting government. By arguing that widely accepted
ideals are satisfied by following set procedures, the conservatives justify but
refuse to accept the outcome of those procedures. Losers in market competition have no reason to complain, no recourse against outcomes, and no right
to appeal to a value higher than competition, because they have "fairly" competed and competition is the real content of these ideals. This approach too
is an evasion because these economists do have a substantive end- protection
of the market to which everything else is subordinate and derivative. But to
acknowledge this would require justifying the market rather than basing justification on the market.

Conservative Political Economy as Empirical Theory
The problem of missing political concerns is compounded by the nature of
the theory itself. This book contends that the political theory of conservative
economists warrants notice apart from the question of the validity of their
economics. The conservative economists may be defended on the grounds that
they present tested and testable hypotheses, propositions, and theories, not
normative statements. That defense is unwarranted for two reasons. First, as
this book has argued, these authors clearly make normative recommendations
and arguments, which they may claim are derived from empirical propositions
but are frequently asserted not analyzed. Second, their theories of political
economy are faulty and deficient in explaining actual behavior. In this section,
I briefly review some of the difficulties inherent in the conservatives' method.
No major economic theory has proven to have great predictive power, except in terms of general trends. Much of the prestige of economics is based
upon quantification that may or may not have actual empirical reference and
on the afterglow of post-World War II Keynesian successes. Whether talking
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about Smith, Marx, Keynes, or their successors, all leave out significant components of political, social, and economic reality, producing very loose fits between theory and perceptions.
One of the most severe problems is the use of economic models to explain
all political behavior. In the history of political theory, there have been at least
five great patterns of attempts to devalue politics by claiming that it has no
autonomous existence or value, or that it is secondary to or derivative from
some other underlying reality that explains and should guide politics and public
behavior. These include the idea, expressed brilliantly by Plato, that it is possible for a gifted person to have true knowledge of the fundamental structure of
the universe. 'Ilue knowledge gives true virtue, and the person possessing such
knowledge/virtue has an absolute right to rule. Religion may also provide a
fundamental reality, as in St. Augustine's claim that God created government
as a punishment and corrective for sin and in contemporary assertions that
some possess special i_nsight provided by God into politics. Burke emphasized
culture and tradition: the notion that the gradual evolution, adaptation, and
acceptance of customs, usages, and behavior enabled people to overcome their
adversities while demonstrating the limits of political possibility. (Unlike Hayek's tradition-based claims, Burke allowed the possibility of tradition evolving
beyond the current ideal.) Other theorists have claimed psychology is the underlying reality and most severe limit on politics and political theory, as in Robert
Owen's and B. F. Skinner's ideal cooperative communities. The conservative
economists-and Marx-find their fundamental reality in the economic foundation of society. Economic relations, as reflected in the development of spontaneous order, are the fundamental human relations. Politics is secondary and dependent; good government depends upon the reality beyond and behind the
temporary shifts and flows of politics-having the right economic relations.
As with other monocausal explanations, the economic model of politics
lends insight into politics, but it and its behavioral assumptions provide an
insufficient explanation of political behavior and are unable to make politics
an adjunct of economic theory. Economics can benefit political analysis as a
useful model of behavior and/or motivation, as a pattern of analysis, and by
suggesting areas needing more study. However, when used to displace political
analysis, it can narrow and cripple effective understanding of and prescription
for politics. While keeping much of the language of politics-if not political
analysis-the market model changes meaning and content to conform to its
needs. The distinction between politics and economics as means to achieving
functionally different ends is obscured. Thus economics defines the good political order, the problems and legitimate solutions of politics, and the duties of
government; conceives of freedom as competition and the right to use one's
property as one wishes; reduces equality to identical treatment by the law and
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the right to compete; and eliminates concern for inequalities of power and
political stability. The result is to limit government and discredit claims that
government has anything to do with creating the good life.26 In the process,
important issues are relegated to secondary considerations.
The comparison of politics to the market can be relevant in some circumstances but cannot be used to explain all behavior. Smith's invisible hand in
economics is a metaphor-and does not operate in all cases- but t1:e metaphorical element and limited application are missing from the conservative
model. This is how the world operates; there are no exceptions. The metaphor
made concrete is transferred to politics, to prove that an "invisible hand" propels the political market to inevitable failure .2 7 As with voting, it is problematic
how politics is analogous to idealized economic markets. There are no goods
or services for sale. There are no recognized currencies, prices, or legitimate
transactions. Behavior is dependent on institutions 28 and changes from one
forum to another. People and politicians do engage in rational discussion and
analysis which alter and widen their preferences based on evidence and needs
of others. It matters who is in office because their perceptions and preferences
shape what they consider to be a problem, a legitimate demand, or acceptable
policy. Role playing constrains behavior. Political leaders do not and normally
cannot act from naked self-interest but often base their actions on their values
and beliefs about the public interest and sometimes in response to their perceptions of the needs of those who are not organized.29 Unless values are simply
rationalizations of individual self-interest, reflect system needs, or are treated
as psychic income-a largely meaningless concept that cannot be made operational in an empirically relevant sense even within the conservative modelthey must be viewed as real motivations and constraints upon behavior. Indeed, actualization of the conservative model depends upon the reality of values and beliefs as motivation.
The conservatives claim that their economics acknowledges and compensates for irremediable human ignorance. Though occasionally stated in tentative
terms, the resulting political-social recommendations are unequivocal30 and inescapable consequences of their supposedly objective understanding of natural
behavior. This position confuses scientific methodology and analytic principles
with conclusions. Though potentially separate, ethical judgments, methodologies, principles, and policies are mixed together, presenting prescriptive rules
as well as observations. This does not make conservative theory incorrect, but
neither its assumptions nor its political-social conclusions are detached statements about an independently existing reality, neutral and thus exempt from
analysis and criticism.31 More important, many conclusions are not disinterested
deductions but judgments where values and preferences play as crucial a role
as "scientific" facts. An illustration is how decisions are made on the relevant
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costs of an economic policy, whether it is a viable policy, and should it be implemented. Answers depend on shifting conjunctions of possibilities and
desirabilities. There is no rigid distinction between preferences and objectively
derived considerations of feasibility. Evidence is evaluated through the beliefs
and values brought to it. Values and ethics shape what is perceived as evidence.
One provides substance for, interacts with, shapes, and informs the other in
evaluating behavior and institutions.32
For example, even if democracies and democratic governments operate as
claimed, that does not automatically warrant the conservatives' limiting conclusions. It is a matter of judgment to determine the goals, trade-offs, and the
values that are promoted by such systems. It is credible that citizen passivity
following from conservatives' recommendations outweighs the damage claimed
from excessive participation. Whether or not this is correct (though I believe it
is), whether or not democracies are performing as they should, are conclusions
that cannot be deduced from claims about inevitability, objectivity, neutrality,
efficiency, and methodology. These conclusions must be weighed, balanced, and
analyzed in light of all relevant purposes and data. Messy facts about how people actually behave cannot be dismissed as inconsistent with underlying theory
while that theory is employed as an objectively correct analysis and prescription.
Normative political theorizing is an honorable, ancient, and necessary
activity. Conservative economists have a potentially significant contribution
to make to an unending debate. They cannot, however, disguise their participation with the claim-along with Marx-that they have an objective, value-free
comprehension of reality that gives them an exact understanding of politics.
Although that is a good ideological argument, it is neither philosophy nor
science.
Despite Hayek's and occasionally Buchanan's criticism of constructivism
and their shared concern for observation and evolution, conservative political economy is a rationalist construction, emphasizing logical consistency33
and imposed upon reality. Observation and behavior are to conform to already accepted principles. These authors define behavior, institutions, and
values, deduce logical results from them, and insist that they have discovered
an accurate explanation of behavior and a basis for prescription . Missing observations are supplied by hypothesis and then assumed to fit reality because
they conform to underlying postulates, which in turn are used to evaluate
behavior. Research presupposes the validity of starting assumptions and is
frequently dedicated to finding evidence to support them. Phenomena-such
as increased productivity due to wage security, expansion of the American
economy under government direction during World War II, firms that do not
maximize profits, seemingly altruistic behavior, or noncoercive constraints on
freedom-that do not conform to assumptions are ignored, explained away,
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or contorted to fit the conservative model, as in the use of self-interest to explain all behavior.
The outcome when applied to politics and society is a long chain of deductive
reasoning, producing a deterministic, untestable-including starting assumptions, definition of human nature, political values, and deductive policy conclusions3'L nonempirical system in which causation is casually asserted.35 Many political and social statements are true by definition and therefore immune to empirical refutation, counter factual evidence, or falsification. Contrary examples
cannot invalidate the theory or basic assumptions, such as government failure .
This applies to the self-interest postulate. These authors are not saying that
they have examined all behavior and found it to be self-interested. Rather,
they define all behavior as self-interested and the market as the only institution
capable of containing self-interest. People necessarily desire their own selfinterest, a proposition that cannot be disputed on empirical grounds. Therefore everything they do is to benefit themselves. From this, it is a logical deduction that if people are allowed (free) to seek their self-interest, they will do
so, leading to the politically charged conclusion that losers deserve no special
help and everything that governments attempt is for purposes of self-interest, ensuring its failure. Conversely, if the market is the only institution able to contain
and turn this natural propensity to good results, the market is natural. As both
a valuable and natural institution, it is insusceptible to rational intervention.

Conservative Political Economy as Theology
From the conservative point of view, it does not matter that so much is missing from this market model. It serves roles other than completeness. Despite
its claims, the political and philosophical economy of conservative theory is
not scientific in the sense of only offering hypotheses for examination. As with
Marx,36 it is a system to be accepted as a whole Truth-a life philosophy that
does not respond or change under the pressure of events but serves to rationalize, explain, and guide them.
Ideologies fill many of the same emotional and psychological needs as
religion. They are widely accepted because of their emotive ideas, vision, hope
of a better life, messianic zeal, or promise of participation in creating a superior
world. Theological truths aside, religions supply their adherents with an inclusive belief system that depicts how the world operates, their place within
it, and a code of behavior. Conservative political economy provides these
elements for those who believe and accept. It is a powerful, self-contained,
natural-law-based belief system that functions like a religion. Gilder recognizes
this, and Buchanan's references to the "Old-Time Fiscal Religion" express deeply
held convictions on moral propriety.37
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Comparing conservative political economy with the sociological functions
of religion illustrates its normative content and impact. Its picture of evolution
explains the world-past, present and, future-and integrates it into the self
seeking its own ends. All behavior is understandable and evaluated from within
the system. It contains a crude eschatology, a theory of human nature, an
autonomous morality, an explanation of the sources of corruption, a demonology (Keynes and intervention), dualism, a promise of justice, rewards for
following fundamental rules, and punishment for violating them. In explaining man's role and place in the world and the individual's relation to the group,
it assures people that they are rewarded according to their intrinsic worth as
determined by impersonal, transindividual rules in the market. As in all great
systems of natural law, these rules have universal application, derive from human nature, are independent of any specific person or group, and guide people to proper conduct and a better life. In this way, conservative political
economy explains the world, and the world explained justifies the theory, making it into an explanation of social reality and a call to transform the world.
Spontaneous order fully expresses this autonomous, automatic system. This
notion captures all the dualistic mystery in the theology of conservative political economy: independence and simultaneous interdependence of individuals
and groups; harmony and conflict; selfish impulses transfigured into cooperative
behavior and benefits for others; an order apart from men yet immanent;
freedom coupled with determinism; explanation of success and failure; reward
and punishment; and the promise of a system that is separate from individual
will yet operates for the best without intervention or even understanding.
Dualism divides the world into the good and bad, the elect and the damned,
based upon acceptance or rejection of the mysteries of spontaneous order.
Though beyond direct human control, the invisible hand of spontaneous order
overcomes human weakness and ignorance to guide behavior.
This order promises earthly salvation and threat:ens punishment. Rewards and
punishments are determined by conduct. Those who patiently follow the
natural competitive rules and prohibitions of the spontaneous order/market
will be rewarded with as much of the good they seek as is possible given their
worth. Though corrupt, self-interested people will not fill every want, they
are assured by the very nature of this autonomous system that their individual
rewards are as large as they can possibly be. Conservative economics promises
more than material goods but assures that one's behavior is in conformity with
higher standards. Although individuals may do quite well from government
intervention, the conservatives believe that they are being false to their real
interests; that they rob those who live by the market code; and that, in the
aggregate, society cannot survive if people act in this way. Nations failing to
follow the system's oughts and those who place human will and willfulness
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ahead of system morality and maintenance are automatically punished by the
system itself. Intervention-putting human pride and individual morality above
the impersonal yet just and universal rules of the market-destroys its delicate
equilibrium, penalizing violators with poverty, economic and social failure, injustice, and public strife.
Existing reality and behavior are viewed as intolerable and in need of transformation. The political world is flawed and corrupt for not adhering to conservative theory. Fallen man is Keynesian man . Overweening pride in human
ability to overcome inherent ignorance and learn enough about politicaleconomic relations to improve society successfully is the corruption that has
crippled natural market relations. Evil enters the market world when mutable
men act on the debased constructivist notion that they can overcome the limits
of their own natures-limits which are accommodated only within the rules
of the market. Secular salvation requires repentance: abandonment of the
original sin of human pride and a return to an earlier state of grace when people recognized and lived by revealed economic truth. Accepting the necessity
of giving oneself up to the market order, rather than rebelling through intervention, is the key to proper living. Only acceptance ensures efficiency and
the creation of a correct order, one that reflects the conservatives' perception
of human nature.
Part of the appeal of conservative political theology is its claim to -eransce-nd
both politics and the need t:o choose proper conduct. Real-world politics involves ambiguity, conflict, compromise, and uncertainty. Conservative political economy
is an antipolitical search for a final answer that will overcome ambiguity and
doubt. While emphasizing human ignorance, these authors claim to have
discovered a fundamental truth to guide politics, reduce the impact of ignorance and pride, and give a pattern to human lives. That truth developed in
and is revealed by the operation of the spontaneous market order. When accepted, it produces harmony, order, and certainty in the correctness of actions.
Politics, on the other hand, inculcates temptation to interfere in this natural
order. It may express an inherent human urge to pursue self-interest, but it
also frees men from the market constraints which limit the harmful impact
of self-interested impulses. As such, the market order is the answer to the problems people foolishly seek to address through politics and is the most effective
limit on the use of power. Being attendants of truth, these economists do not
wish to accommodate the passions to which fullen, political man is prey, or
to find ways to meet popular hopes and demands, but to limit harmful and
destructive passions by holding people to the realization of market truth.
How should people relate to one another? The needs of system maintenance answer that perennial and vexing question. The market has the character
of a mcral absolute. People who follow market rules are relieved of responsibility

Conclusions

207

for everything except narrow personal relations. The system itself provides the
answer for disturbing questions of justice, proper distribution, and correct relations: namely, to follow self-interest within the framework of the spontaneous
market order. In guiding self-interest, the system guides and constrains behavior, determining what people owe to one another while providing ultimate
harmony. One's highest duty is to pursue self-interest. Following that natural
impulse within the rules of the transcending market purifies self-centered action into benefits for others. Altruism and deliberate efforts to help others
through political action, however, are punished with ruinous failure when selfinterest inevitably corrupts them.
An act offaith, or what George Gilder refers to as "faith ... in the compensatory logic of the cosmos,"38 underpins the beliefs that the market system
is harmonious, autonomous, and just; that people deserve what they get and
can do no better; that they must accept their place within the spontaneous
order because that order reflects the fundamental reality of which they are a
part; that economic competition is the only legitimate way to gain; and that
those who have much have succeeded through their own efforts and factors
which no person controls.
This political economy is riddled with acts of faith masquerading as scientific principles. One of the most basic is that the market can accommodate
all changes. Of course this is true, but it is the truth of which all tautologies
partake. It is true by definition, if people accept their fate and do not interfere
in the natural spontaneous order. It is the truth of the medieval peasant faced
with war or a sick person who lacks medical care-events will take their course,
and everything will work out for the best. Real hardships, the rise and fall of
nations and of men, and the impact on people who bear the costs are ignored.
Conservative faith insists these costs must be slighted, or else the faith will be
compromised and people will believe that they can do something through intervention, leading again to a fall from grace.
Emphasis on the long run parallels this secular salvation. Eventually the
forces of spontaneous order will produce the optimum outcome. Though this
cannot be proven, and indeed empirical proof is probably impossible, it is an
article of faith. People will be saved (though this refers to society, not individuals) if they are patient, believe, and follow the market's just and spontaneous
rules without complaint. But if people are as self-seeking as these theorists
claim, this demand reduces to a moral appeal for which their model allows
no room.
The religious nature of this argument is apparent from its appeals to a power
greater than men: inevitability, the inexorable working-out of political-economic
relations, and inescapable conclusions. As an ideological faith, there is no way
to challenge these arguments. They are more akin to faith healing than science.
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When it "works"-and whatever happens is what works-adherents take that
as a sign of grace and believe even more strongly. When it fails-when what
occurs is not as adherents hope-that is a sign of human failure. People did
not believe strongly enough, or unregenerate man refused to accept that spontaneous order will reassert itself, or tampering with the conservative version
of evolution upset the delicate, natural adjustment mechanism. In any case,
there is always an external cause why things have not worked according to the
theory. There is never any internal problem, never any accommodation of
theory to the reality of popular government, labor unions, private power, sticky
wages, social stability, and large-scale production. Solutions require radical, external changes to conform the world to the system's assumptions and conclusions. Faith, however, may offer insights into the human condition, but it is
not enough to guide the destiny of great nations. Though great nations need
a belief system to order and make sense of experience, conservative political
economy fulls short in its attempts to provide that system.
Conclusions
There are at least two fundamental critiques of conservative political economy.
The first is broadly economic: The market model is an inaccurate and incomplete representation of reality, making it a poor basis for and justification of
public policy. Keynes epitomized this argument for liberals when he claimed
that classical theory assumes political and economic characteristics that "happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with
the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply
it to the facts of experience." Such theory "follows not from the actual facts,
but from an incomplete hypothesis introduced for the sake of simplicity."39
Keynes and other liberals deny that the economic system is autonomous or
self-regulating in the way claimed by the conservatives and assert that exclusive
emphasis on private gain is unlikely to achieve either efficiency, satisfaction,
or national safety. They also believe that common interest exists and that public policy may sometimes be employed to achieve it. This ensures a positive
role for government while still mistrusting government.
The second critique, and the one this book examines, is that as a normative political theory, the conservative model is inadequate to fulfill its political aspirations. Conservative political economy attempts to employ economic concepts to monopolize political debate. Even if the economic theory
is acceptable and even though its criticisms of democracy and politics are
sometimes accurate, that does not automatically or necessarily validate its
political theory or its radical reconstruction of political values and institutions.
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Though this theory takes up deep problems in both the domestic and international political economy-indeed, much of its popularity must be attributed
to its pledge to remedy current maladies-the deductive, definitional conservative model is not a solution to these difficulties. Because societies as a whole
rarely die, it is often impossible to prove whether a theory is successful or not,
but one can see if it addresses relevant problems. Conservative theory defines
away many perceived problems. Issues such as private power and popular discontent should not exist and under the proper economy will not exist; therefore, policy advice need not be concerned with them. The theory is too simple, too monocausal, ignoring both real complexities of everyday life and its
own extremely high social costs. It elevates a narrow range of economic concepts such as economic order, efficiency, and competition from an instrumental relation to freedom, equality, democracy, and justice into primary
values. In the process, it narrows, downgrades, and subordinates these traditional ends, emptying out much of the content and meaning that has attached
to them over the last two hundred years, weakening their legitimacy, making
them dependent on economic success, and undermining the basis for liberal
democracy.
This is an old issue, reenacted in a less conspicuously political form between Malthus and Ricardo and their critics, including the Owenite socialists
and the Chartists; between social Darwinism and its critics, including populism
and the social gospel movement; and neoclassical economics and Keynesianism
in the 1930s. Though the exact terms of this debate have changed from one
period to the next, the metaphysics have remained remarkably constant. Differences are as much philosophical as empirical. It is a debate over the nature
of economic and political reality, rival views of the nature of order, and acceptable models and procedures in science. In its claim to possess correct answers
to perennial political questions, conservative political economy raises many
unavoidable normative issues: human motivation; proper conduct; limits of
human possibility; relevant time frames when prescribing for society; the meaning and arena of freedom; the nature of community; the relation of individual
and community; proper social and political goals; standards for determining
goals; the nature, meaning, and location of power; and whether social systems
are created or discovered or both.
These are not scientific questions, but they are the questions that political
and social theories must ceaselessly explore. There is no single answer to any
of them, just varying patterns of attempts to find an answer in which policies
change in order to fulfill basic principles in altered circumstances. Conservative
theory is not, however, content to explore these but insists it has absolutely
correct answers. The claim is not methodologically wrong, but the answers
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exclude a large part of experience. The naturalness of the spontaneous order,
whose premises are to be followed, not contested, terminates debate. When
alternatives are impossible, it is futile to search for them . People experiencing
distress will not turn to the political system for relief if they are convinced that
their problems are natural or are the result of forces and arrangements over
which no one has control, or that public action must fail . Even if dissatisfied,
they will accept their fate. As with Orwell's "newspeak," the conservative view
shrinks possibilities, cuts off options to the future, and ends the search for
other arrangements. Without the belief that alternatives are available, neither
the concept of nor desire for intervention can exist. If for some perverse reason
it remains, it will be seen as unnatural, irrational, and illegitimate.
What is to be made of the conservative argument? These theorists raise
serious questions about politics and public policy. They express the anguish
and despair of people faced with the dislocations and uncertainty of our times
but do not offer answers that include all problems or all actors. Conservative
theory is an escape from real predicaments into a world where there will be
neither public issues, public moral dilemmas, nor the perennial political problem of how to govern. Given the probable political ramifications of this economic model, we must ask for more. The issue extends beyond economics
and is more than a contest for the soul of economic man . It also determines
the activities of the citizen and the shape, direction, and guiding philosophy
of politics. Though disguised as economics, this is a political question. This
is political philosophy.
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Court, 1975), p. 210; idem, Adam Smith's Relevance, p. 15; Friedman, Essays, p. 271.
See also Friedman, Capitalism and Freetrom, p. 38.
59. Joseph J. Spengler, "The Problem of Order in Economic Affairs," Southern
Economic Journal 15 (1948) : 15; Buchanan, What Should Economists Do? pp. 81, 282.
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65. In connoting what is desirable, "efficiency'' requires a criterion and is itself a
normative concept-i.e., efficiency in terms of a goal or purpose.
66. With some notable exceptions. Cf. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Market as
Prison," Journal Of Politics 44 (1982):324-36; C. B. Macpherson, Democmtic Theory:
Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 185-94; idem, "The Economic
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politics, and ethics into one analysis dominated by the market model; see 1:4.
71. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3:151; Buchanan, What Should Economists Do? p. 241.
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Pamphlet no. 29 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 2; idem, Road to
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Court, 1975), pp. 187-96, 229-32; Friedman and Friedman, Tyranny, pp. 137-41.
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It's difficult to overstate the impact of conservative economics on
American life. The conservative thought of economists like Milton
Friedman.James Buchanan, and Friedrich Hayek has provided the
conceptual framework that undergirds nearly every aspect of
current U.S. social-economic policy.Although a great deal has been
written about the economic theories of these Nobel Prize-winning
economists, this study is the first to examine the political theory
that underlies conservative economics and its implications for
public policy.
"Neither a celebration of nor a polemic against conservative
economists,Waligorski's study is sensible, perceptive, deep, and
judicious. It should appeal to a wide range of economists and
other social scientists interested in political and policy issues."
-Warren J. Samuels, author of Institutional Economics
"Deftly blends theoretical and practical concerns while elaborating,
synthesizing, and criticizing the principles that inspire contemporary partisans of laissez-faire."-Review of Politics
"There can be no doubt that this is a very good book, comprehensive in its thematic coverage and incisive in its critique."-Ethics
"Even those who resist the book's conclusions will find this an
intelligent analysis of the connection between how we think about
political economy and the way that thinking governs our political
aspirations."-Journal of Politics
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